Combinatorial Repairability for Threshold Schemes[*]

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Abstract

In this paper, we consider methods whereby a subset of players in a (k, n)-threshold scheme can "repair" another player's share in the event that their share has been lost or corrupted. This will take place without the participation of the dealer who set up the scheme. The repairing protocol should not compromise the (unconditional) security of the threshold scheme, and it should be efficient, where efficiency is measured in terms of the amount of information exchanged during the repairing process. We study two approaches to repairing. The first method is based on the "enrollment protocol" from [9] which was originally developed to add a new player to a threshold scheme (without the participation of the dealer) after the scheme was set up. The second method distributes "multiple shares" to each player, as defined by a suitable combinatorial design. This method results in larger shares, but lower communication complexity, as compared to the first method.

1 Introduction

Suppose that k_1, k_2 and n are positive integers such that $k_1 < k_2 \leq n$. Informally, a (k_1, k_2, n)-*ramp scheme* is a method whereby a *dealer* chooses a *secret* and distributes a *share* to each of n *players* such that the following two properties are satisfied:

reconstruction Any subset of k_2 players can compute the secret from the shares that they collectively hold, and

secrecy No subset of k_1 players can determine any information about the secret.

We call k_1 and k_2 the *lower threshold* and *upper threshold* of the scheme, respectively. When $k_2 = k_1 + 1 = k$, a ramp scheme is known as a (k, n)-*threshold scheme*.

In this paper, we are only interested in schemes that are *unconditionally secure*. That is, all security results are valid against adversaries with unlimited computational power.

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The original motivation for ramp schemes (as opposed to threshold schemes) is that ramp schemes permit larger secrets be shared for a given share size. The efficiency of secret sharing is often measured in terms of the *information rate* of the scheme, which is defined to be the ratio $\rho = \log_2 |\mathcal{K}| / \log_2 |\mathcal{S}|$ (where $\mathcal{S}$ is the set of all possible shares and $\mathcal{K}$ is the set of all possible secrets). That is, the information rate is the ratio of the size of the secret to the size of a share.

For a threshold scheme, a fundamental result states that $\rho \leq 1$. However, there are constructions for ramp schemes where the (optimal) information rate is $k_2 - k_1$; for non-threshold ramp schemes, this quantity exceeds one.

We briefly describe a standard construction for ramp schemes with optimal information rate (see, e.g., [11]). In the threshold case, this is just the classical Shamir threshold scheme [12]. The construction takes place over a finite field $\mathbb{F}_Q$, where $Q \geq n + 1$.

1. In the **Initialization Phase**, the dealer, denoted by D, chooses n distinct, non-zero elements of $\mathbb{F}_Q$, denoted x_i, $1 \leq i \leq n$. The values x_i are public. For $1 \leq i \leq n$, D gives the value x_i to P_i.

2. Let $\lambda = k_2 - k_1$. In the **Share Distribution** phase, D chooses a secret
$$K = (a_0, \ldots, a_{\lambda-1}) \in (\mathbb{F}_Q)^\lambda.$$

   Then D secretly chooses (independently and uniformly at random) $a_\lambda, \ldots, a_{k_2-1} \in \mathbb{F}_Q$. Next, for $1 \leq i \leq n$, D computes $y_i = a(x_i)$, where
$$a(x) = \sum_{j=0}^{k_2-1} a_j \, x^j.$$

   Finally, for $1 \leq i \leq n$, D constructs the share $y_i = a(x_i)$ and gives it to P_i.

Reconstruction is easily accomplished using the Lagrange interpolation formula (see, e.g., [14, §13.1]).

1.1 Share Repairability

The problem of *share repairability* has been considered by several authors in recent years (see, for example, [8]). We will mainly consider repairability of threshold schemes. The problem setting is that a certain player P_ℓ (in a (k, n)-threshold scheme, say) loses their share. The goal is to find a "secure" protocol involving P_ℓ and a subset of the other players that allows the missing share y_ℓ to be reconstructed. (Of course the dealer could simply re-send the share to P_ℓ, but we are considering a setting where the dealer is no longer present in the scheme after the initial setup.) In general, we will assume secure pairwise channels linking pairs of players.

We consider protocols that operate in two phases:

1. In the **message exchange phase**, a certain subset of d players (not including P_ℓ) exchange messages among themselves. The integer d is called the *repairing degree*. We will only consider protocols where each player sends at most one message to any other player, and every message is sent at the same time.

2. In the **repairing phase**, these same d players each send a message to P_ℓ. The messages received by P_ℓ allow P_ℓ's share to be reconstructed. Some of the protocols we study only require a repairing phase.

We note that $d \geq k$ is an obvious necessary condition for the existence of such a scheme. This is seen as follows. Suppose $k-1$ players could repair another player's share. Then these $k-1$ players would have k shares, which would enable them to reconstruct the secret. This is of course not allowed in a (k, n)-threshold scheme.

We have to consider what it means for a protocol of this type to be "secure". Our definition of security is motivated by the required threshold property. In general, we will consider a coalition of $k-1$ players. This coalition may or may not include P_ℓ. We assume that all players execute the protocol correctly, but the coalition is trying to obtain some information about the secret. (Thus we are assuming that the coalition is "honest-but-curious".) After executing the protocol, the coalition combines all the information it holds. This includes their shares, as well as all messages that they send or receive during the protocol. All of this information should still yield no information about the secret. If a (k, n)-threshold scheme has a repairability protocol that satisfies this security requirement, then we say that it is a (k, n, d)-*repairable threshold scheme*, which we abbreviate to (k, n, d)-*RTS*.

We distinguish between two types of repairability in this paper. We will say that an (n, k, d)-RTS has *universal repairability* if *any* subset of d players can repair a share of any other player. Most previous discussions of repairability in the literature have implicitly or explicitly considered this model. A weaker condition would be to require only that *there exists* a subset of d players who will be able to repair a given share belonging to some other player. We will call this *restricted repairability*.

One potential advantage of considering restricted repairability is that it can lead to more efficient schemes, where efficiency is measured in terms of information rate (of the threshold scheme) and/or communication complexity (of the repairing process). This is one of the themes we explore in this paper.

1.2 Our Contributions

We present two repairability schemes in this paper. The first scheme is a modification of an enrollment protocol due to Nojoumian *et al.* described in [9, 10]. In this scheme, any k users are able to repair a share of another user, and the scheme provides universal repairability. Thus it is a (k, n, k)-RTS. The underlying threshold scheme is just the Shamir secret sharing scheme, which is an ideal scheme (i.e., the information rate is equal to 1).

The second scheme provides restricted repairability. It combines two schemes and can lead to a solution with higher information rate and lower communication complexity (so it trades off larger share sizes for less information communicated during repairing). It uses a distribution design having certain properties to allocate subsets of shares of a Shamir scheme (or a ramp scheme) to each user. We look at various types of combinatorial designs that yield good solutions for repairability when used in this way.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the enrollment protocol, modified to provide repairability. In Section 3, we give a brief overview of the Guang-Lu-Fu Scheme [8]. Section 4 presents our second scheme, which has a somewhat

similar flavour. Then, in Section 5, we examine various types of distribution designs and the repairable threshold schemes that can be obtained form them. In Section 6. we compare our construction to the GLF scheme from [8]. Section 7 addresses the problem of universal repairability in the combinatorial setting. Finally, Section 8 is a brief conclusion.

2 NSG Enrollment Protocol

The *enrollment protocol* from [10, 9] was introduced to create a share for a new player in a threshold scheme, without requiring the participation of the dealer who initially set up the scheme. It was also described in a setting where threshold of the scheme was to be altered. Here, we discuss a straightforward modification where the protocol is used to repair a share, without changing the threshold. This protocol has repairing degree k and achieves universal repairability.

Suppose we have a (k, n)-Shamir threshold scheme defined over $\mathbb{F}_Q$, and we wish to repair the share for a player P_ℓ. We assume that this share is being repaired by players $P_1, \ldots, P_k$ and $\ell > k$. Suppose the share for P_ℓ is $\varphi_\ell = f(\ell)$, where $f(x) \in \mathbb{F}_Q[x]$ is a random polynomial of degree at most $k - 1$ whose constant term is the secret. The share φ_ℓ can be expressed as

$$\varphi_\ell = \sum_{i=1}^{k} \gamma_i \varphi_i, \tag{1}$$

where the γ_i's are public Lagrange coefficients (see, e.g., [14, §13.1]). In what follows, all arithmetic is performed in $\mathbb{F}_Q$.

The enrollment protocol proceeds as follows:

1. For all $1 \le i \le k$, player P_i computes random values $\delta_{j,i}$ for $1 \le j \le k$ such that

$$\gamma_i \varphi_i = \sum_{j=1}^{k} \delta_{j,i}. \tag{2}$$

2. For all $1 \le i \le k$, $1 \le j \le k$, player P_i transmits $\delta_{j,i}$ to player P_j using a secure channel.

3. For all $1 \le j \le k$, player P_j computes

$$\sigma_j = \sum_{i=1}^{k} \delta_{j,i}. \tag{3}$$

4. For all $1 \le j \le k$, player P_j transmits σ_j to player P_ℓ using a secure channel.

5. Player P_ℓ computes their share φ_ℓ using the formula

$$\varphi_\ell = \sum_{j=1}^{k} \sigma_j. \tag{4}$$

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It is straightforward to verify that player P_ℓ computes their share correctly, i.e., the value of φ_ℓ computed using (2), (3) and (4) is the same as (1).

Let us consider the security of this protocol. We assume that all players act honestly during the protocol and do not reveal any information while the protocol is being executed. Later, however, it may be the case that a coalition $\mathcal{C}$ of $k - 1$ participants attempts to compute some information about the secret. We will show that this is impossible. Note that we are basically describing the security proof from [10, §2.4.2c] with a few additional details added.

First, we note that computing the secret, given $k - 1$ shares, is equivalent to computing any additional share. This is easy to see, because any k shares allow the secret to be computed, and any $k - 1$ shares along with the secret allow any other share to be computed (this is a well-known property of the Shamir scheme).

There are two cases to consider:

case (i) The coalition $\mathcal{C}$ consists of a subset of $k - 1$ players in $\{P_1, \ldots, P_k\}$.

case (ii) The coalition $\mathcal{C}$ consists of P_ℓ along with a subset of $k - 2$ players in $\{P_1, \ldots, P_k\}$.

It is convenient to consider the following *share-exchange matrix* defined in [10]:

$$
\mathcal{E} = \begin{pmatrix} \delta_{1,1} & \delta_{2,1} & \cdots & \delta_{k,1} \\ \delta_{1,2} & \delta_{2,2} & \cdots & \delta_{k,2} \\ \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ \delta_{1,k} & \delta_{2,k} & \cdots & \delta_{k,k}. \end{pmatrix}.
$$

Observe from (2) that the sum of the entries in the ith row of $\mathcal{E}$ is equal to $\gamma_i \varphi_i$. Also, from (3), the sum of the entries in the jth column of $\mathcal{E}$ is equal to σ_j, so P_ℓ knows all k column sums. Finally, it is immediate from (2), (3) and (4) that the sum of all the entries in $\mathcal{E}$ is equal to φ_ℓ.

In case (i), we can assume without loss of generality that $\mathcal{C} = \{P_1, \ldots, P_{k-1}\}$. Here the coalition $\mathcal{C}$ possesses all the entries in $\mathcal{E}$ except for $\delta_{k,k}$. But this value is completely random, and knowing this value is equivalent to knowing the value of φ_k, φ_ℓ or the secret. We conclude that $\mathcal{C}$ has no information about the secret in this case.

Case (ii) is a bit more complicated. Here, we can assume without loss of generality that $\mathcal{C} = \{P_1, \ldots, P_{k-2}, P_\ell\}$. The coalition $\mathcal{C}$ possesses all the entries in $\mathcal{E}$ except for the four entries $\delta_{k-1,k-1}$, $\delta_{k-1,k}$, $\delta_{k,k-1}$ and $\delta_{k,k}$. Further, since P_ℓ knows the column sums, the equations

$$
\sigma_{k-1} = \delta_{k-1,k-1} + \delta_{k-1,k} \tag{5}
$$

and

$$
\sigma_k = \delta_{k,k-1} + \delta_{k,k} \tag{6}
$$

are known. So we have two linear equations in four unknowns.

Of course P_ℓ also knows the value of the share φ_ℓ, and φ_ℓ is a known linear combination of the k shares $\varphi_1, \ldots, \varphi_k$, as given by (1). But only the first $k - 2$ of these shares are known to $\mathcal{C}$.

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It is possible to choose arbitrary values for $\delta_{k-1,k-1}$ and $\delta_{k,k-1}$. Thus

$$\varphi_{k-1} = \frac{\delta_{k-1,k-1} + \delta_{k,k-1}}{\gamma_{k-1}}$$

can take on any arbitrary value. Then the values of $\delta_{k-1,k}$ and $\delta_{k,k}$ (and hence φ_k) will be determined by (5) and (6).

Similarly, we could choose an arbitrary value for φ_k and then φ_{k-1} would be determined. In either case, the coalition knows the values of $k-1$ shares, but they have no information about the individual shares φ_{k-1} and φ_k. Since this represents all the information available to $\mathcal{C}$, we conclude that $\mathcal{C}$ also has no information about the secret in case (ii).

2.1 Communication Complexity of the Enrollment Protocol

The *communication complexity* of a share repairing scheme is the sum of the sizes (i.e., the bit-lengths) of all the messages transmitted during the protocol divided by the bit-length of the secret. In the enrollment protocol, every message is an element of $\mathbb{F}_Q$, as is the secret. Therefore, the communication complexity is equal to the total number of messages transmitted. It is computed as follows:

- $k(k-1)$ in step 2,

- k in step 4, and

- therefore the total is k^2.

2.2 Ramp Scheme Repairability

The same protocol works in the case of a ramp scheme. Here we need k_2 players to reconstruct a lost secret. The same Lagrange formula applies in this situation, since a share is just an evaluation of the polynomial at a particular point. The security proof needs to be modified to consider security against coalitions of k_1 players. As was the situation in analyzing the threshold scheme, there are two cases to consider:

case (i) The coalition $\mathcal{C}$ consists of a subset of k_1 players in $\{P_1, \ldots, P_{k_2}\}$.

case (ii) The coalition $\mathcal{C}$ consists of P_ℓ along with a subset of k_1-1 players in $\{P_1, \ldots, P_{k_2}\}$.

We briefly outline the proof in the two cases.

In case (i), we can assume without loss of generality that $\mathcal{C} = \{P_1, \ldots, P_{k_1}\}$. The coalition $\mathcal{C}$ possesses all the entries in the share-exchange matrix $\mathcal{E}$ except for the λ by λ lower right submatrix of $\mathcal{E}$ (where $\lambda = k_2 - k_1$). The entries of this submatrix can be filled in such that they are consistent with any possible values of the λ shares $\varphi_{k_1+1}, \ldots, \varphi_{k_2}$. Therefore, the secret is completely undetermined.

In case (ii), we assume that $\mathcal{C} = \{P_1, \ldots, P_{k_1-1}, P_\ell\}$. Then $\mathcal{C}$ possesses all the entries in $\mathcal{E}$ except for the $\lambda+1$ by $\lambda+1$ lower right submatrix of $\mathcal{E}$. The coalition also knows the value of φ_ℓ as well as the column sums $\sigma_{k_1}, \ldots, \sigma_{k_2}$. Any λ rows of this submatrix can be filled in with arbitrary values, which means that the λ corresponding shares can take on arbitrary values. The values in the remaining row of the submatrix are then determined by the known

column sums, which means that the share corresponding to this row is determined. So the information available to the coalition consists of k_2 known shares, and it is consistent with any possible values of any λ additional shares. So the coalition has no information about the secret.

In conclusion, we have shown that $\mathcal{C}$ has no information about the secret in either of the two cases.

3   Guang-Lu-Fu (GLF) Scheme

The GLF scheme, described in [8], has a lower information rate than the enrollment scheme, but also lower communication complexity. As such, it achieves a tradeoff between these two measures. The GLF scheme provides universal repairability and it is based on linearized polynomials and minimum bandwidth regeneration (MBR) codes [6]. We do not discuss the scheme in detail, but we will refer to its basic properties where it is relevant to do so.

We recall one example from [8] to illustrate the basic idea. Example 2 from [8] is a $(2, 4)$-threshold scheme with information rate $1/3$. The secret is an element over $\mathbb{F}_Q$ and each share is a triple over $\mathbb{F}_Q$. The repairing degree $d = 3$. Repairing a player works as follows. Each of three players send one message to the fourth player, where a message is an element of $\mathbb{F}_Q$. The three messages received enable the three components of the share to be reconstructed. For this scheme, we would say that the total communication complexity is 3. This is an improvement over the communication complexity (which is equal to 4) using the enrollment scheme for a $(2, 4)$-threshold scheme.

4   A New Technique for Combinatorial Repairability

In this section, we present a (k, n)-threshold scheme with low information rate and communication complexity that achieves restricted repairability. We base our construction on an old technique, namely giving each player a subset of shares from an underlying threshold scheme[1]. We will start with an (ℓ, m)-threshold scheme, say a Shamir scheme, implemented over a finite field $\mathbb{F}_Q$. This is called the *base scheme*. We then give each player a certain subset of d of the m shares. A *design* consisting of n blocks of size d, defined on a set of m points, will be used to do this. This design is termed the *distribution design.* The repairing degree will be equal to d.

We will call the shares of the base (ℓ, m)-threshold scheme *subshares.* Each share in the resulting (k, n)-threshold scheme consists of d subshares. We need to ensure that the threshold property is satisfied for the resulting (k, n)-threshold scheme, which we call the *expanded scheme.* We also need to be able to repair the share of any player in the expanded scheme by judiciously choosing a certain set of other players, who will then send appropriate subshares to the player whose share is being repaired.

Let the blocks in the distribution design be denoted $B_1, \ldots, B_n$ and let X denote the set of m points. The threshold property will be satisfied in the expanded scheme provided that the following two conditions are satisfied:

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[1]This technique has most commonly been considered in the past in connection with the construction of secret sharing schemes for non-threshold access structures; see, e.g., [3, Theorem 1].

1. the union of any k blocks contains at least ℓ points, and

2. the union of any $k - 1$ blocks contains at most $\ell - 1$ points.

We are considering a repairing scheme where certain designated players transmit subshares to the player whose share is being repaired. This technique can be applied provided that every point in the distribution design occurs in at least two blocks (this is a necessary and sufficient condition for this kind of repairability to be possible). Therefore, if this property is satisfied, we say that the distribution design is *repairable*.

Suppose we want to repair the share corresponding to a block B. For each point $x \in B$, we can find another block that contains x (because the distribution design is repairable). The corresponding player can send the subshare corresponding to x to the player whose node is being repaired. The communication complexity of the expanded scheme will be equal to d, since d elements of $\mathbb{F}_Q$ are transmitted to repair a share of a secret in $\mathbb{F}_Q$.

It is not a requirement that the d subshares are obtained from d different blocks. For example, it could happen that $d = 3$, one block contributes two subshares, and one block contributes one subshare during the repairing process. However, we will frequently be considering schemes where we have d blocks, each of which contributes one subshare. This is analogous to the model from [8], where it is assumed that each player contributes a constant number β of "elements" to the player whose share is begin repaired (where an "element" is a subshare or a certain linear combination of subshares).

It is quite simple to analyze the security of combinatorial repairability. The main point to observe is that the information collectively held by any subset of players (after the repairing protocol is completed) consists only of their shares in the expanded scheme. They did not obtain any information collectively that they did not already possess before the execution of the repairing protocol. So it is immediate that a set $k - 1$ players cannot compute the secret after the repairing of a share occurs.

4.1   Using Ramp Schemes as Base Schemes

We have one additional useful modification to describe. Suppose that the distribution design satisfies the following two properties.

1. the union of any k blocks contains at least ℓ_2 points, and

2. the union of any $k - 1$ blocks contains at most ℓ_1 points,

where $\ell_2 - \ell_1 \geq 1$. In this case we say that the distribution design is a (k, ℓ_1, ℓ_2)-*distribution design*. See Table 1 for a summary of the parameters and required properties of a distribution design.

Given a (k, ℓ_1, ℓ_2)-distribution design, we let the base scheme be an (ℓ_1, ℓ_2, m)-ramp scheme[2] defined over $\mathbb{F}_Q$ (this can be done if $Q \geq m + 1$). Then we use the distribution design to distribute shares to the n players. This yields a (k, n)-threshold scheme (the expanded scheme) having information rate $(\ell_2 - \ell_1)/d$.

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[2]Note that, if $\ell_2 - \ell_1 = 1$, then the ramp scheme is a threshold scheme, and we have the construction described in the previous section.

Table 1: Parameters and properties of a (k, ℓ_1, ℓ_2)-distribution design

m	number of points in the design
n	number of blocks in the design (= the number of players)
d	block size (= the repairing degree)
k	threshold
ℓ_1	maximum number of points in the union of $k-1$ blocks
ℓ_2	minimum number of points in the union of k blocks

Repairing works exactly as before, and d subshares, each of which is an element of $\mathbb{F}_Q$, are transmitted to repair a share. However, the secret is now an element in $(\mathbb{F}_Q)^{\ell_2 - \ell_1}$, so the communication complexity is now $d/(\ell_2 - \ell_1)$. (Note that this is just the reciprocal of the information rate of the expanded scheme.)

Theorem 4.1. *Suppose there exists a repairable (k, ℓ_1, ℓ_2)-distribution design on m points, having n blocks of size d, and suppose that $Q \geq m + 1$. Then there is a (k, n, d)-RTS with restricted repairability, having information rate $(\ell_2 - \ell_1)/d$ and communication complexity $d/(\ell_2 - \ell_1)$, where every share is in $(\mathbb{F}_Q)^d$.*

Suppose we have a (k, ℓ_1, ℓ_2)-distribution design on n blocks in which every point occurs in at least two blocks, as required in Theorem 4.1. If we take an arbitrary subset of the blocks of such a design, then it may not be the case that every point occurs in at least two blocks of the "smaller" design. It would be convenient to have a simple method of selecting subsets of blocks of a design in such a way that this property continues to be satisfied.

Here is the approach we will use to achieve this objective. We say that a subset of s blocks in a (k, ℓ_1, ℓ_2)-distribution design on n blocks is a *basic repairing set of size s* if every point in the design is contained in at least two blocks in the basic repairing set. It is obvious that any superset of a basic repairing set is repairable. So we have the following result.

Theorem 4.2. *Suppose there exists a (k, ℓ_1, ℓ_2)-distribution design on m points, having b blocks of size d, and suppose that $Q \geq m + 1$. Suppose that this design contains a basic repairing set of size s. Then, for any n such that $s \leq n \leq b$, there is a (k, n, d)-RTS with restricted repairability, having information rate $(\ell_2 - \ell_1)/d$ and communication complexity $d/(\ell_2 - \ell_1)$, where every share is an element of $(\mathbb{F}_Q)^d$.*

5 Some Distribution Designs and the Resulting RTS

In this section, we provide some examples of distribution designs and describe how they can be used to construct repairable secret sharing schemes. The designs we use are Steiner triple systems, resolvable $(m, d, 1)$-BIBDs and projective planes.

5.1 Steiner Triple Systems

We first consider using a Steiner triple system as a distribution design. This only allows certain thresholds, but the number of players can take on a large range of values. A *Steiner*

triple system of order m (or, STS(m)) has m points and $b = m(m-1)/6$ blocks of size 3, and every pair of points occurs in exactly one block. An STS(m) can also be defined as an $(m, 3, 1)$-BIBD (balanced incomplete block design). For a comprehensive reference on Steiner triple systems, see [5].

Using the blocks of an STS(m) as a distribution design would yield repairing degree $d = 3$. The simplest application would be to take $k = 2$. The union of any two blocks in the design contains at least five points, and each block contains three points. Hence we can take $\ell_1 = 3$, $\ell_2 = 5$ and use a $(3, 5, m)$-ramp scheme as the base scheme. The expanded scheme will be a $(2, n, 3)$-RTS having information rate $2/3$ and communication complexity is $3/2$. This is certainly an improved communication complexity as compared to the enrollment protocol with threshold $k = 2$, which has communication complexity 4.

We still need to determine the permissible values of n in the above construction. It will be advantageous to make use of resolvable STS(m). An STS(m) is *resolvable* if the set of $b = m(m-1)/6$ blocks can be partitioned into $b = (m-1)/2$ *parallel classes*, where each parallel class consists of $m/3$ disjoint blocks. It is well-known that a *resolvable* STS(m) exists if and only if $m \equiv 3 \pmod 6$.

Suppose we use a resolvable STS(m) as our distribution design. Then two parallel classes in this design comprise a basic repairing set of size $2m/3$. As a result, we can accommodate any number n of players such that $2m/3 \le n \le m(m-1)/6$. We have proved the following theorem.

Theorem 5.1. *Suppose* $m \equiv 3 \pmod 6$, Q *is a prime power such that* $Q \ge m + 1$ *and* $2m/3 \le n \le m(m-1)/6$. *Then there exists a* $(2, n, 3)$-*RTS with restricted repairability, with shares from* $(\mathbb{F}_Q)^3$, *having information rate* $2/3$ *and communication complexity* $3/2$.

Example 5.1. *The smallest interesting application of Theorem 5.1 is when* $m = 9$. *The distribution design is a resolvable* STS(9), *consisting of four parallel classes of three blocks. We take two parallel classes to form the basic repairing sent, along with an arbitrary subset of the remaining six blocks. In this way, we can construct a* $(2, n, 3)$-*RTS for any* n *such that* $6 \le n \le 12$. *The scheme has information rate* $2/3$ *and communication complexity* $3/2$. *Subshares are elements of* $\mathbb{F}_Q$, *where* $Q \ge 11$ *is any prime power, and the secret is an element of* $(\mathbb{F}_Q)^2$. *Shares consist of three elements of* $\mathbb{F}_Q$.

5.1.1 Quadrilateral-free STS

What if we use an STS to try to construct a scheme with a higher threshold? The union of two blocks contains at most six points (and equality is achieved if the two blocks are disjoint). However, it is easy to find sets of three blocks whose union contains six points (e.g., three blocks of the form xyz, xuv, uyw). Even four blocks might have a union consisting of six points: xyz, xuv, uyw, vzw. Such a set of four blocks is known as a *quadrilateral* or *Pasch configuration*. However, it is possible to construct Steiner triple systems that do not contain any Pasch configurations. These designs are termed *anti-Pasch* Steiner triple systems. An anti-Pasch Steiner triple system exists for any order $m \equiv 1, 3 \pmod 6$, $m \ne 7, 13$ (see [7]).

In an anti-Pasch Steiner triple system, the union of two blocks contain at most six points, and the union of four blocks contain at least seven points. Therefore, the expanded scheme is a $(2, 4, n)$-ramp scheme. So we have weakened the desired threshold property in

the expanded scheme, but we still might get something interesting if we can identify a small repairing set. In fact, infinite classes of resolvable anti-Pasch Steiner triple systems are known. For example, in [4], it is shown that a resolvable anti-Pasch Steiner triple system of order m exists for any positive integer $m \equiv 9 \bmod 18$. We can use any two parallel classes of the design as a basic repairing set, as we did in Theorem 5.1.

5.2 BIBDs with $\lambda = 1$

Using the blocks of an $(m, 4, 1)$-BIBD as a distribution design would yield a scheme with repair degree $d = 4$. We have the following result.

Theorem 5.2. *Suppose $m \equiv 4 \pmod{12}$, Q is a prime power such that $Q \geq m + 1$ and $m/2 \leq n \leq m(m-1)/12$. Then there exists a $(2, n, 4)$-RTS with restricted repairability, with shares from $(\mathbb{F}_Q)^4$, having information rate $3/4$ and communication complexity $4/3$.*

Proof. If $m \equiv 4 \pmod{12}$, then there is a resolvable $(m, 4, 1)$-BIBD. The union of any two blocks in a $(m, 4, 1)$-BIBD contains at least seven points, and each block contains four points. Hence we can take $k = 2$, $\ell_1 = 4$ and $\ell_2 = 7$, and use a $(4, 7, m)$-ramp scheme as the base scheme. The expanded scheme will be a $(2, n, 4)$-RTS having information rate $3/4$ and repair degree 4. The communication complexity is $4/3$.

Two parallel classes in the BIBD comprise a basic repairing set of size $m/2$. As a result, we can accommodate any value of n such that $m/2 \leq n \leq m(m-1)/12$. $\square$

As mentioned before, the enrollment protocol with threshold $k = 2$ has communication complexity equal to 4, so the communication complexity is lowered quite considerably in Theorem 5.2.

Using the same idea, we can use other known classes of resolvable $(m, d, 1)$-BIBDs to construct repairable threshold schemes. When d increases, the threshold may also increase. We illustrate by stating results for the cases $d = 5$ and $d = 8$. The proofs are similar to Theorem 5.1 and 5.2.

Theorem 5.3. *Suppose $m \equiv 5 \pmod{20}$ and there exists a resolvable $(m, 5, 1)$-BIBD. Let Q be a prime power such that $Q \geq m + 1$ and $2m/5 \leq n \leq m(m-1)/20$. Then the following RTS exist:*

1. *A $(2, n, 5)$-RTS with restricted repairability, with shares from $(\mathbb{F}_Q)^5$, having information rate $4/5$ and communication complexity $5/4$.*

2. *A $(3, n, 5)$-RTS with restricted repairability, with shares from $(\mathbb{F}_Q)^5$, having information rate $2/5$ and communication complexity $5/2$.*

Proof. The verifications are straightforward. We note that the union of two blocks in the BIBD contains either nine or ten points, and the union of three blocks in the design contains at least 12 points. So we can take $\ell_1 = 5$ and $\ell_2 = 9$ when $k = 2$, and $\ell_1 = 10$ and $\ell_2 = 12$ when $k = 3$. $\square$

The first few values of m for which Theorem 5.3 can be applied are $m = 25, 65$ and 85. Actually, resolvable $(m, 5, 1)$-BIBDs are known to exist for all $m \equiv 5 \bmod 20$ except $m = 45, 345, 465, 645$ (see [1]).

We state the following similar result without proof.

Theorem 5.4. *Suppose* $m \equiv 8$ *(mod 56) and there exists a resolvable* $(m, 8, 1)$*-BIBD. Let* Q *be a prime power such that* $Q \geq m + 1$ *and* $m/4 \leq n \leq m(m-1)/56$. *Then the following RTS exist:*

1. *A* $(2, n, 8)$*-RTS with restricted repairability, with shares from* $(\mathbb{F}_Q)^5$, *having information rate 7/8 and communication complexity 8/7.*

2. *A* $(3, n, 8)$*-RTS with restricted repairability, with shares from* $(\mathbb{F}_Q)^5$, *having information rate 5/8 and communication complexity 8/5.*

3. *A* $(4, n, 8)$*-RTS with restricted repairability, with shares from* $(\mathbb{F}_Q)^5$, *having information rate 1/4 and communication complexity 4.*

The first few values of m for which Theorem 5.4 can be applied are $m = 64$ and 120. Another known result is that resolvable $(m, 8, 1)$-BIBDs exist for all $m \equiv 8$ mod 56, $m > 24480$ (see [1]).

5.3 Projective Planes

Finally, we examine the possibility of using finite projective planes as distribution designs. A *projective plane of order* q is a design consisting of $m = q^2 + q + 1$ points and $q^2 + q + 1$ blocks (or lines), where each block contains exactly $d = q + 1$ points and every pair of points occurs in exactly one block. It follows that every point occurs in exactly $q + 1$ blocks and any pair of blocks intersect in exactly one point.

For basic results on projective planes, see [13]. It is well-known that a projective plane of order q exists whenever q is a prime or prime power. In this case, we can let the one-dimensional subspaces of $(\mathbb{F}_q)^3$ be points and define the two-dimensional subspaces of $(\mathbb{F}_q)^3$ to be blocks. The result is a projective plane of order q known as $\mathrm{PG}(2, q)$.

We will use a certain subset of the blocks of the projective plane as our distribution design. The permissible values of n will be determined by the repairability requirement.

First, we consider the minimum and maximum number of points spanned by a set of j blocks. These values will determine the parameters of the base scheme.

Lemma 5.5. *The union of any* $j - 1$ *blocks in a projective plane of order* q *contains at most* $q(j-1) + 1$ *points.*

Proof. Denote the $j - 1$ blocks by $A_0, \ldots, A_{j-2}$. Each A_i ($i \geq 1$) contains a point in A_0, so

$$\left| \bigcup_{i=0}^{j-2} A_i \right| \leq q + 1 + (j-2)q = q(j-1) + 1.$$

$\square$

Lemma 5.6. *For* $j \leq q + 1$, *the union of any* j *blocks in a projective plane of order* q *contains at least* $j(q + 1 - (j-1)/2)$ *points.*

Table 2: (n, k, d)-RTS based on projective planes

q	d	k	ℓ_1	ℓ_2	n	ρ
3	4	2	4	7	$9 \le n \le 13$	3/4
		3	7	9		1/2
4	5	2	5	9	$12 \le n \le 21$	4/5
		3	9	12		3/5
		4	13	14		1/5
5	6	2	6	11	$15 \le n \le 31$	5/6
		3	11	15		2/3
		4	16	18		1/3

$q =$ order of projective plane
$d =$ repairing degree
$k =$ threshold
$n =$ number of players
ℓ_1, ℓ_2 are ramp scheme thresholds
$\rho =$ information rate of the scheme

Proof. Denote the j blocks by $A_0, \ldots, A_{j-1}$. Each A_i (for $1 \le i \le q$) contains $q + 1 - i$ points that are not in $\cup_{h=0}^{i-1} A_h$. It follows that

$$\left| \bigcup_{i=0}^{j-1} A_i \right| \ge \sum_{i=0}^{j-1} (q + 1 - i) = j(q+1) - \frac{j(j-1)}{2}.$$

$\square$

For repairability, we determine the existence of some good basic repairing sets. In general, a basic repairing set of size s is equivalent to the *dual of a 2-blocking set* on s points. Blocking sets in projective planes have been studied by several authors and various bounds on the minimum size of a blocking set are known (see, e.g., Ball and Blokhuis [2]). One simple (and well-known) construction is to choose any three noncollinear points x, y and z of the projective plane, and take all the blocks that contain at least one of these points. This yields a basic repairing set of size $3q$.

Here is a well-known construction that sometimes yields basic repairing sets of size $s < 3q$. Suppose that q is a square of a prime power. Start with two disjoint Baer subplanes in $\mathrm{PG}(2, q)$ and take all the blocks that contain a line from either of these two subplanes. There are $2(q + \sqrt{q} + 1)$ such blocks, and every point in $\mathrm{PG}(2, q)$ is contained in at least two of these blocks. So we have a basic repairing set of size $2(q + \sqrt{q} + 1)$ in this case, which is an improvement asymptotically over the previous construction. (However, $q = 9$ is the first value that actually yields a smaller basic repairing set than the "simple" construction.)

Table 2 contains some examples of repairable threshold schemes using projective planes as distribution designs. We consider various values of q and k. The values of ℓ_1 and ℓ_2 are obtained from Lemmas 5.5 and 5.6. For every n such that $s \le n \le m = q^2 + q + 1$, there is a $(k, n, q+1)$-RTS having information rate ρ and communication complexity $1/\rho$.

6 Comparison with the GLF Scheme

We are able to obtain substantially improved information rates as compared with the GLF scheme from [8]. They prove an upper bound on the information rate of the schemes

they construct that have *optimal repairing rate*. Optimal repairing rate means that the information received by the user whose share is being repaired has the same size as a share. Our combinatorial schemes also have this feature, so a direct comparison is relevant. The bound obtained in [8] has the form

$$\rho \leq \frac{k(2d - k + 1)}{2dt},\tag{7}$$

where t is given by the formula

$$t = \sum_{i=0}^{k-1} \min\{\alpha, (d - i)\beta\}.\tag{8}$$

In (8), α denotes the number of elements of $\mathbb{F}_Q$ in a share, and each user sends β elements of $\mathbb{F}_Q$ to a user whose node is being repaired. Therefore, in our scheme, we have $\alpha = d$, $\beta = 1$, and hence, from (8), we have

$$t = \sum_{i=0}^{k-1} (d - i) = kd - \frac{k(k - 1)}{2}.\tag{9}$$

Substituting (9) into (7), we obtain

$$\rho \leq \frac{k(2d - k + 1)}{2d\left(kd - \frac{k(k-1)}{2}\right)} = \frac{2d - k + 1}{2d\left(d - \frac{(k-1)}{2}\right)}.\tag{10}$$

We illustrate with a couple of examples.

Example 6.1. *Suppose $k = 2$, $d = 3$. Then (10) results in $\rho \leq 1/3$. On the other hand, we are able to achieve $\rho = 2/3$ for certain values of n.*

Example 6.2. *Suppose $k = 3$, $d = 4$. Then (10) results in $\rho \leq 1/4$. However, we are able to achieve $\rho = 3/4$ in certain situations.*

We can also compare the communication complexity of our schemes to the GLF scheme [8]. It is easy to see that the GLF scheme always has communication complexity that is at least d. On the other hand, our schemes, as presented in Theorems 4.1 and 4.2, always have communication complexity that is at most d. (Of course, we also require a suitable distribution design to exist in order to apply our results.)

7 Universal Repairability

In this section, we consider possible ways to achieve universal repairability in the combinatorial setting we have introduced.

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7.1 Dual Hypergraph of a Complete Graph

The first examples of distribution designs for universal repairability that we consider allow various thresholds, but the number of players is constrained. The distribution designs are just the dual hypergraphs of complete graphs. For a positive integer n, let K_n denote the complete graph on n vertices. The points of our distribution design will be the $\binom{n}{2}$ edges of K_n. For each vertex x of K_n, we define a block $B_x = \{e : x \in e\}$. Thus there are n blocks in the design, each of size $n - 1$. Any two blocks intersect in exactly one point, and every point occurs in exactly two blocks. The following lemma is proved by a simple counting argument.

Lemma 7.1. *Suppose $1 \leq j \leq n$. The union of any j blocks in the above-described design has cardinality $j(n-1) - \binom{j}{2}$.*

From Lemma 7.1, for $2 \leq k \leq n$, it follows that the design is a (k, ℓ_1, ℓ_2)-distribution design on $\binom{n}{2}$ points, where

$$\ell_1 = (k-1)(n-1) - \binom{k-1}{2}$$

and

$$\ell_2 = k(n-1) - \binom{k}{2}.$$

The design itself constitutes a basic repairing set since every point occurs in exactly two blocks.

We have the following corollary of Theorem 4.2.

Theorem 7.2. *Suppose that $n \geq 3$ and $2 \leq k \leq n$. Denote $m = \binom{n}{2}$ and suppose that $Q \geq m+1$. Then, there is a $(k, n, n-1)$-RTS with universal repairability, having information rate $(n-k)/(n-1)$ and communication complexity $(n-1)/(n-k)$, where every share is an element of $(\mathbb{F}_Q)^{n-1}$.*

Proof. The only observation we need to make is that universal repairability and restricted repairability are equivalent when $d = n - 1$, since there is only one possible set of d players to consider when repairing a given share. $\qquad\square$

7.2 Universal Repairability and 1-designs

Suppose the distribution design is a (v, b, r, d)-*1-design*. This means that we have v points, each of which occurs in r blocks, and b blocks in total, each of which contains d points. We are going to focus on the repairability property in this section; we do not concern ourselves with the specific thresholds that can be achieved.

Theorem 7.3. *A (v, b, r, d)-1-design provides universal repairability if and only if $b < r+d$.*

Proof. Suppose we have a (v, b, r, d)-1-design in which $b \geq r + d$. Suppose B is a block that we want to repair. Let $x \in B$. There are r blocks that contain x, one of which is B. Choose any d blocks that do not contain x (this can be done because $b - r \geq d$). Then these d blocks cannot repair the block B, since none of these blocks contain x.

Conversely, suppose have a (v, b, r, d)-1-design in which $b < r + d$. Let B be a block and let $B_1, \ldots B_d$ be any other d blocks. Then every point $x \in B$ is contained in at least one of these d blocks. Thus,

$$B \subseteq \bigcup_{i=1}^{d} B_i.$$

It follows that the d given blocks are sufficient to repair B (we do not require that each block contributes one subshare, so it is sufficient that B is covered by the union of the d blocks). □

The dual hypergraph of the complete graph K_n (as considered in the previous section) is an $(\binom{n}{2}, n, 2, n-1)$-1-design. Since $n < 2 + (n-1)$, the universal repairability property also follows from Theorem 7.3.

Another class of designs that provide universal repairability are the complements of Hadamard designs. These are $(4t+3, 2t+2, t+2)$-BIBDs and they exist for all t such that a Hadamard matrix of order $4t+4$ exists. We just need to observe that such a BIBD is a $(4t+3, 4t+3, 2t+2, 2t+2)$-1-design. Since $4t+3 < (2t+2) + (2t+2)$, Theorem 7.3 guarantees that the repairability property holds.

8 Summary and Conclusion

We have presented two methods for repairing secrets in threshold schemes. The first method is a simple modification of the enrollment protocol and the second method is based on using a suitable combinatorial design to distribute "subshares" of a threshold or ramp scheme. Our schemes provide improved information rates and/or communication complexity as compared to previously known schemes.

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