

## Cryptanalysis of Triple Modes of Operation\*

Eli Biham

Computer Science Department,  
Technion – Israel Institute of Technology,  
Haifa 32000, Israel  
biham@cs.technion.ac.il  
WWW: <http://www.cs.technion.ac.il/~biham/>

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**Abstract.** Multiple modes of operation and, in particular, triple modes of operation were proposed as a simple method to improve the strength of blockciphers, and in particular of DES. Developments in the cryptanalysis of DES in recent years have popularized the triple modes of DES, and such modes are now considered for ANSI standards.

In a previous paper we analyzed multiple modes of operation and showed that the security of many multiple modes is significantly smaller than expected. In this paper we extend these results, with new cryptanalytic techniques, and show that all the (cascaded) triple modes of operation are not much more secure than a single encryption—in the case of DES they can be attacked with up to an order of  $2^{56}-2^{66}$  chosen plaintexts or ciphertexts and complexity of analysis. We then propose several candidates for more secure modes.

**Key words.** Triple modes of operation, Cryptanalysis, Multiple encryption, Blockciphers, DES.

### 1. Introduction

Since the introduction of DES [21], and its modes of operation [22], many methods to improve its strength have been proposed including [3], [10], [18], and others. The most popular of these methods is multiple modes of operation, and, in particular, triple modes of operation. These modes were believed [17], [16] to be as strong as triple DES against all kinds of attacks [8], [20], [7], [23], [4]. Such modes were recently discussed toward acceptance as ANSI standards [1], [2].

In [5] we have shown that the strength of many multiple modes is comparable with a single encryption. For the analysis we denoted the complexity  $t$  of an attack as the maximal number of known/chosen plaintexts or ciphertexts, number of memory cells,

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and number of steps of analysis. This measure assumes that the number of steps of analysis, known/chosen plaintexts and ciphertexts, and memory cells are comparable.<sup>1</sup> We considered only multiple modes, namely, cascaded (pipelined) modes in which the plaintext is encrypted under a single mode at a time, whose output becomes the input to the next single mode. For example, outer feedback modes of triple DES were viewed as single modes whose underlying cipher is triple DES. Inner feedback modes were viewed as multiple modes, thus as cascades of several modes whose underlying cipher is single DES.<sup>2</sup> Finally we conjectured that designers should prefer using outer feedback modes over inner feedback modes (multiple modes).

In this paper we go one step further. We develop additional cryptanalytic techniques to attack multiple (cascaded) modes, and show that all the double modes and all the triple modes of DES, except the triple ECB mode, are not much more secure than a single encryption against finding their keys. These techniques use known plaintext, chosen plaintext, or chosen ciphertext attacks. Only a handful of these techniques require more demanding attacks (such as adaptive attacks or known initial value attacks) to find the complete key. If we also consider the dictionary attack against the triple ECB mode (in which case the key remains unknown, but the attacker can encrypt and decrypt under the unknown key using  $2^{64}$  known plaintexts), all the triple modes are considered not much more secure than a single encryption.

All the attacks on all the modes we describe in this paper exhaustively search for the key of one single-mode component at a time using information obtained by the various techniques, and do not assume any special assumptions on the internals of the underlying blockciphers. In particular (unlike in [5]), all these attacks do not use differential cryptanalysis [8], linear cryptanalysis [20], nor other kinds of attacks based on the internals of the ciphers [4], [7]. Therefore, all the attacks are applicable to any blockcipher, and their complexity depends only on the block size and the key size.

Our results led us to develop new noncascaded modes of operation, which are more secure than the cascaded triple modes, easily pipelinable, and do not require more applications of the underlying cipher than the triple modes. We also propose easily pipelinable modes using four applications of single modes. Some of these proposed modes contradict the advice given by our conjecture from [5], mentioned above, that outer feedback modes are preferable to inner feedback modes.

This paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we describe our novel techniques. In Section 3 we elaborate some more information on some of the more complicated attacks on specific modes. In Section 4 we propose new candidates for more secure (pipelinable) modes of operation. Section 5 describes the modes considered by ANSI. Section 6 summarizes the paper. Finally, we enclose an appendix in which we give brief

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<sup>1</sup> Note that in practice some implementors might prefer to implement attacks which have higher complexities than the optimal attacks, in order to reduce the number of required plaintexts and ciphertexts and the memory size for the price of increasing the complexity of analysis. For example, the attacks of differential cryptanalysis [8] and linear cryptanalysis [20] of DES have complexities  $2^{47}$  and  $2^{43}$ , respectively, but they require a large number of chosen or known plaintexts. Attackers might prefer to attack DES by Wiener's search machine [23] whose attacking complexity is  $2^{56}$ , but which can find a single-DES key in 3.5 hours in average, with only a small memory and one plaintext/ciphertext pair.

<sup>2</sup> Note that many other combined (noncascaded) modes cannot be denoted by our notations.

hints on the techniques of the attacks on each of the single, double, and triple (cascaded) modes of DES, and their complexities.

## 2. Novel Techniques


In this section we describe very powerful novel techniques for analyzing multiple modes of operation. They require an order of  $2^{65}-2^{67}$  chosen plaintexts. Note that although  $2^{65}-2^{67}$  chosen plaintexts are more than the number of possible one-block plaintexts, encryption of multiple modes results with more than  $2^{64}$  distinct plaintext/ciphertext pairs, since the internal feedbacks add memory to the encryption process, and the ciphertext is a function of the plaintext and of the feedbacks.

### 2.1. Technique G

The techniques in [5] which do not use any information on the internals of the underlying blockcipher, i.e., exhaustive search and the birthday techniques, can only attack modes whose plaintexts or ciphertexts are the actual inputs or outputs of some encryption box. This novel technique overcomes this difficulty, and enables us to attack modes whose plaintext and ciphertext are mixed with some unknown feedback, or do not affect the encryption box at all. This technique is later used as a building block by the techniques described afterward.

We describe this technique on two examples: the double mode CBC|OFB and on the triple mode ECB|ECB|OFB.

The attack on the ECB|ECB|OFB (see Fig. 1) is as follows: At the first stage of the attack, we cannot hope to attack the ECB modes, since the OFB mode hides the information required for the meet-in-the-middle attack [15, p. 83] on the double-ECB



**Fig. 1.** The triple mode: ECB|ECB|OFB.

mode. Thus, we attack the OFB mode. We choose some arbitrary (one-block) value  $A$ , and ask for the ciphertext of  $2^{64}$  consecutive plaintext blocks  $A$ , followed by a few blocks with distinct values. The period of the OFB is at most  $2^{64}$ , and thus the period can be identified from the ciphertext.

Assume that  $A' = E_{K_2}(E_{K_1}(A))$  and assume that the OFB stream is  $v_0, v_1, \dots, v_{2^{64}-1}$ . Then the received ciphertext is  $v_0 \oplus A', v_1 \oplus A', \dots, v_{2^{64}-1} \oplus A'$  followed by a few other blocks. From the ciphertexts we can compute the differences of consecutive OFB blocks  $v_0 \oplus v_1, v_1 \oplus v_2, \dots, v_{2^{64}-2} \oplus v_{2^{64}-1}$ .

We now guess an arbitrary value  $u_0$  to appear as one of the  $v_i$ 's in the cycle of the OFB stream. We exhaustively encrypt  $u_0$  under all the possible keys  $K$ , and get  $u_1 = E_K(u_0)$ , and  $u_2 = E_K(u_1)$ , and compute the differences  $u_0 \oplus u_1$  and  $u_1 \oplus u_2$ . If these two values do not appear as two consecutive values in the differences  $v_0 \oplus v_1, v_1 \oplus v_2, \dots, v_{2^{64}-2} \oplus v_{2^{64}-1}$ , then the key  $K$  is not the key or  $u_0$  is not in the OFB cycle. If all the keys do not pass this test for a particular  $u_0$ , then certainly  $u_0$  is not in the cycle, and we should try another one. In average we need to try about  $2^{64}/\text{period}(\text{OFB})$   $u_0$ 's, which is expected to be small, since the period of the OFB mode is expected to be about  $2^{64}$  (see [13]).

Once we found matching  $u_0$  and  $K$ , such that  $u_0 \oplus u_1 = v_i \oplus v_{i+1}$  and  $u_1 \oplus u_2 = v_{i+1} \oplus v_{i+2}$ , we assume that we found the key  $K_3 = K$ , and conclude that  $u_0 = v_i$ ,  $u_1 = v_{i+1}$ ,  $u_2 = v_{i+2}$ , and identify  $A'$  and all the OFB cycle, including the initial value. After peeling up the OFB mode, we remain with a few distinct double-ECB encryptions, which can be attacked by the meet-in-the-middle attack [15].

The attack on the CBC|OFB mode (see Fig. 2) is slightly more complex. We choose two block values  $A$  and  $B$ , and choose the ciphertext as  $2^{64}$  blocks  $A$  followed by  $2^{64}$  blocks  $B$ . Since the period  $p$  of the OFB mode is at most  $2^{64}$ , it can be identified from the plaintext. Thus, we obtain  $A \oplus v_0, A \oplus v_1, \dots, A \oplus v_{2^{64}-1}, B \oplus v_{2^{64}}, B \oplus v_{2^{64}+1}, \dots, B \oplus v_{2^{65}-1}$  as the output of the CBC mode, and  $P_0 \oplus IV_1, P_1 \oplus A \oplus v_0, P_2 \oplus A \oplus v_1, \dots, P_{2^{64}-1} \oplus A \oplus v_{2^{64}-2}, P_{2^{64}} \oplus A \oplus v_{2^{64}-1}, P_{2^{64}+1} \oplus B \oplus v_{2^{64}}, P_{2^{64}+2} \oplus B \oplus v_{2^{64}+1}, \dots, P_{2^{65}-1} \oplus B \oplus v_{2^{65}-2}$  as the input of the encryption box of the CBC mode. Since the period




Fig. 2. The double mode: CBC|OFB.

$p \leq 2^{64}$ , we can eliminate the unknown  $v_i$ 's by computing differences between the cycle in the first half of the data and the cycle in the second half of the data, and get  $A \oplus B$  as the difference of all the output pairs of corresponding blocks  $0 < i < 2^{64} < j < 2^{65}$  (where  $p$  divides  $j - i$  and  $v_j = v_i$ ), and  $(P_j \oplus B \oplus v_{j-1}) \oplus (P_i \oplus A \oplus v_{i-1}) = P_j \oplus P_i \oplus A \oplus B$  as the difference of the inputs of the encryption box.

We received *period(OFB)* input differences, all of whose output differences are the same  $A \oplus B$ . We guess some value  $u_0$  to be any one of the output block values of the CBC mode, compute its counterpart  $u'_0 = u_0 \oplus A \oplus B$ , and try exhaustively all possible keys  $K$ . By the equation

$$D_K(u_0) \oplus D_K(u'_0) = P_j \oplus P_i \oplus A \oplus B, \quad (1)$$

we get the value of  $P_i \oplus P_j$ , where  $i$  and  $j$  satisfy the above conditions, but are still unknown. We identify  $i$  and  $j$  using a hash table on the values of  $P_i \oplus P_j$ . Then we verify that the  $K$ ,  $i$ , and  $j$  also satisfy the differences of the next block

$$E_K(u_0 \oplus P_{i+1}) \oplus E_K(u'_0 \oplus P_{j+1}) = A \oplus B \quad (2)$$

(or, to improve performance, verify that it satisfies either (2) or  $E_K(u'_0 \oplus P_{i+1}) \oplus E_K(u_0 \oplus P_{j+1}) = A \oplus B$ , due to the symmetry of (1)). Again, only a small number of guesses for  $u_0$  is required in order to find the key of the CBC mode and the initial value.

## 2.2. Technique H

This technique is the most sophisticated technique so far, and it allows us to attack most of the modes that could not be attacked with simpler techniques. It is particularly suitable to attack modes with both feedbackward and feedforward feedbacks, which hide both the input of the first encryption box and the output of the last encryption box from the attacker.

We describe the application of this technique to the CBC|ECB|CBC<sup>-1</sup> mode, shown in Fig. 3 (which was conjectured in [16] to be the strongest triple mode). In this mode, we denote the intermediate values between the plaintext, the encryption boxes, and the ciphertext by  $w_i$ ,  $x_i$ ,  $y_i$ , and  $z_i$  as is shown in the figure.

We choose some arbitrary (single-block) value  $S$ , and request the ciphertext of  $2^{66}$  tuples of the form  $(R_i, S, S, S)$ , where the  $R_i$ 's are chosen at random. We denote these  $4 \cdot 2^{66}$  plaintext blocks by  $P_1, P_2, \dots, P_{2^{68}}$ , and their values are given by


$$P_{4i-3} = R_i, \quad P_{4i-2} = S, \quad P_{4i-1} = S, \quad P_{4i} = S \quad (1 \leq i \leq 2^{66}).$$

After encrypting the plaintext, the attacker gets the  $2^{68}$  ciphertext blocks  $C_1, C_2, \dots, C_{2^{68}}$ .

We denote the equivalence set of all the (indices of the) tuples whose last three ciphertext blocks are the same as those of a given tuple by

$$\theta(i) = \{j | (C_{4j-2}, C_{4j-1}, C_{4j}) = (C_{4i-2}, C_{4i-1}, C_{4i})\}.$$

We further denote  $i \equiv j$  if  $j \in \theta(i)$  (and necessarily  $i \in \theta(j)$  and  $\theta(i) = \theta(j)$ ). It is expected that the last three blocks of all the tuples in  $\theta(i)$  (including  $i \in \theta(i)$ ) are the



**Fig. 3.** The triple mode: CBC|ECB|CBC<sup>-1</sup>.

same in the plaintext and the ciphertext. Also the intermediate values ( $w, x, y, z$ ) have the same property (i.e., if  $i \equiv j$ , then  $(x_{4j-2}, x_{4j-1}, x_{4j}) = (x_{4i-2}, x_{4i-1}, x_{4i})$ , etc.). The probability that there are some  $i$  and  $j$  for which it does not hold is negligible.

We concentrate on some  $i \equiv j$  ( $i, j > 1$ ). For such  $i$  and  $j$ ,  $x_{4i-3} = x_{4j-3}$ , and thus  $w_{4i-3} = w_{4j-3}$ . However, for any  $k$ ,  $x_{4k-4} \oplus P_{4k-3} = w_{4k-3}$ , and therefore we get differences between the unknown intermediate values  $x$ :

$$x_{4i-4} \oplus x_{4j-4} = P_{4i-3} \oplus P_{4j-3} = R_i \oplus R_j.$$

Similarly, we get differences between the unknown intermediate values  $y$ :

$$y_{4i-4} \oplus y_{4j-4} = C_{4i-3} \oplus C_{4j-3}.$$

Note that from this single equivalence set we got several differences, since for any  $j, k \in \theta(i)$  we found the difference  $x_{4j-4} \oplus x_{4k-4}$ , and the tuples of the  $(4j-4)$ th and the  $(4k-4)$ th blocks belong to different equivalence sets. Each equivalence set in our  $2^{66}$  tuples contains on average four tuples, and thus from each equivalence set we get on average differences between 16 elements of the  $x$ 's. By computing the equivalence sets of all the tuples following those for which we know these differences (e.g.,  $\theta(l)$  where the difference of  $x_{4l-4}$  with some other values is already known), and computing the differences for the larger sets, we extend the set of  $x$ 's for which the differences are known by a factor of about  $(16-4) \cdot 3 \cdot 4 = 144$ . After several iterations, the size of this set grows to include all (or almost all) the tuples in the data.

Therefore, after completing the above analysis, we can compute  $x_{4i} \oplus x_{4j}$  and  $y_{4i} \oplus y_{4j}$  for any  $i$  and  $j$ . Alternatively, we can write

$$\begin{aligned} x_{4i} &= X \oplus u_{4i}, \\ y_{4i} &= Y \oplus v_{4i}, \end{aligned}$$

where  $u_{4i} = x_{4i} \oplus x_4$  and  $v_{4i} = y_{4i} \oplus y_4$  are known, and where only  $X = x_4$  and  $Y = y_4$  are unknown.

Till now we did not use all the three plaintext blocks  $S$  in the tuples efficiently, since if we would have only two such blocks in each tuple, the probabilities for mistakes in the predictions of the equivalences would still be very low. The reason for the extra block  $S$  is to find differences of two consecutive blocks, while till now we know only the differences of blocks whose indices are multiples of four. Since we need only two consecutive ciphertext blocks whose plaintexts are  $S$  in order to conclude equivalence of two tuples, we can now do it not only on the full tuples, but also shifted by one block, e.g., to compare the second and third blocks inside the tuples to the third and fourth in another tuple, by searching for each  $i$ , some  $j$  for which

$$(C_{4i-2}, C_{4i-1}) = (C_{4j-1}, C_{4j}),$$

and for each such equality concluding that  $x_{4i-1} = x_{4j}$  and  $y_{4i-1} = y_{4j}$ , and thus also

$$u_{4i-1} = u_{4j} \quad \text{and} \quad v_{4i-1} = v_{4j}.$$

We got about  $2^{66}$  pairs of blocks  $(4i-1, 4i)$  for which we know  $x_{4i-1} \oplus x_{4i} = u_{4i-1} \oplus u_{4i}$  and  $y_{4i-1} \oplus y_{4i} = v_{4i-1} \oplus v_{4i}$ . The encryption equations

$$\begin{aligned} E_{K_1}(P_{4i} \oplus x_{4i-1}) &= x_{4i}, \\ E_{K_3}(y_{4i}) &= y_{4i-1} \oplus C_{4i} \end{aligned}$$

can be written using  $u$  and  $v$  as

$$\begin{aligned} E_{K_1}(S \oplus X \oplus u_{4i-1}) &= X \oplus u_{4i}, \\ E_{K_3}(Y \oplus v_{4i}) &= Y \oplus v_{4i-1} \oplus C_{4i}. \end{aligned}$$

Since the blocksize is only 64 bits, we get only about  $2^{64}$  distinct instances of the equations, each instance occurs on average four times, and (almost) all the possible values of inputs to the encryption function  $E$  are expected.

We now apply another variant of Technique G: we choose some arbitrary (one-block) value  $a$ . It is expected that in one of the above instances,  $E_{K_1}(a)$  is computed, but we do not know in which. We compute

$$b = E_{K'_1}(a)$$

under all the possible keys  $K'_1$  in the keyspace of  $K_1$ , and for each find the value of  $u_{4i-1} \oplus u_{4i}$  from the equation

$$a \oplus E_{K'_1}(a) = (S \oplus X \oplus u_{4i-1}) \oplus (X \oplus u_{4i}) = S \oplus u_{4i-1} \oplus u_{4i}.$$

This equation must hold when  $S \oplus X \oplus u_{4i-1} = a$ . We use a hash table on the already known values of  $u_{4i-1} \oplus u_{4i}$  to identify  $i$ , and assume for a moment that  $X = S \oplus u_{4i-1} \oplus a$ . With the candidate key  $K'_1$  and  $X$ , we can now encrypt the following blocks and verify that there are no contradictions in the values of  $x_{4i+3}$  and  $x_{4i+4}$ . If their values do not fit, we try another key  $K'_1$  till we find some value which fits. If the values do not fit for any key, then it must be that  $E_{K'_1}(a)$  is not in the above equations; in this case we choose another value for  $a$ , and try again. After a few trials, we find the key  $K_1$  and the value  $X = x_4$  with a high probability. From these values, we can complete the knowledge of all the  $x_i$ 's, and in particular the initial value  $IV_1$ . Similarly, we can find  $K_3$ ,  $Y = y_4$ , and  $IV_3$ .  $K_2$  can now be found by exhaustive search (or by differential or linear cryptanalysis).

### 2.3. Technique I: Double Stream Cipher Technique

This technique can analyze modes in which the ciphertext is an XOR of two streams. In particular, it can analyze the double OFB mode (whose output is the XOR of the plaintext and of two OFB streams), and many triple modes whose last (or first) mode is an OFB.

Assume we know that some stream  $\{s_i\}$  is the result of XORing two cyclic streams  $\{a_i\}$  and  $\{b_i\}$ , by  $s_i = a_i \oplus b_i$ . In a double OFB mode, we can find the stream  $s_i$  with a known plaintext attack, by XORing the plaintext with the ciphertext:  $s_i = P_i \oplus C_i$ . The purpose of this technique is primarily to find the periods of  $\{a_i\}$  and  $\{b_i\}$ , and then this information will be used to find the keys and the initial values.

We denote the period of  $\{a_i\}$  by  $k$  and the period of  $\{b_i\}$  by  $l$ , and assume without loss of generality that  $k < l$ .<sup>3</sup> We also restrict the discussion to only even  $k + l$ ; odd  $k + l$  can be analyzed similarly with only small changes. Both periods are expected to be about  $2^{64}$ , and thus the expected period of  $\{s_i\}$  is about  $2^{128}$ .

We write

$$s_i = a_i \oplus b_i = a_{i \bmod k} \oplus b_{i \bmod l}.$$

Given  $k + l + 1$  consecutive blocks of  $\{s_i\}$ :  $s_0, s_1, \dots, s_{k+l}$ , the following equations hold:

$$\begin{aligned} s_0 &= a_0 \oplus b_0, \\ s_k &= a_k \oplus b_k = a_0 \oplus b_k, \\ s_l &= a_l \oplus b_l = a_l \oplus b_0, \\ s_{k+l} &= a_{k+l} \oplus b_{k+l} = a_l \oplus b_k, \end{aligned}$$

from which we derive

$$s_0 \oplus s_k \oplus s_l \oplus s_{k+l} = 0.$$

We later use this equation in the form

$$s_0 \oplus s_{k+l} = s_k \oplus s_l.$$

In order to use this equation, we need to know  $k$  and  $l$ . Therefore, we rewrite the equations (shifted in the stream by  $i - (k + l)/2$  blocks, for any  $i$ ) as

$$\begin{aligned} s_{i-(k+l)/2} &= a_{i-(k+l)/2} \oplus b_{i-(k+l)/2}, \\ s_{i-(l-k)/2} &= a_{i-(l-k)/2} \oplus b_{i-(l-k)/2} = a_{i-(k+l)/2} \oplus b_{i+(k+l)/2}, \\ s_{i+(l-k)/2} &= a_{i+(l-k)/2} \oplus b_{i+(l-k)/2} = a_{i+(k+l)/2} \oplus b_{i-(k+l)/2}, \\ s_{i+(k+l)/2} &= a_{i+(k+l)/2} \oplus b_{i+(k+l)/2} \end{aligned} \tag{3}$$

and thus

$$s_{i-(k+l)/2} \oplus s_{i+(k+l)/2} = s_{i-(l-k)/2} \oplus s_{i+(l-k)/2}.$$

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<sup>3</sup> We ignore the rare case where  $k = l$  in which the period of  $\{s_i\}$  is itself  $k = l$ .



We define  $S_i$  to be the concatenation of  $s_i$  and  $s_{i+1}$ , in order to increase the blocksize and to reduce random effects. Then

$$S_{i-(k+l)/2} \oplus S_{i+(k+l)/2} = S_{i-(l-k)/2} \oplus S_{i+(l-k)/2}.$$

We define

$$\Delta_j = S_{2^{64}-j} \oplus S_{2^{64}+j}$$

(similarly, for odd  $k+l$  we should define  $\Delta_j = S_{2^{64}-j} \oplus S_{2^{64}+j+1}$ ) and for  $i = 2^{64}$  we get the equation

$$\Delta_{(k+l)/2} = \Delta_{(l-k)/2}.$$

The attack we use is a start in the middle attack. Given  $2^{65}$  stream blocks, we compute  $\Delta_j$  for each  $j = 1, 2, \dots, 2^{64}$  and search for two distinct  $j$ 's ( $j_1 > j_2$ ) for which

$$\Delta_{j_1} = \Delta_{j_2}$$

(by keeping the values in a hash tables, and waiting till some value is entered twice into the table). These  $j_1$  and  $j_2$  satisfy

$$S_{2^{64}-j_1} \oplus S_{2^{64}-j_2} \oplus S_{2^{64}+j_2} \oplus S_{2^{64}+j_1} = 0$$

from which we conclude that

$$k = j_1 - j_2 \quad \text{and} \quad l = j_1 + j_2.$$

Given the candidate values for  $k$  and  $l$ , it is easy to verify that (3) holds for several additional  $i$ 's. If it does not, the choice of  $k$  or  $l$  is wrong, and we should find another pair of  $j_1$  and  $j_2$ .


So far, we have found only the periods of the two streams, but we do not know anything more than the periods. At this point we use the periods in order to find information on the streams  $\{a_i\}$  and  $\{b_i\}$ . We assume that  $k$  and  $l$  are coprimes (or at least that  $\gcd(k, l)$  is small, which can be analyzed with only a minor modification to the following algorithm). We compute the following algorithm, which results with  $d_i = a_i \oplus a_0$  for every  $i$ :

$$\begin{aligned} d_0 &= 0 \\ \text{for } i &= 1 \text{ to } k-1 \text{ do} \\ d_{il \bmod k} &= d_{(i-1)l \bmod k} \oplus (S_{(i-1)l \bmod k} \oplus S_{((i-1)l \bmod k)+l}) \end{aligned}$$

We get all the  $d_i = a_i \oplus a_0$ ,  $i = 0, \dots, k-1$ . Now, the stream  $\{a_i\}$  is known up to an XOR with one block  $a_0$ . The stream  $\{b_i\}$  is known under the same condition, since  $b_i = s_i \oplus a_i = s_i \oplus d_i \oplus a_0$ .

When one of the two streams is the output of an OFB mode (without loss of generality we assume that the OFB stream is  $\{b_i\}$ ), we can use Technique G to solve the key and the initial value. Then the  $\{a_i\}$  stream can be computed by  $a_i = s_i \oplus b_i$ . If  $\{a_i\}$  is also an output of an OFB mode, we can now find the key easily by an exhaustive search for the key  $K$  for which the equation  $E_K(a_1) = a_2$  is satisfied.

This attack is also applicable to many triple modes in which the first (or last) single mode is an OFB, by feeding the other two modes by carefully chosen plaintexts or



**Fig. 4.** The triple mode:  $\text{CBC|CBC}^{-1}|\text{OFB}$ .

ciphertexts. The  $\text{CBC|CBC}^{-1}|\text{OFB}$  is an example (see Fig. 4). In this mode we fix  $2^{65}$  same plaintext blocks, and get a cycle in the output of the first CBC mode. The cycle is not affected by the next  $\text{CBC}^{-1}$  mode. The result is the XOR of the cycle of the  $\text{CBC|CBC}^{-1}$  mode and the OFB mode. The above technique can find the periods, and analyze the OFB mode, resulting with the key and the initial value of the OFB mode, and with the exact output of the  $\text{CBC|CBC}^{-1}$  mode. The  $\text{CBC|CBC}^{-1}$  mode can then be analyzed with additional  $2^{66}$  chosen plaintexts using Technique H.

Note that this technique is also applicable to stream ciphers in which the output of two nonlinear streams (such as the outputs of NLFSRs) are XORed. This technique can also increase the efficiency of the Berlekamp–Massey algorithm [19] when the outputs of two LFSRs are XORed, by dividing the original problem into two smaller problems in a linear time, and using the Berlekamp–Massey algorithm on each of the smaller problems. In the next technique we show that not only the complexity of the Berlekamp–Massey algorithm can benefit from this attack, but attacks on multiple OFB modes can benefit from the Berlekamp–Massey algorithm.

#### 2.4. Technique J: Triple and Multiple Stream Cipher Technique

This technique extends Technique I for the case of an XOR of more than two streams. This “miracle” is obtained using the Berlekamp–Massey algorithm [19] to retrieve the shortest linear feedback shift register that generates the stream. This shortest LFSR is expected to uncover (in most cases) the periods of all the combined streams.

For example, we show the case where three streams are combined (as in the triple OFB mode):  $\{a_i\}$ ,  $\{b_i\}$ , and  $\{c_i\}$ , whose periods are  $k$ ,  $l$  and  $m$ , respectively. The resulting stream is  $s_i = a_i \oplus b_i \oplus c_i$ . Then the following LFSR generates  $s_i$ :

$$s_{k+l+m} = s_0 \oplus s_k \oplus s_l \oplus s_m \oplus s_{k+l} \oplus s_{k+m} \oplus s_{l+m}.$$

In polynomial form this LFSR is

$$\begin{aligned} Q(x) &= x^{k+l+m} + x^{l+m} + x^{k+m} + x^{k+l} + x^m + x^l + x^k + x^0 \\ &= Q_k(x)Q_l(x)Q_m(x) = 0, \end{aligned}$$

where

$$\begin{aligned} Q_k(x) &= x^k + 1 = \left( \sum_{j=0}^{k-1} x^j \right) (x + 1), \\ Q_l(x) &= x^l + 1 = \left( \sum_{j=0}^{l-1} x^j \right) (x + 1), \\ Q_m(x) &= x^m + 1 = \left( \sum_{j=0}^{m-1} x^j \right) (x + 1). \end{aligned}$$

The minimal polynomial of  $s_i$  is, however,

$$Q'(x) = \text{lcm}(Q_k(x), Q_l(x), Q_m(x))$$

which, when  $k$ ,  $l$ , and  $m$  are coprimes is

$$Q'(x) = Q(x)/(x + 1)^2$$

of degree  $k + l + m - 2$ .

Note that  $k$  and  $l$  are coprimes if and only if  $Q_k(x)/(x + 1)$  and  $Q_l(x)/(x + 1)$  are coprimes (similarly for  $m$  and  $Q_m(x)/(x + 1)$ ). Otherwise, if  $\gcd(k, l) = d > 1$ , then both  $Q_k(x)/(x + 1)$  and  $Q_l(x)/(x + 1)$  are divisible by  $(x^d + 1)/(x + 1) = \sum_{j=0}^{d-1} x^j$ , and all the terms of the quotients are exponents of  $x^d$ .

Given the  $2(k+l+m)$  first blocks of  $\{s_i\}$ , the Berlekamp–Massey algorithm reproduces the minimal LFSR generating the stream. From this polynomial the periods  $k$ ,  $l$ , and  $m$  can be deduced (either by multiplying by  $(x + 1)^2$  and taking the indices of the feedbacks as the periods, if  $k$ ,  $l$ , and  $m$  are coprime, or else by factoring the minimal polynomial, and using their special forms described above to reconstruct the periods).

The Berlekamp–Massey algorithm requires  $2n$  blocks, and its complexity is  $O(n^2)$ , where  $n$  is the length of the shortest LFSR, i.e., in the example  $n = k + l + m$ . However, this complexity is too high for our purposes. Fortunately, there is a variant of the Berlekamp–Massey algorithm, called the recursive Berlekamp–Massey algorithm [9, Section 11.7], whose complexity is lower than  $O(n \log n \log \log n)$ . This complexity is about  $2^{66} \cdot 66 \cdot \log 66 = 2^{75}$  when  $n \leq 2^{66}$ , i.e., when up to four OFB streams are combined. These  $2^{75}$  steps are very simple, and are faster to apply than  $2^{66}$  DES encryptions.

Given the periods of the individual streams ( $k$ ,  $l$ , and  $m$ ), we decompose the individual streams, up to an XOR with their first block (which remains unknown), with a similar method to the one used by Technique I. In the case of three streams, as in the above

example, the decomposition algorithm is

$$\begin{aligned}
 e_0 &= 0 \\
 \text{for } i &= 1 \text{ to } k - 1 \text{ do} \\
 e_{im \bmod k} &= e_{(i-1)m \bmod k} \oplus (s_{(i-1)m \bmod k} \oplus s_{((i-1)m \bmod k)+l} \\
 &\quad \oplus s_{((i-1)m \bmod k)+m} \oplus s_{((i-1)m \bmod k)+l+m}) \\
 d_0 &= 0 \\
 \text{for } i &= 1 \text{ to } k - 1 \text{ do} \\
 d_{2il \bmod k} &= d_{2(i-1)l \bmod k} \oplus (e_{2(i-1)l \bmod k} \oplus e_{(2(i-1)l \bmod k)+l})
 \end{aligned}$$

where  $e_i$  results with  $e_i = a_i \oplus a_{i+l} \oplus a_0 \oplus a_l$ , and  $d_i$  results with  $d_i = a_i \oplus a_0$ . From these values we can now compute  $a_i \oplus a_{i+1}$  for any  $i$  (or at least  $a_i \oplus a_{i+2}$  for even  $k$ 's), and similarly we can compute the differences of consecutive blocks in all the individual streams. Technique G is then used to solve the keys and the initial values of the individual OFB streams. The total complexity of this attack is equivalent to less than  $2^{64}$  DES encryptions, and the attack requires about  $2^{67}$  blocks and  $2^{66}$  memory, when up to four streams are combined.

### 3. The Strength of All the Triple Modes

In this section we elaborate some more information on some of the more complicated attacks. Brief hints on the attacks on all the modes are given in the Appendix.

1. ECB|CBC|ECB: The attack requires five chosen ciphertext blocks of the form  $(A, A, B, B, A)$ , for any block values  $A$  and  $B$  ( $A \neq B$ ). The intermediate values after the first ECB component (under the real unknown key) must be of the form  $(?, A' \oplus A'', B' \oplus A'', B' \oplus B'', A' \oplus B'')$ , where  $A'$  and  $B'$  are the intermediate values entering the second encryption box (after mixing with the feedbacks), and  $A''$  and  $B''$  are the intermediate values after the second component. These values depend only on the values of the corresponding ciphertext blocks ( $A$  or  $B$ ), since no feedbacks are mixed during their encryption. Therefore, the XOR of the last four (of the five) blocks after the first component is zero. We need only encrypt the four corresponding plaintext blocks by all the possible keys of the first component, and verify which key results with such zero XOR. The last ECB component can then be analyzed with three blocks of the above five  $(A, B, B)$ . Don Coppersmith has also developed a similar attack on this mode [11].
2. ECB|CFB<sup>-1</sup>|CBC: We describe two attacks on this mode. In the first attack we choose three same plaintext blocks  $(A, A, A)$ . The intermediate data after the second component is thus of the form  $(?, A'', A'')$ . We now try to decrypt the ciphertext under all possible keys of the last component, and see which key results with two equal second and third blocks. To find the keys of the first and the second components we need an additional plaintext block, so in total we need four blocks  $(A, A, A, B)$  to find all three keys.

The second attack is a meet-in-the-middle attack. We choose tuples  $(A, A, B)$ , so we can conclude that the XOR of the intermediate value of the second and third blocks after the second component equals the XOR of the same blocks after the first component. Encrypt the two corresponding plaintext blocks under all possible keys,

XOR the results of the two blocks, and keep the result in a table. Now decrypt the last component under all possible keys and check whether the XOR of the second and third resultant blocks appears in the table. If, for two tuples, the same keys succeed, we conclude that they are the keys of the first and last components. For this attack, the plaintexts  $(A, A, B, B, A)$  suggest the required two tuples.

3.  $\text{CBC}^{-1}|\text{ECB}|\text{CBC}$ : The attack on this mode is similar to the first attack on the  $\text{ECB}|\text{CFB}^{-1}|\text{CBC}$  mode, where the required chosen plaintext blocks (or symmetrically, chosen ciphertext blocks) are of the form  $(B, A, A, A)$ .
4.  $\text{CBC}^{-1}|\text{OFB}|\text{CBC}$ : We can identify the period of the OFB component by choosing  $2^{64}$  chosen plaintext (or ciphertext) blocks  $A$  followed by  $2^{64}$  tuples of the form  $(R_i, A, A, A)$ . It is expected that, for some tuple  $i$ , the feedback from the first block  $R_i$  to the next will be the same as in some block in the first  $2^{64}$  blocks whose distance is a multiple of the period. In this case, we can use this knowledge to identify the period. Once the period is known, we can use the same data to predict two equal values after the second component, and use them to find the key of the last component. Then the other keys can be completed with the same data and simpler analysis.
5.  $\text{CBC}|\text{OFB}|\text{CBC}$ : We choose  $2^{32}$  ciphertext blocks  $A$ , followed by  $2^{32}$  tuples of  $2^{32}$  ciphertext blocks of the form  $(A, A, A, A, R_i, R_i, R_i, R_i, \dots)$ , followed by  $2^{64}$  ciphertext tuples of the form  $(R_i, R_i, R_i, R_i)$ , where  $R_i$  are random (the same at each tuple). From the first  $2^{64} + 2^{32}$  blocks, we can identify the OFB period. Then we can use all the tuples and search for collisions in the decryption of the last CBC component in distances of multiples of the OFB period (the collisions are similar to the collisions in the birthday attack, but in this case the birthday paradox is not involved). We can identify such collisions since the corresponding plaintext blocks are expected to be the same. When such a collision is found, we continue like in the birthday attack, and find the key of the last component. We complete the rest of the keys with Technique G.
6.  $\text{ECB}|\text{CFB}^{-1}|\text{CBC}^{-1}$  and  $\text{ECB}|\text{CBC}^{-1}|\text{CFB}^{-1}$ : We choose  $2^{34}$  plaintext tuples of the form  $(F, R_i, B_1, F, R_i, B_2)$  or  $(B_1, R_i, F, B_2, R_i, F)$ , respectively, where  $F$ ,  $B_1$ , and  $B_2$  are fixed in all the tuples, and  $R_i$  varies at random (but the same in both occurrences in each tuple). We expect a collision between  $E_{K_1}(B_1) \oplus E_{K_2}(E_{K_1}(R_i))$  and  $E_{K_1}(B_2) \oplus E_{K_2}(E_{K_1}(R_j))$ , for some  $i$  and  $j$ . The same blocks will have another match when the indices  $i$  and  $j$  are exchanged (i.e., in the other halves of the tuples).

We identify the collision by computing the difference of the third and sixth ciphertext blocks in each tuple, and searching for equality of the results in two distinct tuples. When found, we can compute  $E_{K_1}(R_i) \oplus E_{K_1}(R_j)$  as the difference of two ciphertext blocks, and can exhaustively search for  $K_1$  that satisfies this equation.

7.  $\text{CBC}|\text{CFB}|\text{OFB}$  and  $\text{CFB}|\text{CBC}|\text{OFB}$ : We choose some arbitrary values  $A$  and  $B$ , and choose the ciphertext to be  $2^{64}$  consecutive blocks  $A$ , followed by  $2^{64}$  tuples of three blocks  $(B, A, A)$ . After identifying the period of the OFB, we compute the differences in the CBC and the CFB modes, in the same positions in the OFB cycle, so the OFB values are canceled in the differences. Thus, we receive differences  $A \oplus B$  in many blocks, and various input differences in the same blocks, and apply Technique G to solve the keys.

8.  $\text{CBC}|\text{CBC}^{-1}|\text{CBC}$  and similar modes: This is a birthday attack, in which we look for collisions not only in the last CBC mode, but also in the  $\text{CBC}^{-1}$  stream. We choose  $2^{64}$  random ciphertext tuples  $(R_i, R_i, R_i, R_i)$ , and search for the pairs  $i, j$  in which  $D(R_i) \oplus R_i = D(R_j) \oplus R_j$  (as in the regular birthday technique) together with equal values in the first block of the tuple in the  $\text{CBC}^{-1}$  mode. Given  $2^{64}$  such tuples, we expect such a collision. We can identify it easily, since, when it occurs, the last three of the four plaintext blocks of one tuple equal the corresponding blocks in the other tuple. Then we find the key of the last CBC mode just as we do in the regular birthday technique.

The first two modes are then attacked by Technique H with the same data.

If the first two modes are  $\text{CBC}|\text{CFB}^{-1}$  or  $\text{CFB}|\text{CBC}^{-1}$ , the data do not suffice. In this case we choose additional tuples  $(R'_i, A, A, A, A)$  to the original chosen ciphertext, which after decryption of the last CBC becomes  $(R''_i, R'''_i, B, B, B)$ , on which we can apply Technique H.

9.  $\text{CBC}|\text{CBC}|\text{CBC}^{-1}$ ,  $\text{CFB}|\text{CFB}|\text{CFB}^{-1}$  and similar modes: The last  $\text{CBC}^{-1}$  (or  $\text{CFB}^{-1}$ ) single mode is attacked by Technique H with chosen ciphertext tuples  $(R_i, A, A, A, A)$ .

If the first two modes are  $\text{CBC}|\text{CFB}$  or  $\text{CFB}|\text{CBC}$ , from a pair in which the difference is of the form (known, 0, 0) or (0, 0, known) we can find the keys of both modes.

If the first two modes are  $\text{CBC}|\text{CBC}$  or  $\text{CFB}|\text{CFB}$ , the problem is more complicated. One way to find the rest of the keys is to mount an adaptive attack, which, after identifying the last key, can attack the remaining double-mode with the data required for such an attack. Another solution is described in the next subsection.

### 3.1. Modes Which Require More Demanding Attacks

In this subsection we elaborate the attacks on modes which we do not know to attack under known plaintext, chosen plaintext, or chosen ciphertext attacks which require only one stream to be encrypted. In some sense these modes are the strongest triple modes: the attacks we use against these modes demand extra information: either to know the initial values or to encrypt two streams with the same keys and the same known initial values. However, we believe that there are other attacks on these modes that do not need the extra requirements.

1.  $\text{CBC}|\text{CBC}|\text{CBC}^{-1}$ ,  $\text{CFB}|\text{CFB}|\text{CFB}^{-1}$ , and similar modes, whose first two components are the same: The last  $\text{CBC}^{-1}$  (or  $\text{CFB}^{-1}$ ) mode is attacked by Technique H as is explained above in item 9.

As we mentioned there, one way to find the rest of the keys is to mount an adaptive attack, which, after identifying the last key, can attack the remaining double-mode with the data required for such an attack.

A nonadaptive attack can be mounted if we know the initial values  $IV_1$  and  $IV_2$  of these two modes. In this case, we can use the meet-in-the-middle attack to solve both keys.

2.  $\text{CBC}|\text{OFB}|\text{CBC}^{-1}$  (and similarly  $\text{CFB}|\text{OFB}|\text{CFB}^{-1}$ ): If the attacker can receive two (known) streams encrypted under the same keys and the same known initial values, he can find  $K_1$  and  $K_3$  by a meet-in-the-middle attack, in which he keeps

$(E_{K_1}(IV_1, P) \oplus E_{K_1}(IV_1, P^*), K_1)$  for every possible  $K_1$  in a table and searches for a  $K_3$  such that  $D_{K_3}(IV_3, C) \oplus D_{K_3}(IV_3, C^*)$  appears in the first field in the table (where  $E_{K_1}(IV_1, P)$  denotes CBC encryption of the first component, and  $D_{K_3}(IV_3, C)$  denotes  $CBC^{-1}$  decryption of the last component). Only two ciphertext blocks are required in each stream for the attack to succeed.

3. CBC|CBC|OFB (and similarly CFB|CFB|OFB): If the attacker can receive two chosen streams encrypted under the same keys and the same known initial values, he can find  $K_1$  by choosing the ciphertext streams  $(A, A)$  and  $(B, A)$  and get the plaintexts  $P$  and  $P^*$ . He tries all the keys  $K_1$  till the second block of the difference  $E_{K_1}(IV_1, P) \oplus E_{K_1}(IV_1, P^*)$  equals  $A \oplus B$ .

Another attack requires only one stream with known  $IV$ : the attacker chooses a ciphertext stream of one  $B$  followed by  $2^{64}$   $A$ 's. From the plaintext, he can identify the period of the OFB component, and find the first  $A$  in the second period. The feedbacks entering the block of this  $A$  equal the initial values, and thus the above attack can be applied.

## 4. More Secure Modes

So far we have shown that all the triple modes (except possibly the triple ECB mode) are not much more secure than a single encryption. In this section we propose more secure noncascaded modes whose complexity of attack is expected to be about  $2^{112}$ – $2^{128}$ . We start with secure noncascaded modes which combine three applications of single modes (whose encryption speed is the same as that of triple modes, and which can be efficiently pipelined in hardware), and then propose similar more secure modes which combine four applications of single modes.

### 4.1. Definitions of Noncascaded Combinations of Modes

In all the discussions above, we only considered multiple modes combined as cascade modes, in which the output of one mode becomes the input to the next mode, and we denoted this cascade by the “|” operator.

We now consider additional (noncascading) operators to combine modes. We denote the first of them by the operator “ $\rightarrow$ ,” which takes two modes  $M1$  and  $M2$ , where  $M2$  is any mode, and  $M1$  is any stream mode (such as the OFB mode) generating a stream independent of the plaintext, and XORs the stream to the plaintext to form the ciphertext.<sup>4</sup> Then,  $M1 \rightarrow M2$  is the mode which computes the stream generated by  $M1$ , and encrypts the result under  $M2$ , resulting in a new stream, to be XORed to the plaintext.

For example, the OFB  $\rightarrow$  CBC mode applies the CBC mode on the stream generated by the OFB mode, and XORs the result to the plaintext. We can combine more than one mode in this way; for example, the OFB  $\rightarrow$  CBC  $\rightarrow$  CFB mode applies the CFB mode on the output of OFB  $\rightarrow$  CBC mode.

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<sup>4</sup> An extension of this definition allows  $M1$  to be any mode, where a fixed plaintext block is fed to the mode  $M1$ , and the result becomes the output stream. This extension is not very useful when applied to standard DES modes, since the CBC and the CFB modes generate an OFB stream when fed by the zero plaintext blocks.

Another operator, which we denote by “M1[M2],” where M1 is any stream mode, applies the stream mode M1 on the plaintext (i.e., XORs the plaintext and the stream of M1), applies the mode M2 on the result, and applies the *same* M1 on the result (i.e., XORs with the same stream of M1, without computing it again). An extension of this operator applies M1 more than twice, in given positions. We denote this extended operator by “M1[M2, M3]” (or more generally “M1[M2, M3, . . . , Mn]”). It applies M1 on the plaintext, then applies M2, then applies M1 again, then applies M3, and then M1 again, etc. This mode actually applies  $2n - 1$  modes (five in the case of M1[M2, M3]) but takes the time for computing only  $n$  (three) modes. Our aim in defining such modes is to get modes which are more secure than cascaded  $n$ -modes, but have the same encryption speed as  $n$ -modes. However, we expect that these modes are less secure than  $(2n - 1)$ -modes.

#### 4.2. Secure Modes with Three Applications of Single Modes

We conjecture that the  $\text{OFB} \rightarrow \text{CBC} \rightarrow \text{CBC}$  and  $\text{OFB} \rightarrow \text{CFB} \rightarrow \text{CFB}$  modes are secure modes, useful for applications which require a security-extended stream (OFB-like) modes. The complexity of attacking these modes is conjectured to be at least  $2^{112}$ . (Note however that their theoretical strength, as defined in [6], i.e., the complexity to find one out of many keys, is only  $2^{84}$ ; this complexity holds for any cipher with 168-bit keys.)

#### 4.3. Secure Modes with Four Applications of Single Modes

We conjecture that the  $\text{CBC|CBC|CBC}^{-1}|\text{CBC}^{-1}$ , the  $\text{CFB|CFB|CFB}^{-1}|\text{CFB}^{-1}$ , and the  $\text{OFB[CBC, CBC, CBC}^{-1}]$  modes are more secure than any triple mode. We also believe that the  $\text{OFB[CBC, CBC, CBC]}$  and the  $\text{OFB[CFB, CFB, CFB]}$  modes are secure, and their complexities of attack are at least  $2^{128}$ . The latter two modes have a limited error propagation.

### 5. Modes Described by ANSI

Recently ANSI was considering standardization of triple modes of operation. The latest ANSI draft [2] described the following modes:

1. The TECB, TCBC, (1-bit, 8-bit, and 64-bit) TCFB, and TOFB modes are defined as the ECB, CBC, CFB, and OFB modes where the underlying cipher is (two-key or three-key) triple DES. These modes are single modes, and their strength (as modes, and from the point of view of this paper) is the same as that of the underlying cipher. In particular, in all these modes a dictionary attack with all  $2^{64}$  known plaintexts is applicable.
2. The TCBC-I, TCFB-P, and TOFB-P modes are interleaved/pipelined variants of the TCBC, TCFB, and TOFB modes, in which encryption is computed to three independent streams in parallel. The TCBC-I mode is described as encrypting three independent interleaved messages. The TOFB-P computes three interleaved TOFB streams and use them to encrypt one message. The 64-bit TCFB-P



views the message as three interleaved messages, and encrypts them as such. The 1-bit and 8-bit TCFB-P have dependencies between the three interleaved encryptions. All these modes are intended to be efficiently implemented in pipelined hardware. They do not have, however, cryptographic advantages over their noninterleaved/nonpipelined variants (and the dictionary attack is still applicable in the same way as in the noninterleaved/nonpipelined variants).

3. The CBCM mode [12], [2] is very similar to the ECB|OFB[ECB]|ECB mode, with the same keys in the first and last ECB components, and with the addition of a (CBC-like) outer-feedback mixing the ciphertext block with the next plaintext block. Due to this structure, this mode cannot be simulated as a combination of other modes. An advantage of this mode is that the intermediate feedbacks are not under the control of the attacker, and, unlike some other modes with cascaded OFB components (such as many of those mentioned earlier in this paper), it seems that the attacker cannot use the various OFB components to factor them, since the same OFB stream is used in both OFB components. The main drawback of this mode is the application of four encryptions per encrypted block. Thus, this mode is moderately slower than triple modes. Moreover, this mode cannot be pipelined, and thus cannot be applied efficiently in (pipelined) hardware.
4. The CBCM mode has an interleaved variant, CBCM-I, which efficiently encrypts three interleaved messages in parallel. The CBCM-I is cryptographically equivalent to the CBCM mode.
5. An earlier ANSI draft [1] described a different collection of modes. These modes included (under different names) the TECB, TCBC, TCFB, TOFB, TCFB-P, and TOFB-P modes mentioned in the later draft, together with the inner-feedback CBC mode  $\text{CBC|CBC}^{-1}\text{|CBC}$  studied earlier in this paper.

In the previous section we described several secure modes with only three applications of single modes. These modes are faster than CBCM. We also described modes with four applications of single modes, which have the same speed as CBCM. All the modes we described are pipelined, and thus can be efficiently applied in (pipelined) hardware, without the interleaving trick described in the ANSI drafts. We conjecture that all the modes we described are more secure than the CBCM mode.

## 6. Summary

In this paper we have shown that all the (cascaded) double modes and all the (cascaded) triple modes of DES (possibly except the triple ECB mode, if dictionary attacks which cannot find the keys are not considered) are much less secure than might be expected, and their strength is comparable with a single encryption. Almost all the modes are vulnerable to known plaintext, chosen plaintext, or chosen ciphertext attacks, with only one stream of encryption. Only a few of the modes require to know the initial values or to get two streams with the same keys and the same initial values. We also suggested several candidates for more secure modes.

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## Appendix

In this appendix we list all the single, double, and triple modes, together with their attacking techniques and complexity of cryptanalysis.

In the Attack field we describe the type of attack and hints about the techniques used. For some of the modes, we describe more than one technique for the attack. In such a case, the first technique finds the key of one single mode, while later, the other technique is used to find the key of the other mode(s). In this field we use the following notations:

- KPA Known plaintext attack.
- CPA Chosen plaintext attack.
- CCA Chosen ciphertext attack.
- Ad Adaptive attacks.
- KIV Attacks in which the initial values are known (see Section 3.1).
- 2SKIV Attacks in which the attacker chooses two streams that are both encrypted under the same key and the *same known* initial value (see Section 3.1).
- Ex Exhaustive search for the key of a single mode (Technique E in [5]).
- Bi Birthday technique (Technique F in [5]).
- Col Like “Bi,” however, the collection of pairs is exhaustive rather than using the birthday paradox.
- G Technique G.
- H Technique H.
- I Technique I.
- MM Meet in the middle, using large tables (similar to the attack on double DES [15, p. 83]).
- (number) Some more details on the attack are elaborated in item (number) in Section 3.
- (\*) Some more details on the attack are elaborated in Section 3.1.

The complexity field describes three complexity parameters: the number of plaintexts required; the number of steps of the attack; the required memory size. These complexities are measured for DES as the underlying blockcipher. In these complexities, all the (up to three) keys and all the (up to three) initial values are found. Note that the memory size is given only when the amount of memory required for tables is nonnegligible. The required memory for keeping the plaintexts and the ciphertexts is not counted.

Note that in this appendix we only give hints for one (or sometimes two) attacks on each mode. It is not the purpose of this appendix to give the best attacks on these modes, nor the most efficient or the easiest to implement attacks. In particular, some modes which are attacked with a chosen ciphertext attacks in this appendix can also be attacked with a chosen plaintext attack, and sometimes even with a known plaintext attack.

*Single Modes*

No.	Mode	Attack	Complexity	Data	Inverse
1	ECB	KPA/Ex	$1/2^{56}/-$		1
2	CBC	KPA/Ex	$2/2^{56}/-$		3
3	CBC <sup>-1</sup>	KPA/Ex	$2/2^{56}/-$		2
4	OFB	KPA/Ex	$2/2^{56}/-$		4
5	CFB	KPA/Ex	$2/2^{56}/-$		6
6	CFB <sup>-1</sup>	KPA/Ex	$2/2^{56}/-$		5

*Double Modes*

No.	Mode	Attack	Complexity	Data	Inverse
7	ECB ECB	KPA/MM	$2/2^{57}/2^{56}$		7
8	ECB CBC	KPA/MM (or CCA)	$3/2^{57}/2^{56}$ (or $3/2^{58}/-$ )	(BAA)	19
9	ECB CBC <sup>-1</sup>	CPA/Ex	$3/2^{58}/-$	BAA	13
10	ECB OFB	CPA/Ex	$2^{64}/2^{58}/-$		25
11	ECB CFB	KPA/MM (or CCA)	$3/2^{57}/2^{56}$ (or $3/2^{58}/-$ )	(AAB)	37
12	ECB CFB <sup>-1</sup>	CPA/Ex	$3/2^{58}/-$	AAB	31
13	CBC ECB*	CCA/Ex (or CPA/Ex)	$3/2^{58}/-$ (or $2^{64}/2^{58}/-$ )	BAA	9
14	CBC CBC	CCA/Bi	$2^{34}/2^{59}/2^{33}$		21
15	CBC CBC <sup>-1</sup>	CPA/H or CCA/H	$2^{68}/2^{66}/2^{66}$		15
16	CBC OFB	CPA/I or CCA/G	$2^{65}/2^{65}/2^{65}$ or $2^{66}/2^{66}/-$		27
17	CBC CFB	CCA/Ex	$4/2^{58}/-$	BAAA	39
18	CBC CFB <sup>-1</sup>	CPA/H or CCA/H	$2^{68}/2^{66}/-$		33
19	CBC <sup>-1</sup>  ECB	KPA/MM (or CPA)	$3/2^{57}/2^{56}$ (or $3/2^{58}/-$ )	(BAA)	8
20	CBC <sup>-1</sup>  CBC	KPA/MM (or CPA)	$3/2^{57}/2^{56}$ (or $3/2^{58}/-$ )	(AAA)	20
21	CBC <sup>-1</sup>  CBC <sup>-1</sup>	CPA/Bi	$2^{34}/2^{59}/2^{33}$		14
22	CBC <sup>-1</sup>  OFB	CPA/Ex	$2^{64}/2^{58}/-$		26
23	CBC <sup>-1</sup>  CFB	KPA/MM (or CPA)	$3/2^{57}/2^{56}$ or $3/2^{58}/-$	(AAA)	38
24	CBC <sup>-1</sup>  CFB <sup>-1</sup>	CPA/Ex	$4/2^{58}/-$	AAAB	32
25	OFB ECB	CPA/Ex or CCA/Ex	$2^{64}/2^{58}/-$		10
26	OFB CBC	CCA/Ex	$2^{64}/2^{58}/-$		22
27	OFB CBC <sup>-1</sup>	CPA/G or CCA/I	$2^{65}/2^{66}/-$ or $2^{65}/2^{65}/2^{65}$		16
28	OFB OFB	KPA/I	$2^{65}/2^{65}/2^{64}$		28
29	OFB CFB	CCA/Ex	$2^{64}/2^{58}/-$	BAA...A	40
30	OFB CFB <sup>-1</sup>	CPA/G or CCA/I	$2^{66}/2^{66}/-$ or $2^{65}/2^{65}/2^{65}$		34
31	CFB ECB	CCA/Ex	$3/2^{58}/-$	AAB	12
32	CFB CBC	CCA/Ex	$4/2^{58}/-$	AAAB	24
33	CFB CBC <sup>-1</sup>	CPA/H or CCA/H	$2^{68}/2^{66}/-$		18
34	CFB OFB	CPA/I or CCA/G	$2^{65}/2^{65}/2^{65}$ or $2^{66}/2^{66}/-$		30
35	CFB CFB	CCA/Bi	$2^{34}/2^{59}/2^{33}$		42
36	CFB CFB <sup>-1</sup>	CPA/H or CCA/H	$2^{68}/2^{66}/2^{66}$		36
37	CFB <sup>-1</sup>  ECB	KPA/MM (or CPA)	$3/2^{57}/2^{56}$ (or $3/2^{58}/-$ )	(AAB)	11
38	CFB <sup>-1</sup>  CBC	KPA/MM (or CPA)	$3/2^{57}/2^{56}$ (or $3/2^{58}/-$ )	(AAA)	23
39	CFB <sup>-1</sup>  CBC <sup>-1</sup>	CPA/Ex	$4/2^{58}/-$	BAAA	17
40	CFB <sup>-1</sup>  OFB	CPA/Ex	$2^{64}/2^{58}/-$	BAA...A	29
41	CFB <sup>-1</sup>  CFB	KPA/MM (or CPA)	$3/2^{57}/2^{56}$ (or $3/2^{58}/-$ )	(AAA)	41
42	CFB <sup>-1</sup>  CFB <sup>-1</sup>	CPA/Bi	$2^{34}/2^{59}/2^{33}$		35

\*Davies and Price suggest this mode in [14].

*Triple Modes*

No.	Mode	Attack	Complexity	Data	Inverse
43	ECB ECB ECB	The best known attack is KPA/MM whose complexity is $3/2^{113}/2^{56}$ . Dictionary attacks (which cannot recover the keys) require only $2^{64}$ known plaintexts.			43
44	ECB ECB CBC	CCA/Bi/MM	$2^{33}/2^{58}/2^{56}$		115
45	ECB ECB CBC <sup>-1</sup>	CPA/G/MM	$2^{64}/2^{58}/2^{56}$		79
46	ECB ECB OFB	CPA/G/MM	$2^{64}/2^{58}/2^{56}$		151
47	ECB ECB CFB	CCA/Bi/MM	$2^{33}/2^{58}/2^{56}$		223
48	ECB ECB CFB <sup>-1</sup>	CPA/G/MM	$2^{64}/2^{58}/2^{56}$		187
49	ECB CBC ECB	CCA/Ex/Ex/Ex(1)	$5/2^{59}/-$	AABBA	55
50	ECB CBC CBC	CCA/Bi/Bi/Ex	$2^{33}/2^{59}/2^{33}$		127
51	ECB CBC CBC <sup>-1</sup>	CPA/H or CCA/H	$2^{68}/2^{66}/-$		91
52	ECB CBC OFB	CPA/I/Ex or CCA/Ex/G	$2^{65}/2^{65}/2^{65}$ or $2^{64}/2^{58}/-$		163
53	ECB CBC CFB	CCA/Bi	$2^{34}/2^{59}/2^{33}$		235
54	ECB CBC CFB <sup>-1</sup>	CPA/H or CCA/H	$2^{68}/2^{66}/-$		199
55	ECB CBC <sup>-1</sup>  ECB	CPA/Ex/Ex/Ex(1)	$5/2^{59}/-$	AABBA	49
56	ECB CBC <sup>-1</sup>  CBC	CPA/Ex/Ex	$5/2^{59}/-$	AABBA	121
57	ECB CBC <sup>-1</sup>  CBC <sup>-1</sup>	CPA/Ex/Bi	$2^{34}/2^{59}/2^{33}$		85
58	ECB CBC <sup>-1</sup>  OFB	CPA/Ex/Ex	$2^{64}/2^{58}/-$		157
59	ECB CBC <sup>-1</sup>  CFB	CPA/Ex/Ex	$5/2^{59}/-$	AABBA	229
60	ECB CBC <sup>-1</sup>  CFB <sup>-1</sup>	CPA/Bi(6)	$2^{36}/2^{59}/2^{33}$		193
61	ECB OFB ECB	CPA/MM or CCA/MM	$2^{64}/2^{58}/2^{56}$		61
62	ECB OFB CBC	CCA/MM	$2^{64}/2^{58}/2^{56}$		133
63	ECB OFB CBC <sup>-1</sup>	CPA/Ex/G	$2^{65}/2^{65}/-$		97
64	ECB OFB OFB	CPA/I	$2^{65}/2^{65}/2^{65}$		169
65	ECB OFB CFB	CCA/MM	$2^{64}/2^{58}/2^{56}$		241
66	ECB OFB CFB <sup>-1</sup>	CPA/Ex/G	$2^{65}/2^{65}/-$		205
67	ECB CFB ECB	CCA/Ex/Ex/Ex	$5/2^{59}/-$	AABBA	73
68	ECB CFB CBC	CCA/Bi	$2^{34}/2^{59}/2^{33}$		145
69	ECB CFB CBC <sup>-1</sup>	CPA/H or CCA/H	$2^{68}/2^{66}/-$		109
70	ECB CFB OFB	CPA/I or CCA/Ex/H	$2^{65}/2^{65}/2^{65}$ or $2^{65}/2^{65}/-$		181
71	ECB CFB CFB	CCA/Bi	$2^{34}/2^{59}/2^{33}$		253
72	ECB CFB CFB <sup>-1</sup>	CPA/Ex/H or CCA/Ex/H	$2^{66}/2^{66}/2^{66}$		217
73	ECB CFB <sup>-1</sup>  ECB	CPA/Ex/Ex/Ex	$5/2^{59}/-$	AABBA	67
74	ECB CFB <sup>-1</sup>  CBC	CPA/Ex/Ex/Ex(2)	$4/2^{58}/-$	AAAB	139
75	ECB CFB <sup>-1</sup>  CBC <sup>-1</sup>	CPA/Bi(6)	$2^{36}/2^{59}/2^{33}$		103
76	ECB CFB <sup>-1</sup>  OFB	CPA/Ex	$2^{64}/2^{58}/-$		175
77	ECB CFB <sup>-1</sup>  CFB	CPA/Ex/Ex/Ex	$4/2^{58}/-$		247
78	ECB CFB <sup>-1</sup>  CFB <sup>-1</sup>	CPA/Ex/Bi	$2^{34}/2^{59}/2^{33}$		211
79	CBC ECB ECB	CCA/G/MM	$2^{64}/2^{58}/2^{56}$		45
80	CBC ECB CBC	CCA/Bi	$2^{34}/2^{59}/2^{33}$		117
81	CBC ECB CBC <sup>-1</sup>	CPA/H or CCA/H	$2^{68}/2^{66}/-$		81
82	CBC ECB OFB	CPA/I	$2^{65}/2^{65}/2^{65}$		153
83	CBC ECB CFB	CCA/Bi/Ex	$2^{34}/2^{59}/2^{33}$		225
84	CBC ECB CFB <sup>-1</sup>	CPA/H or CCA/H	$2^{68}/2^{66}/-$		189
85	CBC CBC ECB	CCA/Ex/Bi	$2^{34}/2^{59}/2^{33}$		57
86	CBC CBC CBC	CCA/Bi	$2^{34}/2^{60}/2^{33}$		129
87	CBC CBC CBC <sup>-1</sup>	CCA/H(9) [Ad or KIV or $K_3$ only]	$2^{68}/2^{66}/-$		93
88	CBC CBC OFB	KIV-CCA(*)	$2^{64}/2^{59}/-$		165
89	CBC CBC CFB	CCA/Bi	$2^{34}/2^{60}/2^{33}$		237
90	CBC CBC CFB <sup>-1</sup>	CCA/H(9) [Ad or KIV or $K_3$ only]	$2^{68}/2^{66}/-$		201
91	CBC CBC <sup>-1</sup>  ECB	CPA/H or CCA/H	$2^{68}/2^{66}/-$		51
92	CBC CBC <sup>-1</sup>  CBC	CCA/Bi(8)	$2^{66}/2^{58}/2^{33}$		123
93	CBC CBC <sup>-1</sup>  CBC <sup>-1</sup>	CPA/H(9) [Ad or KIV or $K_1$ only]	$2^{68}/2^{66}/-$		87
94	CBC CBC <sup>-1</sup>  OFB	CPA/I/H	$2^{66}/2^{66}/2^{66}$		159
95	CBC CBC <sup>-1</sup>  CFB	CCA/Bi(8)	$2^{66}/2^{58}/2^{33}$		231

*continued*

No.	Mode	Attack	Complexity	Data	Inverse
96	CBC CBC <sup>-1</sup>  CFB <sup>-1</sup>	CPA/H(9)	$2^{68}/2^{58}/-$		195
97	CBC OFB ECB	CCA/Ex/G	$2^{65}/2^{65}/-$		63
98	CBC OFB CBC	CCA/Col/G(5)	$2^{66}/2^{66}/-$		135
99	CBC OFB CBC <sup>-1</sup>	2SKIV-KPA/MM(*)	$4/2^{58}/2^{56}$		99
100	CBC OFB OFB	CPA/J	$2^{67}/2^{75}/2^{66}$		171
101	CBC OFB CFB	CCA/Col/G	$2^{66}/2^{66}/-$		243
102	CBC OFB CFB <sup>-1</sup>	2SKIV-KPA/MM(*)	$4/2^{58}/2^{56}$		207
103	CBC CFB ECB	CCA/Bi(6)	$2^{36}/2^{59}/2^{33}$		75
104	CBC CFB CBC	CCA/Bi	$2^{34}/2^{60}/2^{33}$		147
105	CBC CFB CBC <sup>-1</sup>	CCA/H(9)	$2^{68}/2^{58}/-$		111
106	CBC CFB OFB	CCA/G(7)	$2^{65}/2^{60}/-$		183
107	CBC CFB CFB	CCA/Bi	$2^{34}/2^{60}/2^{33}$		255
108	CBC CFB CFB <sup>-1</sup>	CCA/H(9)	$2^{68}/2^{58}/-$		219
109	CBC CFB <sup>-1</sup>  ECB	CPA/H or CCA/H	$2^{68}/2^{66}/-$		69
110	CBC CFB <sup>-1</sup>  CBC	CCA/Bi(8)	$2^{68}/2^{58}/2^{33}$		141
111	CBC CFB <sup>-1</sup>  CBC <sup>-1</sup>	CPA/H(9)	$2^{68}/2^{58}/-$		105
112	CBC CFB <sup>-1</sup>  OFB	CPA/I/H	$2^{68}/2^{66}/2^{66}$		177
113	CBC CFB <sup>-1</sup>  CFB	CCA/Bi(8)	$2^{68}/2^{58}/2^{33}$		249
114	CBC CFB <sup>-1</sup>  CFB <sup>-1</sup>	CPA/H(9) [Ad or KIV or $K_1$ only]	$2^{68}/2^{66}/-$		213
115	CBC <sup>-1</sup>  ECB ECB	CPA/Bi/MM	$2^{33}/2^{58}/2^{56}$		44
116	CBC <sup>-1</sup>  ECB CBC	CPA/Ex/Ex(3) or CCA/Ex/Ex(3)	$4/2^{58}/-$	BAAA	116
117	CBC <sup>-1</sup>  ECB CBC <sup>-1</sup>	CPA/Bi	$2^{34}/2^{59}/2^{33}$		80
118	CBC <sup>-1</sup>  ECB OFB	CPA/G/Ex	$2^{64}/2^{58}/-$		152
119	CBC <sup>-1</sup>  ECB CFB	CPA/Ex or CCA/Ex	$4/2^{58}/-$	BAAA or AAAB	224
120	CBC <sup>-1</sup>  ECB CFB <sup>-1</sup>	CPA/Bi/Ex	$2^{34}/2^{59}/2^{33}$		188
121	CBC <sup>-1</sup>  CBC ECB	CCA/Ex/Ex	$5/2^{59}/-$	AABBA	56
122	CBC <sup>-1</sup>  CBC CBC	CCA/Ex/Bi	$2^{34}/2^{59}/2^{33}$	AAAA+...	128
123	CBC <sup>-1</sup>  CBC CBC <sup>-1</sup>	CPA/Bi(8)	$2^{66}/2^{58}/2^{33}$		92
124	CBC <sup>-1</sup>  CBC OFB	CPA/I/Ex	$2^{65}/2^{65}/2^{65}$		164
125	CBC <sup>-1</sup>  CBC CFB	CCA/Ex/Ex	$5/2^{58}/-$	BAAAA	236
126	CBC <sup>-1</sup>  CBC CFB <sup>-1</sup>	CPA/Bi(8)	$2^{68}/2^{58}/2^{33}$		200
127	CBC <sup>-1</sup>  CBC <sup>-1</sup>  ECB	CPA/Bi/Bi/Ex	$2^{33}/2^{59}/2^{33}$		50
128	CBC <sup>-1</sup>  CBC <sup>-1</sup>  CBC	CPA/Ex/Bi	$2^{34}/2^{59}/2^{33}$	AAAA+...	122
129	CBC <sup>-1</sup>  CBC <sup>-1</sup>  CBC <sup>-1</sup>	CPA/Bi	$2^{34}/2^{60}/2^{33}$		86
130	CBC <sup>-1</sup>  CBC <sup>-1</sup>  OFB	CPA/Col	$2^{66}/2^{59}/-$		158
131	CBC <sup>-1</sup>  CBC <sup>-1</sup>  CFB	CPA/Ex/Bi	$2^{34}/2^{59}/2^{33}$	AAAA+...	230
132	CBC <sup>-1</sup>  CBC <sup>-1</sup>  CFB <sup>-1</sup>	CPA/Bi	$2^{34}/2^{60}/2^{33}$		194
133	CBC <sup>-1</sup>  OFB ECB	CPA/MM	$2^{64}/2^{58}/2^{56}$		62
134	CBC <sup>-1</sup>  OFB CBC	CPA/(4) or CCA/(4)	$2^{66}/2^{58}/-$		134
135	CBC <sup>-1</sup>  OFB CBC <sup>-1</sup>	CPA/Col/G(5)	$2^{66}/2^{66}/-$		98
136	CBC <sup>-1</sup>  OFB OFB	CPA/I	$2^{65}/2^{65}/2^{65}$		170
137	CBC <sup>-1</sup>  OFB CFB	CPA/(4) or CCA/(4)	$2^{66}/2^{58}/-$		242
138	CBC <sup>-1</sup>  OFB CFB <sup>-1</sup>	CPA/Col/G	$2^{66}/2^{66}/-$		206
139	CBC <sup>-1</sup>  CFB ECB	CCA/Ex/Ex/Ex(2)	$4/2^{58}/-$	AAAB	74
140	CBC <sup>-1</sup>  CFB CBC	CCA/Ex/Ex	$5/2^{58}/-$	AAAAB	146
141	CBC <sup>-1</sup>  CFB CBC <sup>-1</sup>	CPA/Bi(8)	$2^{68}/2^{58}/2^{33}$		110
142	CBC <sup>-1</sup>  CFB OFB	CPA/I/Ex	$2^{65}/2^{65}/2^{65}$		182
143	CBC <sup>-1</sup>  CFB CFB	CCA/Ex/Bi	$2^{34}/2^{59}/2^{33}$	AAAA+...	254
144	CBC <sup>-1</sup>  CFB CFB <sup>-1</sup>	CPA/Bi(8)	$2^{66}/2^{58}/2^{33}$		218
145	CBC <sup>-1</sup>  CFB <sup>-1</sup>  ECB	CPA/Bi	$2^{34}/2^{59}/2^{33}$		68
146	CBC <sup>-1</sup>  CFB <sup>-1</sup>  CBC	CPA/Ex/Ex	$5/2^{58}/-$	AAAAB	140
147	CBC <sup>-1</sup>  CFB <sup>-1</sup>  CBC <sup>-1</sup>	CPA/Bi	$2^{34}/2^{60}/2^{33}$		104
148	CBC <sup>-1</sup>  CFB <sup>-1</sup>  OFB	CPA/Col	$2^{66}/2^{59}/-$		176
149	CBC <sup>-1</sup>  CFB <sup>-1</sup>  CFB	CPA/Ex/Ex	$5/2^{58}/-$	AAAAB	248
150	CBC <sup>-1</sup>  CFB <sup>-1</sup>  CFB <sup>-1</sup>	CPA/Bi	$2^{34}/2^{60}/2^{33}$		212
151	OFB ECB ECB	CCA/G/MM	$2^{64}/2^{58}/2^{56}$		46
152	OFB ECB CBC	CCA/G/Ex	$2^{64}/2^{58}/-$		118

continued

No.	Mode	Attack	Complexity	Data	Inverse
153	OFB ECB CBC <sup>-1</sup>	CCA/I	$2^{65}/2^{65}/2^{65}$		82
154	OFB ECB OFB	CPA/I or CCA/I	$2^{65}/2^{65}/2^{64}$		154
155	OFB ECB CFB	CCA/G/Ex	$2^{64}/2^{58}/-$		226
156	OFB ECB CFB <sup>-1</sup>	CCA/I	$2^{65}/2^{65}/2^{65}$		190
157	OFB CBC ECB	CCA/Ex/Ex	$2^{64}/2^{58}/-$		58
158	OFB CBC CBC	CCA/Col	$2^{66}/2^{59}/-$		130
159	OFB CBC CBC <sup>-1</sup>	CCA/I/H	$2^{66}/2^{66}/2^{66}$		94
160	OFB CBC OFB	CCA/I/G	$2^{66}/2^{66}/2^{66}$		166
161	OFB CBC CFB	CCA/Col	$2^{66}/2^{59}/-$		238
162	OFB CBC CFB <sup>-1</sup>	CCA/I/H	$2^{66}/2^{66}/2^{66}$		202
163	OFB CBC <sup>-1</sup>  ECB	CPA/Ex/G or CCA/I/Ex	$2^{65}/2^{58}/-$ or $2^{65}/2^{65}/2^{65}$		52
164	OFB CBC <sup>-1</sup>  CBC	CCA/I/Ex	$2^{65}/2^{65}/2^{65}$		124
165	OFB CBC <sup>-1</sup>  CBC <sup>-1</sup>	KIV-CPA(*)	$2^{64}/2^{59}/-$		88
166	OFB CBC <sup>-1</sup>  OFB	CPA/I/G	$2^{66}/2^{66}/2^{66}$		160
167	OFB CBC <sup>-1</sup>  CFB	CCA/I/Ex	$2^{65}/2^{65}/2^{65}$		232
168	OFB CBC <sup>-1</sup>  CFB <sup>-1</sup>	CPA/G(7)	$2^{65}/2^{60}/-$		196
169	OFB OFB ECB	CCA/I	$2^{65}/2^{65}/2^{65}$		64
170	OFB OFB CBC	CCA/I	$2^{65}/2^{65}/2^{65}$		136
171	OFB OFB CBC <sup>-1</sup>	CCA/J	$2^{67}/2^{75}/2^{66}$		100
172	OFB OFB OFB	KPA/J	$2^{67}/2^{75}/2^{66}$		172
173	OFB OFB CFB	CCA/I	$2^{65}/2^{65}/2^{65}$		244
174	OFB OFB CFB <sup>-1</sup>	CCA/J	$2^{67}/2^{75}/2^{66}$		208
175	OFB CFB ECB	CCA/Ex	$2^{64}/2^{58}/-$		76
176	OFB CFB CBC	CCA/Col	$2^{66}/2^{59}/-$		148
177	OFB CFB CBC <sup>-1</sup>	CCA/I/H	$2^{66}/2^{66}/2^{66}$		112
178	OFB CFB OFB	CCA/I/G	$2^{66}/2^{66}/2^{66}$		184
179	OFB CFB CFB	CCA/Col	$2^{66}/2^{59}/-$		256
180	OFB CFB CFB <sup>-1</sup>	CCA/I/H	$2^{66}/2^{66}/2^{66}$		220
181	OFB CFB <sup>-1</sup>  ECB	CPA/Ex/H or CCA/I	$2^{65}/2^{65}/-$ or $2^{65}/2^{65}/2^{65}$		70
182	OFB CFB <sup>-1</sup>  CBC	CCA/I/Ex	$2^{65}/2^{65}/2^{65}$		142
183	OFB CFB <sup>-1</sup>  CBC <sup>-1</sup>	CPA/G(7)	$2^{65}/2^{60}/-$		106
184	OFB CFB <sup>-1</sup>  OFB	CPA/I/G	$2^{66}/2^{66}/2^{66}$		178
185	OFB CFB <sup>-1</sup>  CFB	CCA/I/Ex	$2^{65}/2^{65}/2^{65}$		250
186	OFB CFB <sup>-1</sup>  CFB <sup>-1</sup>	KIV-CPA(*)	$2^{64}/2^{59}/-$		214
187	CFB ECB ECB	CCA/G/MM	$2^{64}/2^{58}/2^{56}$		48
188	CFB ECB CBC	CCA/Bi/Ex	$2^{34}/2^{58}/2^{33}$		120
189	CFB ECB CBC <sup>-1</sup>	CPA/H or CCA/H	$2^{68}/2^{66}/-$		84
190	CFB ECB OFB	CPA/I	$2^{65}/2^{65}/2^{65}$		156
191	CFB ECB CFB	CCA/Bi/Ex	$2^{34}/2^{59}/2^{33}$		228
192	CFB ECB CFB <sup>-1</sup>	CPA/H or CCA/H	$2^{68}/2^{66}/-$		192
193	CFB CBC ECB	CCA/Bi(6)	$2^{36}/2^{59}/2^{33}$		60
194	CFB CBC CBC	CCA/Bi	$2^{34}/2^{60}/2^{33}$		132
195	CFB CBC CBC <sup>-1</sup>	CCA/H(9)	$2^{68}/2^{58}/-$		96
196	CFB CBC OFB	CCA/G(7)	$2^{65}/2^{60}/-$		168
197	CFB CBC CFB	CCA/Bi	$2^{34}/2^{60}/2^{33}$		240
198	CFB CBC CFB <sup>-1</sup>	CCA/H(9)	$2^{68}/2^{58}/-$		204
199	CFB CBC <sup>-1</sup>  ECB	CPA/H or CCA/H	$2^{68}/2^{66}/-$		54
200	CFB CBC <sup>-1</sup>  CBC	CCA/Bi(8)	$2^{68}/2^{58}/2^{33}$		126
201	CFB CBC <sup>-1</sup>  CBC <sup>-1</sup>	CPA/H(9) [Ad or KIV or K <sub>1</sub> only]	$2^{68}/2^{66}/-$		90
202	CFB CBC <sup>-1</sup>  OFB	CPA/I/H	$2^{66}/2^{66}/2^{66}$		162
203	CFB CBC <sup>-1</sup>  CFB	CCA/Bi(8)	$2^{68}/2^{58}/2^{33}$		234
204	CFB CBC <sup>-1</sup>  CFB <sup>-1</sup>	CPA/H(9)	$2^{68}/2^{58}/-$		198
205	CFB OFB ECB	CCA/Ex/G	$2^{65}/2^{65}/-$		66
206	CFB OFB CBC	CCA/Col/G	$2^{66}/2^{66}/-$		138
207	CFB OFB CBC <sup>-1</sup>	2SKIV-KPA/MM(*)	$2/2^{58}/2^{56}$		102
208	CFB OFB OFB	CPA/J	$2^{67}/2^{75}/2^{66}$		174
209	CFB OFB CFB	CCA/Col/G	$2^{66}/2^{66}/-$		246
210	CFB OFB CFB <sup>-1</sup>	2SKIV-KPA/MM(*)	$2/2^{58}/2^{56}$		210

continued

No.	Mode	Attack	Complexity	Data	Inverse
211	CFB CFB ECB	CCA/Ex/Bi	$2^{34}/2^{59}/2^{33}$		78
212	CFB CFB CBC	CCA/Bi	$2^{34}/2^{60}/2^{33}$		150
213	CFB CFB CBC <sup>-1</sup>	CCA/H(9) [Ad or KIV or $K_3$ only]	$2^{68}/2^{66}/-$		114
214	CFB CFB OFB	KIV-CCA(*)	$2^{64}/2^{59}/-$		186
215	CFB CFB CFB	CCA/Bi	$2^{34}/2^{60}/2^{33}$		258
216	CFB CFB CFB <sup>-1</sup>	CCA/H(9) [Ad or KIV or $K_3$ only]	$2^{68}/2^{66}/-$		222
217	CFB CFB <sup>-1</sup>  ECB	CPA/Ex/H or CCA/Ex/H	$2^{66}/2^{66}/2^{66}$		72
218	CFB CFB <sup>-1</sup>  CBC	CCA/Bi(8)	$2^{66}/2^{58}/2^{33}$		144
219	CFB CFB <sup>-1</sup>  CBC <sup>-1</sup>	CPA/H(9)	$2^{68}/2^{58}/-$		108
220	CFB CFB <sup>-1</sup>  OFB	CPA/I/H	$2^{68}/2^{66}/2^{66}$		180
221	CFB CFB <sup>-1</sup>  CFB	CCA/Bi(8)	$2^{66}/2^{58}/2^{33}$		252
222	CFB CFB <sup>-1</sup>  CFB <sup>-1</sup>	CPA/H(9) [Ad or KIV or $K_1$ only]	$2^{68}/2^{66}/-$		216
223	CFB <sup>-1</sup>  ECB ECB	CPA/Bi/MM	$2^{33}/2^{58}/2^{56}$		47
224	CFB <sup>-1</sup>  ECB CBC	CPA/Ex/Ex or CCA/Ex/Ex	$4/2^{58}/-$	BAAA or AAAB	119
225	CFB <sup>-1</sup>  ECB CBC <sup>-1</sup>	CPA/Bi/Ex	$2^{34}/2^{59}/2^{33}$		83
226	CFB <sup>-1</sup>  ECB OFB	CPA/G/Ex	$2^{64}/2^{58}/-$		155
227	CFB <sup>-1</sup>  ECB CFB	CPA/Ex/Ex or CCA/Ex/Ex	$4/2^{58}/-$	AAAB	227
228	CFB <sup>-1</sup>  ECB CFB <sup>-1</sup>	CPA/Bi/Ex	$2^{34}/2^{59}/2^{33}$		191
229	CFB <sup>-1</sup>  CBC ECB	CCA/Ex/Ex	$5/2^{59}/-$	AABBA	59
230	CFB <sup>-1</sup>  CBC CBC	CCA/Ex/Bi	$2^{34}/2^{59}/2^{33}$	AAAA+...	131
231	CFB <sup>-1</sup>  CBC CBC <sup>-1</sup>	CPA/Bi(8)	$2^{66}/2^{58}/2^{33}$		95
232	CFB <sup>-1</sup>  CBC OFB	CPA/I/Ex	$2^{65}/2^{65}/2^{65}$		167
233	CFB <sup>-1</sup>  CBC CFB	CCA/Ex/Ex	$5/2^{58}/-$	BAAAA	239
234	CFB <sup>-1</sup>  CBC CFB <sup>-1</sup>	CPA/Bi(8)	$2^{68}/2^{58}/2^{33}$		203
235	CFB <sup>-1</sup>  CBC <sup>-1</sup>  ECB	CPA/Bi	$2^{34}/2^{59}/2^{33}$		53
236	CFB <sup>-1</sup>  CBC <sup>-1</sup>  CBC	CPA/Ex/Ex	$5/2^{58}/-$	BAAAA	125
237	CFB <sup>-1</sup>  CBC <sup>-1</sup>  CBC <sup>-1</sup>	CPA/Bi	$2^{34}/2^{60}/2^{33}$		89
238	CFB <sup>-1</sup>  CBC <sup>-1</sup>  OFB	CPA/Col	$2^{66}/2^{59}/-$		161
239	CFB <sup>-1</sup>  CBC <sup>-1</sup>  CFB	CPA/Ex/Ex	$5/2^{58}/-$	BAAAA	233
240	CFB <sup>-1</sup>  CBC <sup>-1</sup>  CFB <sup>-1</sup>	CPA/Bi	$2^{34}/2^{60}/2^{33}$		197
241	CFB <sup>-1</sup>  OFB ECB	CPA/MM	$2^{64}/2^{58}/2^{56}$		65
242	CFB <sup>-1</sup>  OFB CBC	CPA/(4) or CCA/(4)	$2^{66}/2^{58}/-$		137
243	CFB <sup>-1</sup>  OFB CBC <sup>-1</sup>	CPA/Col/G	$2^{66}/2^{66}/-$		101
244	CFB <sup>-1</sup>  OFB OFB	CPA/I	$2^{65}/2^{65}/2^{65}$		173
245	CFB <sup>-1</sup>  OFB CFB	CPA/(4) or CCA/(4)	$2^{66}/2^{58}/-$		245
246	CFB <sup>-1</sup>  OFB CFB <sup>-1</sup>	CPA/Col/G	$2^{66}/2^{66}/-$		209
247	CFB <sup>-1</sup>  CFB ECB	CCA/Ex/Ex/Ex	$4/2^{58}/-$	AAAB	77
248	CFB <sup>-1</sup>  CFB CBC	CCA/Ex/Bi	$5/2^{58}/-$	AAAAB	149
249	CFB <sup>-1</sup>  CFB CBC <sup>-1</sup>	CPA/Bi(8)	$2^{68}/2^{58}/2^{33}$		113
250	CFB <sup>-1</sup>  CFB OFB	CPA/I/Ex	$2^{65}/2^{65}/2^{65}$		185
251	CFB <sup>-1</sup>  CFB CFB	CCA/Ex/Bi	$2^{34}/2^{59}/2^{33}$	AAAA+...	257
252	CFB <sup>-1</sup>  CFB CFB <sup>-1</sup>	CPA/Bi(8)	$2^{66}/2^{58}/2^{33}$		221
253	CFB <sup>-1</sup>  CFB <sup>-1</sup>  ECB	CPA/Bi	$2^{34}/2^{59}/2^{33}$		71
254	CFB <sup>-1</sup>  CFB <sup>-1</sup>  CBC	CPA/Ex/Bi	$2^{34}/2^{59}/2^{33}$	AAAA+...	143
255	CFB <sup>-1</sup>  CFB <sup>-1</sup>  CBC <sup>-1</sup>	CPA/Bi	$2^{34}/2^{60}/2^{33}$		107
256	CFB <sup>-1</sup>  CFB <sup>-1</sup>  OFB	CPA/Col	$2^{66}/2^{59}/-$		179
257	CFB <sup>-1</sup>  CFB <sup>-1</sup>  CFB	CPA/Ex/Bi	$2^{34}/2^{59}/2^{33}$	AAAA+...	251
258	CFB <sup>-1</sup>  CFB <sup>-1</sup>  CFB <sup>-1</sup>	CPA/Bi	$2^{34}/2^{60}/2^{33}$		215

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