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Pacific Rim International Conference on Artificial Intelligence

PRICAI 1998: PRICAI’98: Topics in Artificial Intelligence pp 542–552Cite as

Logical fiction: Real vs. ideal

  • Foundation of AI
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Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNAI,volume 1531))

Abstract

Formal systems for knowledge and belief, from Lemmon13 and Hintikka11 to present day Belief Revision systems5, have often been described as models of “ideal rational agents.” From the first, there has been extensive controversy about the validity of the models. 12, 14, 18 A series of topics have given focus to the controversy. They include distinguishing knowing from believing, formalising positive and negative introspection, omniscience of various kinds, the contrast between finite and infinite, and contradictory belief. We consider the extent to which a range of formal models of knowledge and belief are reasonable and realistic. We conclude with comments on the persistence of unreal models and the lack of discussion of their structure.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy, University of Auckland, Auckland, New zealand

    Roderic A. Girle

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  1. Roderic A. Girle
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Hing-Yan Lee Hiroshi Motoda

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© 1998 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Girle, R.A. (1998). Logical fiction: Real vs. ideal. In: Lee, HY., Motoda, H. (eds) PRICAI’98: Topics in Artificial Intelligence. PRICAI 1998. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 1531. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg . https://doi.org/10.1007/BFb0095299

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BFb0095299

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-65271-7

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-49461-4

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