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International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security

ASIACRYPT 1996: Advances in Cryptology — ASIACRYPT '96 pp 286–300Cite as

“Indirect discourse proofs”: Achieving efficient Fair Off-Line e-cash

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Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNCS,volume 1163))

Abstract

Cryptography has been instrumental in reducing the involvement of over-head third parties in protocols. For example; a digital signature scheme assures a recipient that a judge who is not present at message transmission will nevertheless approve the validity of the signature. Similarly, in off-line electronic cash the bank (which is off-line during a purchase) is assured that if a user double spends he will be traced.

Here we suggest the notion of Indirect Discourse Proofs with which one can prove indirectly yet efficiently that a third party has a certain future capability (i.e., assure Trustees can trace). The efficient proofs presented here employ algebraic properties of exponentiation (or functions of similar homomorphic nature).

Employing this idea we present the concept of “Fair Off-Line e-Cash” (FOLC) system which enables tracing protocols for identifying either the coin or its owner. Recently, the need to trace and identify coins with owners/withdrawals was identified (to avoid blackmailing and money laundering). Previous solutions that assured this traceability (called fair e-cash as they balance the need for anonymity and the prevention of criminal activities) involved third parties at money withdrawals. In contrast, FOLC keeps any third party uninvolved, thus it is “fully off-line e-cash” even when law enforcement is added (i.e., it is off-line w.r.t. law enforcement at withdrawals and off-line w.r.t. the bank at payments).

This work was performed under U.S. Department of Energy contract number DE-AC04-94AL85000.

This author's research was partially funded by GTE Laboratories Incorporated, Waltham MA.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Sandia National Laboratories, 1515 Eubank SE, 87123, Albquerque, New Mexico

    Yair Frankel

  2. College of Computer Science, Northeastern University, 161 Cullinane Hall, 02115, Boston, Massachusetts

    Yiannis Tsiounis

  3. IBM T.J. Watson Research Center, USA

    Moti Yung

Authors
  1. Yair Frankel
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  2. Yiannis Tsiounis
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  3. Moti Yung
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Editor information

Kwangjo Kim Tsutomu Matsumoto

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© 1996 Springer-Verlag

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Frankel, Y., Tsiounis, Y., Yung, M. (1996). “Indirect discourse proofs”: Achieving efficient Fair Off-Line e-cash. In: Kim, K., Matsumoto, T. (eds) Advances in Cryptology — ASIACRYPT '96. ASIACRYPT 1996. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 1163. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/BFb0034855

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BFb0034855

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-61872-0

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-70707-3

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