

Mitigating DoS attack in MANETs considering node reputation with AI

Subrata Joardar (✉ subratajoardar@gmail.com)

National Institute of Technology

Nilanjan Sinhababu

Indian Institute of Technology

Soumyodeep Dey

National Institute of Technology

Prasenjit Choudhury

National Institute of Technology

Research Article

Keywords: Mobile Adhoc Network (MANET), Node Reputation, Machine Learning, DoS attacks, Network security

Posted Date: October 12th, 2022

DOI: <https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-2088146/v1>

License: © ⓘ This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.

[Read Full License](#)

Mitigating DoS attack in MANETs considering node reputation with AI

¹Subrata Joardar*, ²Nilanjan Sinhababu, ¹Soumyodeep Dey, ¹Prasenjit Choudhury

¹National Institute of Technology, Durgapur, India

²Indian Institute of Technology, Kharagpur, India

{ subratajoardar@gmail.com, nilanjan.thecscboy@gmail.com, soumyodeepdey86@gmail.com,
prasenjit007@yahoo.co.in }

Abstract

Mobile Adhoc Network (MANET) is a decentralized and dynamically adoptable network. It is infrastructure less and hence can be used where a fixed configuration is not possible or required. MANETs have various real-life applications and hence have gained the attention of research community. Security is an integral part of any computer network system and MANETs are no different. This paper focuses on solving DoS attacks in MANET and shows that a general classification model might fail to identify this kind of attacks as these models fail to differentiate between network errors and a real DoS attack. A reputation-based node classification scheme is proposed to improve identification of real DoS attacks versus any other cause that might not be an attack. Results showed that our proposed reputation-based approach when integrated with any classifier increases its accuracy by around 3.25%. Further, the combined model is able to block real DoS attacks and allow any other cause which is not an attack.

Keywords – Mobile Adhoc Network (MANET), Node Reputation, Machine Learning, DoS attacks, Network security

1 INTRODUCTION

MANET is an infrastructure-less network on a purely temporary basis, connected by a set of mobile nodes without any centralized system. Applications of MANET have been seen in many fields. Mobile Ad hoc networking helps the military to maintain information networks between military personnel's, vehicles, and military information headquarters. Ad hoc networks can be applied in emergency or rescue operations for disaster relief efforts for example in fire, flood, or earthquake and so on. Other commercial applications include for instance ship to ship Ad Hoc Mobile communication and so on. Ad hoc networks can autonomously link immediate and temporary multimedia networks by using notebook or palmtop computers to distribute and allocate information among conference or classroom participants. Besides, it can also be applied for home networks where devices can be linked. Another instance would be a sports arena, watercraft, or tiny aircraft. Short-range MANET can simplify the inter communication between a lot of mobile devices such as a PDA, a laptop, and a cellular phone and there are a lot of new devices in this for MANETs. MANET, though being very popular over a decade, is not available as a standard benchmark and has not received any application in either the business standard or the commercial field. The nature of the mobile environment makes it very vulnerable to an adversary's malicious attacks [1]. The use of wireless links in the network is susceptible to attacks ranging from passive eavesdropping to active interfering. In wired networks, an adversary may gain physical access to the network wires whereas, wireless networks can come from all directions and can target any node. All of these indicate that a wireless ad-hoc network lacks a clear line of defence and that each node must be ready for direct or indirect combat with an attacker. Second, there are various reasons for packet losses in MANET: node-related, congestion-related, and mobility-related [2]. Node-related losses: A node in a forwarding path may refuse to forward routing or data traffic on purpose, either to conserve its limited resources (selfish behavior) or to cause network operation and performance to be disrupted (malicious behavior). Congestion-related losses: Packet losses in this category happen at the MAC layer for a variety of causes. *Queuing problem*: A forwarding node may drop an incoming packet due to high data rates and insufficient link bandwidth, which causes congestion and queue overflow. *Busy channel*: The forwarding node's data channel may be so busy that the number of back offs exceeds the limit, and the packet is discarded. *Link interference*: A data packet may be rejected or discarded due to transmission errors caused by link-related phenomena such as high bit error rate, hidden nodes, and interference. Mobility-related losses: In this

category, packet losses can occur at both the MAC and routing layers. *MAC layer*: Packet loss occurs when a packet's next hop is out of range. Because routing information becomes obsolete faster as node mobility increases, this phenomenon is more common in highly mobile networks than in low mobility networks. *Routing layer*: When a packet reaches the network layer, the routing protocol looks for a valid route and forwards it if one exists. The packet is buffered if there isn't a route to the destination available. A packet is dropped in one of two situations: when it remains in the buffer over the timeout limit, or when the buffer overflow prevents the packet from being buffered.

Third, decision-making in the mobile computing environment is sometimes decentralized and some wireless network algorithms rely on the cooperative participation of all nodes and the infrastructure. Due to the lack of centralized control, the adversaries can take advantage of this weakness to launch new kinds of attacks aimed at destroying the cooperative algorithms. There are several Intrusion Identification and prevention measures [3] [4], such as encryption and authentication, that can be used in MANETs to reduce intrusions, but cannot eliminate them. There are well organized Intrusion Identification systems developed for wired networks. But there are no well-designed intrusion schemes for Ad hoc networks. The main difference between wired and Ad hoc networks is infrastructure. While most of today's wired Intrusion Identification schemes depend on real time traffic analysis, they capture this information by relying on switches, routers, or gateways. This type of equipment is absent in ad hoc networks and causes the most difficult to design good identification schemes. Because of the selfish nature of mobile nodes, it is very difficult to build any scheme. The aim of this paper is to use machine learning techniques to provide an efficient classification of the node which is malicious and the node which is normal in MANET.

1.1 DoS ATTACK

The wireless nodes are quite prone to being compromised and are particularly weak to different denial of service (DoS) attacks performed by malevolent nodes or intruders. A DoS attack is called a distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack if it originates from multiple distributed sources. A DoS attack is regarded as an attempt to prevent the legitimate use of a service. The main goal of the attack was to temporarily or permanently deny authorized users access to the services and resources. It is commonly carried out by overloading the victim machine or resource with an enormous number of requests making the systems inaccessible [5]. DoS attacks have thus become a major security concern and have attracted the interest of many researchers. However, none of the remedies proposed so far have successfully curbed the impact of DoS attack in MANET in practical scenarios.

1.2 MOTIVATION

If we look at our problem statement from an overall perspective, it can be termed as a binary classification problem. The basic approach to solve this would be to classify each node in the network as malicious or normal. But this would be a very generic approach where we would try to apply any machine learning algorithm to solve this binary classification problem. Instead, we try to consider the history of a node before classifying it as malicious or normal. This can also be termed the reputation of a node. This reputation-based approach helps us maintain the reputation of all the nodes in the network and aids us in evaluating their trustworthiness. It helps us counter the various anomalies resulting due to the selfish and malicious nodes in the network. The intuition behind this idea is to provide an incentive or credit-based mechanism which helps the nodes to cooperate amongst each other while also improving the overall network performance and functionality by preventing the DoS and DDoS attacks. This can be compared to a real-life example of giving loans to people based on their credit score. A person is given a loan only if his/her credit score is above a certain value. Similarly, each node is assigned a value corresponding to its reputation, and the higher the value, the more would be the node's credibility. Another point of similarity is that irrespective of whether that person has a high or low credit score, he always has an opportunity to increase his credit score and thus become eligible for higher loans. In our case, a node having a low value of reputation can increase its reputation by choosing to participate in ethical and non-malicious activities. This approach helps us in minimizing the cases where a malicious node has been classified as normal, thus providing protection from the DoS and DDoS attacks which ultimately would increase the security of the network.

Traditional approaches that are used for DDoS attack detection like Firewalls, filtering techniques, and traceback have many inherent limitations. Machine learning approaches have been used in the recent past to overcome the limitations of traditional approaches while DoS and DDoS attack detection. A node misclassification may happen mainly due to two reasons. The possibility of an ML model being a weak learner and thus giving more number of false positives is

one of the reasons. Network difficulties impede the different nodes in a MANET design from interacting successfully with one another. This is also one of the possible causes for a node being misclassified. The concern with classifying a normal node as malicious is that we are effectively excluding a possible good node from the network and thus making the MANET network more resource-constrained. On the other hand, when a malicious node gets classified as normal, it can have serious implications on the network and can turn out to be counterproductive for the MANET architecture.

1.3 LIMITATIONS OF TRADITIONAL APPROACHES

MANETs are high in demand and application in today's world owing to its many advantages. One of the main reasons is that its deployment does not require any centralized administration. Even after all that, there are a few challenges like open network architecture, strict constraints for resources and its highly dynamic network topology which make it vulnerable to external attacks like DoS and DDoS. A system offering security for a MANET architecture should ensure that the services offered to a mobile user are confidential, maintain integrity and are authenticated. One of the common defense attacks against DoS attacks is a firewall. It is a system for network security that keeps track of and manages all incoming and outgoing network traffic in accordance with pre-established security standards.

Firewalls cannot distinguish between normal traffic and DoS attack traffic. Simple rules are followed like allowing some ports or IP addresses which can be counter-productive in case of a resource constrained environment. Other disadvantages are that it is client-dependent. Firewalls do not prove to be much effective in case they are not up to date. Moreover, many small devices are not computationally adept in employing firewalls.

Filtering is another primary concept which is used to mitigate DoS and DDoS attacks in MANETs. It could be local, global, or statistical. A filter in the local router is installed in case of **local filtering** to stop the malicious nodes. But if the victim's local network can be jammed with enough traffic, the local router can be compromised thus overloading the local filtering. In case of **global filtering**, the idea is to prevent any accumulation of malicious packets in each time frame. Filters are installed all over the Internet and when any victim detects an attack, it shares this information with all the other nodes. This can result in the malicious nodes being stopped early. However, this attack cannot be considered reliable since sometimes the router can get compromised by the continuous flow of packets, thus causing a DoS attack. Another filtering approach is through **Statistical filtering**. Here in this approach, the statistics of a packet are observed closely to classify its behavior as normal or malicious. The packets that are classified as malicious are dropped by the filter. This again can be a problem in a resource-constrained environment. Another major limitation of it is that it is a cluster-based routing protocol filtering mechanism.

Traceback is another approach to detect DoS attacks. Here the main aim is to trace the intruder back to the zombie computers and thus help in identifying the source of the attacker. Cost management, low accuracy of results, and slow tracking speeds are some of the drawbacks of these traceback schemes. This becomes ineffective since the attacker moves to another position, owing to the high mobility of nodes in the MANET before the attacker is traced.

Pushback is another approach where routers are enabled to identify the high bandwidth aggregates that contribute to the high congestion rate and help limit it. But the pushback approach is unable to work in non-contiguous deployment and thus unable to stop the DoS attacks that do not overcrowd the core routers.

1.4 WHY LIMITATIONS OF TRADITIONAL APPROACHES CAN BE MITIGATED USING MACHINE LEARNING APPROACHES

Currently a lot of research has been done to mitigate DoS and DDoS attacks using various traditional machine learning algorithms. Since detecting malicious nodes in a manet architecture is predominantly an anomaly detection-based problem, machine learning algorithms perform well in such scenarios.

P. Xiao et al. [6] presented a detection approach that exploits correlation information of the training data to improve the classification accuracy and reduce the overhead caused by the density of training data. The approach is based on cknn (k-nearest neighbours traffic classification with correlation analysis) and performs efficiently to detect DDoS attacks. P.K. Agarwal et al. [7] proposed a machine learning approach using support vector machine (SVM) to predict the number of zombies in a DDoS attack. S. Saad et al. [8] applied and compared the performance of five different machine learning algorithms - support vector machine (SVM), artificial neural network (ANN), nearest neighbours

classifier (NNC), gaussian-based classifier (GBC) and naïve bayes classifier (NBC) to detect p2p bots which are used to generate spam and carry out DDoS attacks. Here the command-and-control phase for detecting DDoS attacks before they are launched, was studied. S. Sambang et al. [9] studies the problem of DDoS attack detection in cloud environments and builds a machine learning model using multiple regression analysis to predict DDoS and bot attacks by choosing the most important features in cids 2017 research dataset. A. Fadlil et al. [10] proposed a DDoS attack detection method based on network traffic activity that was statistically analyzed using gaussian naïve bayes method. This approach predicted the existence of DDoS attacks based on the average and standard deviation of the network packets according to the gaussian method. Yi-Chi Wu et al. [11] proposed another DDoS detection system which uses a decision tree algorithm on 15 different attributes to detect abnormal traffic flow. It also traces back the attacker's locations with a traffic-flow pattern matching technique. M Suresh et al. [12] studies one of the major limitations in statistics based detections is that they can only be simulated as a uniform distribution and it is not possible to find out the normal network packet distribution.

In traditional approaches, the whole dataset is used to make a prediction, whether there is a DDoS attack or not. In case of machine learning approaches, the whole dataset is divided into two parts, the training data which is used to train the model and the testing data which is used to observe the performance of the model on unseen data. This ensures that the model is less biased. Machine learning models offer a new glimmer of hope as it can address the gaps in traditional DoS and DDoS detection algorithms, by performing well on even new and unseen DDoS attacks.

1.5 LIMITATIONS OF MACHINE LEARNING APPROACH

Although the advantages of Machine learning approaches are discussed in the previous section, it becomes particularly difficult to extract and select a valid number of independent features for building an efficient machine learning model to identify DDoS attacks. Many variables can be used to characterize network traffic patterns, and if the task of feature reduction and extraction is not done properly, it may affect the time required in to train and test the model. Thus, the task of feature engineering holds special importance in this domain as it can help in differentiating between the normal and the malicious nodes. As already discussed previously, S. Saad et al. [8] had used a machine learning approach to detect P2P botnets before they are even launched. The major limitation that came along with this work is that it can only detect a single compromised host and is unable to detect a whole BotNet. We have already seen that machine learning algorithms perform exceptionally well while detecting DoS and DDoS attacks and produce high degrees of accuracy. But they have their own set of limitations. Often, most machine learning algorithms require a lengthy training period and even if they give good results, they cannot be used in real time. Moreover, these algorithms are highly demanding in terms of computational expenses.

Due to all these limitations, there is a high chance of misclassifications. And, as per the general implementation of these algorithms misclassification will result in eliminating either a good node or accepting an attack. Further, when considering real time implementation, where the number of processes keeps on increasing, makes these techniques infeasible for machine learning algorithms to be used.

1.6 SCOPE

We identified the following scope of research for mitigating DoS Attack

- 1 As per the literature survey, every work done in this domain is based on the generalized nature of the security, i.e., they assume that every system has similar security needs. But, in fact, security of a system has a very personalized aspect with varying requirements. Considering a methodology for a highly secured system is missing in the literature.
- 2 A methodology that can be adopted on any system is still not available.
- 3 Most of the work in the literature has directly classified the node, which in fact poses a severe problem in case of a mis-classification.
- 4 Existing work does not consider different costs associated with the misclassifications. They assign equal weightage for all the misclassification errors. A non-malicious node that has been correctly classified and a malicious node that has been incorrectly classified are given equal importance.

1.7 OBJECTIVE

The objective of the paper is outlined below:

1. Design a reputation-based scheme for MANET environment.
2. To find variation in the model performances for general algorithms i.e., SVM and DNN versus the integration of reputation schemes with those algorithms i.e., RSVM and RDNN.
3. To minimize the most significant error based on different costs associated with the misclassification errors.

2 LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 OLD METHODOLOGIES TO OBSTRUCT DOS ATTACKS IN MANET

Mobile ad-hoc networks (MANETs) are particularly vulnerable to denial of service (DoS) attacks originated through compromised nodes or intruders. Goals of DoS attack is to degrade or deny normal facilities for legitimate nodes through distribution of huge traffic to victims which affects the network, host, and resources in different ways. There are many approaches to handle this attack such as traditional methods and other specific methods. Here we survey papers that presented various techniques on how to obstruct DOS attacks in MANET.

Table 1 Survey in considering to obstruct DoS attacks in MANET in old methodologies

Title Name	Description	Approach/ Mechanism	Drawback
Fully distributed dynamically configurable firewall to resist DOS attacks in MANET [13]	Presented a distributed dynamically configurable firewall architecture that uses ingress and egress filtering to resist the DOS attacks.	Firewalls	Firewalls cannot distinguish between normal traffic and DoS attack traffic. Next, due to the mobility of node firewall cannot be sufficient for MANETs.
A Cooperative Approach for Understanding Behavior of Intrusion Detection System in Mobile Ad Hoc Networks [14]	IDS collects, monitors, and analyses audit data in order to find any anomalous attempts.	Intrusion detection system (IDS)	Many false alarm, fidelity problem, overhead problem.
Framework for Statistical Filtering Against DDoS Attacks in MANETs [15]	Statistical filtering is proposed by using traffic profiling for the purpose of filtering and DDoS attacks detection.	Filtering	Not reliable as sometimes the packets can overwhelm the router and cause a DoS attack.
A review on different Intrusion Detection Systems for MANET and its Vulnerabilities [16]	Watchdog tagged the node as a misbehaving node if it fails to forward the packet to the next node.	Watchdog/ Pathrater	Watchdog cannot detect malicious nodes in the presence of receiver collisions, limited power for transmission, and false misbehavior reports.
Hotspot-based Traceback for Mobile Ad Hoc Networks [17]	This method helps to identify the source of an attack i.e. physical location of the attacker.	Traceback	Since nodes are moving so the attacker could move to another position before the tracing the process is finished.
DoS Pushback. Encyclopedia of	In this mechanism routers are enabled to identify the high	Pushback	Pushback is unable to work in non-contiguous deployment and

Cryptography and Security [18]	bandwidth aggregates that participate in the congestion rate and help to limit them.		unable to compromise attacks that do not overcrowd the core routers.
Detection and Prevention of Denial of Service (DoS) Attacks in Mobile Ad Hoc Networks Using Reputation-based Incentive Scheme [19]	This method helps to prevent DDoS attacks by providing cooperation among nodes based on incentive mechanisms.	Reputation-based incentive mechanism	The cluster heads were assumed to be stationary and only the nodes of the cluster could move freely. In addition, scalability is not considered by this approach.
Security through Collaboration and Trust in MANETS [20]	The main objectives of this framework are to support localized control and relationships by binding public keys to allow the access control process without complex security authentication procedures.	Trust management	A trust calculation done on a certain node by another node raises the resource cost. Unfortunately, these resources are limited in MANETs.
Mitigating denial-of-service attacks in MANET by distributed packet filtering: A game-theoretic approach [21]	This method is based on using the digital signatures to apply verification of legitimate packets. There is a penalty to the forwarders of bad packets and also a reward system to the forwarders that verify packets which is gained as a credit.	Game theoretic approach	The signature-based defense is prone to the replay attack.

2.2 MACHINE LEARNING APPROACH

Table II Survey in considering DDoS attack detection using machine learning approach

Title Name	Description	Approach/Mechanism	Drawback
The DDoS attacks detection through machine learning and statistical methods in SDN [22]	To detect DDoS attacks in an SDN environment that depends on three parts collector, entropy-based and classification sections based on machine learning algorithms (Random Tree, REPTree).	Dataset used ISCX-SlowDDos-2016 and machine learning algorithm used Random Tree.	Setting a threshold value that involves several statistics is challenging.
Detection of known and unknown DDoS attacks using artificial neural networks [23]	based on study of each TCP/UDP/ICMP protocol's features through training of an ANN algorithm to identify DDoS attacks.	Dataset used UNB-ISCX and machine learning algorithm used Neural Network	the method needs to distinguish packet protocol, which is complex and inefficient.
Detection of distributed denial of service using deep learning neural network [24]	It reduces the classification error with minimal cost and it improves the accuracy of detection.	Dataset used KDD Cup and machine learning algorithm used deep learning neural network.	This model cannot adopt SVM and KMC for real time applications.

Mining based detection of botnet traffic in network [25]	Compare several different machine learning algorithms in the context of network traffic classification.	Dataset used CTU-13 and machine learning algorithm used SVM, naive bayes, decision trees and neural networks.	Being aimed at a comparison rather than to the optimization of a specific approach, lacks an accurate feature selection.
Anomaly-based intrusion detection through k-means clustering and Naive Bayes classification [26]	Semi-supervised learning (halfway between classification and clustering) is used here. The additional information from the labelled data is combined with the unlabeled data.	Dataset used UNB-ISCX and machine learning algorithm used k-means clustering + Naïve Bayes	High false-alarm rates and lack of accuracy in detection procedure
A Flexible SDN-Based Architecture for Identifying and Mitigating Low-Rate DDoS Attacks Using Machine Learning [27]	The IDS implemented in the proposed architecture was trained with a set of machine learning algorithms.	Dataset used CIC DoS-2017 and machine learning algorithm used RT, REP Tree, Random Forest and SVM.	The collection of traffic features in small- time intervals increase processing and communication overhead.

3 PROPOSED METHODOLOGY

When initially a node is created, it is assigned with a neutral reputation (0.5RP), where the reputation value ranges between 0 and 1. Since every system is different in terms of security requirements, we provide a filter hyperparameter (ranging between 0.25RP to 0.75RP) that can control the incoming packet from a node. For example, a system that does not care much about security can lower this hyperparameter and allow packets with low reputation nodes. In contrast, a sensitive system with a requirement of high security should take a higher value of this hyperparameter to wait for the node to achieve a higher reputation. From the perspective of the nodes, their reputation is decided by the host that they are interacting with, making this scheme dynamic. e.g., consider a situation where the system (A) threshold is 0.55RP and a new node (B) arrives in the network with a reputation 0.50RP. Now, B tries to send some packets to A, but due to a higher threshold, instead of accepting or rejecting the packet directly, A holds the packet in a secure buffer and pings B for updated reputation score. From here two things can happen. First, if the reputation score of B's is not able to cross the threshold, then after the timeout the packet is discarded. Secondly, if B in the meantime sends some packet to system C with 0.45RP requirement, the packets after getting accepted will increase the reputation of B. After these increments, if the reputation of B is equal or more than 0.55RP then the packet is accepted by A and forwarded to next firewalls.

3.1 JUSTIFY THE RATIONALE BEHIND OUR APPROACH

Our approach is based on a reputation-based framework where nodes maintain the reputation of other nodes and use it to evaluate their trustworthiness. This is done for detecting anomalies arising from a few malicious and selfish nodes in a MANET architecture. The reputation value of a node shows how reliable it is, based on its history and aids in the process of decision making. The anomalies can arise from mainly two kinds of activities – selfish behavior, for example nodes wanting to save power. The other activity is malicious behavior where the node is primarily concerned with attacking and damaging the network, as in the case of DoS and DDoS attacks. To counter these misbehaviors, an incentive should be provided to all the nodes, so that they can co-operate amongst each other. This mechanism ensures that even the selfish nodes, which behave in a way to maximize their benefits, also make the most out of the cooperation among the various nodes in the MANET architecture. The main intent with this reputation-based approach is to enable the nodes to distinguish between the trustworthy and the untrustworthy nodes. The approach encourages the nodes to refrain from malicious activities and thus collaborate with the other nodes in the architecture to build on its reputation value. The type of supervised machine learning algorithm used to classify between a normal and a malicious node is irrelevant, since this approach is independent of the classifier used. There can be various ways of

initialization of the reputation values of the nodes. It can be initialized to zero, meaning that all the nodes are considered untrustworthy in the beginning. They can also be assigned maximum value of reputation at the start, meaning that all the nodes are considered trustworthy. In our approach we have tried to take the middle ground by assigning a neutral value of reputation to each node, which signifies that the nodes are neither considered trustworthy nor untrustworthy in the beginning.

3.2 ADVANTAGES OF THE PROPOSED REPUTATION BASED SCHEME:

The packet is temporarily held in a secure buffer because this method does not accept or reject it directly. The message is buffered when an attacker node sends a packet to the system. The packet is discarded after the timeout because the attacker node's reputation score is gradually decreasing and the attacker node can not let its reputation value dip below the threshold value.

This scheme doesn't instantly reject a packet from a non-attacker node due to misclassification. Since the non-attacker node's reputation score increases over time, the value may surpass the threshold, allowing the packet to be accepted later. In this scheme if a packet is rejected or accepted due to network traffic errors, they will be remedied later since the reputation value of nodes will not be harmed.

4 EXPERIMENT

In the following sections, the experimental setup has been mentioned followed by the description of the Kitsune Network Attack Dataset. The steps undertaken to clean the dataset has also been mentioned where we talk about the various preprocessing steps which includes filtering, missing value handling and how different anomalies have been dealt with. The dataset obtained is then split into the training and the testing data using the train test split function of the sklearn library. Further, all the classification algorithms (namely Support Vector Machine, Deep Neural Network, Reduced Support Vector Machine, and the Reduced Deep Neural Network) that have been applied to the dataset, have been discussed in detail. Finally, the results obtained from each of these machine learning models have been analyzed which led us to a few conclusions.




Fig. 1 Experimental flow diagram

4.1 EXPERIMENTAL ENVIRONMENT

The hardware specification of the system used is as follows:

OS-Windows 10 Professional, CPU-AMD® Ryzen™ 7-3700X Processor, RAM-32GB DDR4, GPU-NVIDIA GeForce® GTX 1080 Ti.

The software and APIs of the experiment are given below:

The Windows version of the Python-64 Bit with IPython notebook [28] is used for building the models. Important APIs used in the experiment include TensorFlow [29], packages from NumPy [30], scikit-learn [31] and Matplotlib [32]. NVIDIA CUDA Version 9.1 for Windows environment is used for enabling GPU computing.

4.2 DATASET DESCRIPTION

We have used Kitsune Network Attack Dataset [33] for our experiment. Kitsune is an online, unsupervised, and efficient ANN-based network intrusion detection system (NIDS). Kitsune is made up of a collection of tiny neural networks (autoencoders) that have been trained to replicate (reconstruct) network traffic patterns and whose performance increases over time. These are cybersecurity dataset containing nine distinct network attacks on a commercial IP-based surveillance system and an IoT network. The dataset contains attacks including botnets, MitM, DoS, and reconnaissance. These datasets are downloaded from UCI. Number of instances of these datasets are 27170754 and the number of attributes is 115. For our experiment we have used 2771275 number of instances and 115 attributes.




Fig. 2 Dataset scatter plot

This scatter plot (Fig. 2) represents the attacker and the non-attacker data at k -th dimension. From the visual inspection, it is clearly visible that there is a possibility of classification using a hyperplane. Hence, machine learning classifiers like SVM can be used to solve this problem. Further, deep learning classifiers can also be implemented to check for improvements.

4.3 PREPROCESSING

In the preprocessing phase, we analyzed the entire dataset for

1. *Any missing values:* Values not captured in a dataset are known as missing data. They can range from a single value missing from a single cell to an entire observation being lost (row).
2. *Header anomaly:* Data preprocessing requirements are reduced by anomaly detection based solely on header information. Because headers make up a tiny portion of overall network data, they take fewer resources (CPU, memory, and storage) to process than entire packet payloads.
3. *Specification anomaly:* Anomaly detectors based on specifications take advantage of the fact that protocols change far more slowly than attackers. As a result, modeling protocols rather than constantly establishing signatures for the latest malicious code should be easier.

After anomaly detection is done and the dataset is optimized for any anomaly or sparsity, we use sampling techniques to sample the labeled data.

4.4 CLASSIFICATION

1. Support Vector Machine (SVM):

SVM is a supervised machine learning algorithm which is used for classification, regression and outliers detection. SVM works well in high dimensional spaces; it is still effective when the number of dimensions exceeds the number of samples. It is memory efficient because it uses a subset of training points (called support vectors) in the

decision function. The decision function can use a variety of Kernel functions. Common kernels are included, however custom kernels can also be specified according to the data.

Various papers have been published where detection of malicious attacks in MANET using machine learning approaches are being used. Some of them used SVM based methods. SVM has been used to detect black hole attacks in MANETs using the AODV protocol [34]. Three performance indicators, namely PDR, packet modification rate, and packet misroute rate, are used in the proposed SVM-based technique to classify the type of nodes. The numbers of sent, modified, and misrouted packets are used to produce these metrics. The SVM-based strategy outperformed the previous method, according to the findings. However, the proposed SVM's explanation is ambiguous. Aside from that, the simulation outcomes are ambiguous. The SVM-based algorithm discovers more harmful nodes than the previous method, but no explanation is provided. A new architecture for intrusion detection in MANETs has been suggested that maximizes the detection accuracy by employing a machine learning technique [35]. They proposed a feature selection technique namely rough set and SVMs were utilized in this study for data reduction and classification, respectively. To lower the complexity of SVM, the rough set reduces the size of features.

Although SVM works well in many domains, it is not suited for extremely large data sets. When there is more noise in the data set, such as when target classes overlap, SVM does not perform well. The SVM will underperform when the number of features for each data point exceeds the number of training data samples.

SVM classifies nodes either attacker or normal. Thus, class label $y_i \in \{\text{attack}, \text{normal}\}$. Given the training datasets $(x_i, y_i), 1 \leq i \leq n$, x_i is used for the training. The objective is to find the hyperplane that offers a maximum margin between the two classes.




Fig. 3 Support Vector Machine (SVM)

Equation of hyperplane is given as follows:

$$g(x) = w^T X + b \quad 1$$

where, X is the input feature vector, w is the weight vector which represents the orientation of the hyperplane in space. And, b is the bias vector which represents the position of the hyperplane in space.

The equation $g(x)$ given above divides the space into two subspaces. For a binary classification problem, where there are two classes (let us assume them to be class $C1$ and class $C2$), one of the subspaces denote the space for $C1$ and the other subspace is for the class $C2$. Mathematically for a point x_1 it can be written as:

$$g(x_1) = w^T x_1 + b > 0 \quad 2$$

such that: $x_1 \in C1$

$$g(x_1) = w^T x_1 + b < 0 \quad 3$$

such that: $x_1 \in C2$

Let d be the measure of distance X to the separating plane. So, we can say that

$$w^T x + b \geq d \quad 4$$

or,

$$\frac{w \cdot x + b}{||w||} \geq d \quad 5$$

where, $||w||$ is the norm of w . such that,

$$w \cdot x + b \geq d * ||w|| \quad 6$$

We know that the value of $d * ||w||$ is 1. Therefore, the equation can be rewritten as:

$$w \cdot x + b \geq 1 \quad 7$$

if $x \in C1$

$$w \cdot x + b \leq -1 \quad 8$$

if $x \in C2$

To reduce the expression down to one term, we introduce another term y_i which represents the class of the i^{th} point.

So,

$$y_i(w \cdot x_i + b) \geq 1 \quad 9$$

We can rewrite the above equation as

$$y_i(w \cdot x_i + b) = 1 \quad 10$$

This equation is only valid for support vectors. Support Vectors are the data points or vectors that are closest to the hyperplane which affect the position of the hyperplane. The margin d needs to be maximized in Eq. 5. This is because our main objective is to find the hyperplane that offers maximum margin between the two classes. Maximizing the margin prevents over-fitting in high dimension input spaces, which ultimately leads to good generalization capabilities. This can be achieved by the maximization of the value of bias vector (b) or the minimization of the norm of w ($||w||$).

The equation which needs to be minimized is given as:

$$\Phi(w) = \frac{1}{2} ||w||^2 \quad 11$$

The above optimization needs to be achieved under a given constraint, given by the Eq. 10:

$$y_i(w \cdot x_i + b) = 1 \quad 12$$

Since this is a constraint optimization problem, it can be converted into an unconstrained optimization problem by using the Lagrangian Multiplier

$$L(w, b) = \frac{1}{2} ||w||^2 - \sum \alpha_i [y_i (w \cdot x_i + b) - 1] \quad 13$$

α_i in Eq. 13 denotes the Lagrangian Multiplier.

$$L(w, b) = \frac{1}{2} ||w||^2 - \sum \alpha_i y_i (w \cdot x_i) - \sum \alpha_i y_i b + \sum \alpha_i \quad 14$$

To minimize the above expression, we find the gradient of L , by taking the partial derivatives of L w.r.t. the variables b and w and equating them to be zero.

$$\frac{\partial L}{\partial b} = - \sum \alpha_i y_i = 0 \quad 15$$

$$\sum_{i=1}^m \alpha_i y_i = 0 \quad 16$$

Here m is the number of training samples.

$$\frac{\partial L}{\partial w} = w - \sum \alpha_i y_i \cdot x_i = 0 \quad 17$$

$$w = \sum_{i=1}^m \alpha_i y_i x_i \quad 18$$

Substituting Eq. 16 and Eq. 18 in Eq. 13:

$$L(w, b) = \sum_{i=1}^m \alpha_i - \frac{1}{2} \sum \alpha_i \alpha_j y_i \cdot y_j (x_i x_j) \quad 19$$

The above Lagrangian expression needs to be maximized with different values of α .

Lagrangian multipliers are always non-negative.

So, $\alpha_i \geq 0$, which satisfies the condition

$$\sum_{i=1}^m \alpha_i y_i = 0 \quad 20$$

For an unknown feature vector Z :

$$D(Z) = \sum_{j=1}^m \alpha_j y_j x_j \cdot Z + b \quad 21$$

Only the sign of the above expression is important for finding out which class it belongs to.

$$L(w, b) = \sum_{i=1}^m \alpha_i - \frac{1}{2} \sum \alpha_i \alpha_j y_i \cdot y_j K(x_i x_j) \quad 22$$

Since the dataset used in this experiment is non-linear and cannot be directly used in SVM, we need to use a kernel function. For most of the non-linear data, polynomial and RBF kernels are used. For our experiment, we tested with both polynomial and RBF kernels and found that the RBF kernel results were around 37% more accurate. This means that the polynomial kernel was unable to transform data properly in the hyperplane. So, we selected and used the RBF kernel function for SVM for the rest of the work.

The Radial Basis Function kernel or the RBF kernel is the most powerful form of kernel since it contains an exponent term. The exponentiation of a value gives a polynomial term of infinite dimensions. It helps in fitting a generalized form of a curve on the most complex datasets. Mathematically it is represented as follows:

$$K(x_i, x_j) = \exp\left(-\frac{\|x_i - x_j\|}{2\sigma^2}\right) \quad 23$$

$\|x_i - x_j\|$ represents Euclidean distance between the two points x_i and x_j .

σ is the variance which can also be treated as a hyperparameter.

2. Deep Neural Network (DNN):

Neural Networks have been designed to imitate the working of the human brain. They consist of simple processing units called nodes. A collection of nodes together consists of a layer of a neural network. The number of layers of a neural network denotes its depth. Any neural network with more than two hidden layers (except the input layer and the output layer) is called a Deep Neural Network (DNN). Each layer in a DNN is basically a function (also called an activation function). Activation functions play a very crucial role in determining the output of a node, given a set of inputs. Some of the most popular activation functions are tanh (hyperbolic tangent function), relu (rectified linear unit), sigma (sigmoid function), etc.

The fundamental difference between any traditional Machine learning algorithm and a Deep Neural Network is that the former works better on smaller datasets. As the amount of data keeps on increasing, the performance of DNNs also keep getting better.

There are various kinds of neural networks that are available and they have their own set of applications. Some of the widely used neural networks are Radial Basis Function Neural Networks (RBFNN), Convolutional Neural Network (CNN), Recurrent Neural Network (RNN), Generative Adversarial Network (GAN) and many more. CNNs are mostly used for image processing, classification, segmentation, recognition, etc. It mainly comprises a few convolution layers and a few other layers like pooling layer and softmax layer. RNNs are the go-to algorithm for all kinds of sequential data. It is mainly used for sentiment classification, sequence labeling, predicting the next word and other language modeling tasks. We have used simple Feed Forward Neural Networks in our experiments to predict whether a given node is malicious or not.

Literature review of DNN for similar problem:

[36] applied four different deep learning approaches for Intrusion Detection System (IDS) in MANET architectures and then compared their results. These 4 approaches were - Convolutional Neural Networks (CNN), Inception Convolutional Neural Networks, Bidirectional Long Short-Term Memory (Bi-LSTM) and Gated Recurrent Units (GRU). The first two were CNN based Intrusion Detection Systems and the last two were RNN based Intrusion Detection Systems. All these four models were tested on the NSL-KDD dataset and their Precision, Recall and Accuracy values were compared to determine which model performed better.

[37] uses a hybrid model approach for the exact classification of malicious network flow from the packets. The main idea behind the approach is to use an autoencoder based deep neural network algorithm to separate malicious nodes from the non-malicious ones. The model relies on sampled network flow data. The autoencoder based approach helps in avoiding overfitting to pre-defined malicious patterns,

[38] uses a hybrid deep neural network approach to detect Low-rate Denial of Service (DoS) attacks in the fluctuating legitimate traffic. It uses a one-dimensional Convolutional Neural Network and a Gated Recurrent Unit to detect DDoS attacks in fluctuating HTTP traffic.

[39] incorporates a DDoS detection framework, a Bidirectional Long Short-Term Memory (Bi-LSTM), a Gaussian Mixture Model (GMM) and incremental learning. This framework helps to counter the Open Set Recognition (OSR) problem in DDoS attacks. The Bi-LSTM layer helps in capturing the essential characteristics of the DDoS traffic, especially the time domain correlations whereas the GMM in the architecture helps to differentiate between the trained samples and the novel instances.

[40] combines a Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) and Bayes approach and refer to the as LSTM-BA to propose a novel DDoS detection algorithm. The LSTM layer in the model helps identify parts in the DDoS attack which possess high confidence outputs and for those outputs with low-confidence the Bayes method is used to improve the accuracy.

The above-mentioned papers and all the related work that has been done in building Intrusion Detection Systems using deep learning approach use the same concept of increasing the model accuracy by making correct predictions which is achieved by building a more complex architecture or by introducing some new deep learning-based model. Our approach differs from these approaches by not just focusing on increasing model accuracy but also considering the history of a node while making a prediction.

Like ML models, DNN models will also suffer from the fact that classifications will be instantaneous without consideration of the history of any node. It is unlike our approach where the reputation of a node is considered to determine whether a given node has malicious intent or not. In this Deep Neural Network approach, we feed data about a node to the input layer and after passing through many hidden layers or abstractions it finally passes through a softmax layer which gives a probabilistic output ranging between 0 and 1. More the value, more would be the chances of the node being malicious in nature.

Let us consider a set of inputs $\langle x_1 x_2 x_3 \dots x_m \rangle$ of size m . A weight is assigned to each connection between an input vector and a single neuron of the hidden layer. For example, the weight assigned to the connection between the first input vector and the first neuron of the first hidden layer would be denoted as w_{11} . Similarly, the weight assigned to the connection between the second input vector and the first neuron of the hidden layer would be denoted as w_{12} , and so on and so forth.

The output of a single neuron in a hidden layer is calculated by the matrix multiplication between the input feature vector and the weights. Let us denote the output by z .

Therefore,

$$z = w_{11}x_1 + w_{21}x_2 + w_{31}x_3 + \dots + w_{m1}x_m \quad 24$$

The result of this calculation would give us the output of the first neuron of the first hidden layer. We can also denote it by the matrix multiplication between the weight vector and the input feature vector.

$$z = w^T \cdot x + b \quad 25$$

Here W represents the feature vector representation of the weight vectors.

$$W: \langle \langle w_{11}, w_{12}, \dots, w_{1n} \rangle, \langle w_{21}, w_{22}, \dots, w_{2n} \rangle, \langle w_{31}, w_{32}, \dots, w_{3n} \rangle, \dots, \langle w_{m1}, w_{m2}, \dots, w_{mn} \rangle \rangle$$

X represents the input feature vector.

$$X: \langle x_1 x_2 x_3 \dots x_m \rangle$$

b is nothing but the bias vector.

The neuron calculates the weighted average of the values using the current value of input vector X . The values of the weight vector and the bias vector in each layer keeps getting updated in each iteration and thus the predicted output from the neural network also gets more accurate after every iteration. To keep the output of a neural network relevant

we need to introduce non linearity into the architecture, otherwise it just becomes like any other linear regression model. Therefore, we need to introduce the concept of activation function. It's role is to calculate the weighted sum of its inputs and add the bias term. The most frequently used activation functions are:

I) Step Function

$$f(x) = 1 \quad 26$$

if $x \geq 0$

$$f(x) = 0 \quad 27$$

if $x < 0$

Gives an output of either 0 or 1.

II) Sigmoid Function

$$f(x) = 1/(1 + e^{-x}) \quad 28$$

Gives an output in the range of 0 to 1.

III)ReLU (Rectified linear Unit)

$$f(x) = \max(0, x) \quad 29$$

IV)Hyperbolic tangent Function

$$f(x) = \tanh(x) = \left(\frac{2}{(1 + e^{-2x})} \right) - 1 \quad 30$$

Gives an output in the range -1 to 1.

There are many other mathematical functions that are used as activation functions in neural networks. The above mentioned ones are only a few of them. For the sake of clarity let us denote the activation function being used in a hidden layer of a neural network as g . Thus, the output coming out of a neuron in a hidden layer can be given as:

$$a_i = g(z_i) \quad 31$$

Since there are many other hidden layers in a neural network, Eq. 25 and Eq. 31 can be generalized for all the layers as follows:

$$z_i^{[l]} = W_i^T a_i^{[l-1]} + b_i^{[l]} \quad 32$$

$$a_i^{[l]} = g^{[l]}(z_i^{[l]}) \quad 33$$

The superscript l here denotes the l^{th} layer of the neural network. $a_i^{[0]}$ can also be written as x_i .

The result generated from the output layer is interpreted using a softmax layer. If it is a binary classification problem, like ours, the softmax layer gives an output of either 0 or 1 meaning attacker or non-attacker.

But even so, the above mentioned steps only constitute the forward propagation part of the neural network. Let us denote the output generated after an iteration to be \hat{y} . While training the neural network we already have the original result with us. Let us denote it by y . By determining how different the predicted output is from the original output, we can calculate the loss incurred. Using this loss value we can update the weight and bias vector parameters of each layer. By doing that we are ensuring that in the next iteration the loss incurred would be comparatively lower. This whole process is termed as backpropagation and this is what makes the neural network architecture so effective.

The loss between the predicted output (\hat{y}) and the correct output (y) is calculated using binary cross entropy function. It is given as follows:

$$L(\hat{y}, y) = -(y \log \hat{y} + (1 - y) \log (1 - \hat{y})) \quad 34$$

It is not mandatory to use binary cross entropy as our cost function. We can also use Mean Absolute Error (MAE) or Root Mean Square Error (RMSE) as our loss functions.

Suppose there are t training samples. The Cost function is synonymous with the loss function. Only difference is that the Cost Function (let us denote it by J) is the average of the loss errors of all the training samples. It can also contain a regularization term. It is a function dependent on two variables - W and b . Therefore, mathematically it can be expressed as:

$$J(W, b) = \frac{1}{t} * \sum_{i=1}^t L(\hat{y}^{(i)}, y^{(i)}) \quad 35$$

The next step in backpropagation involves the calculation of the gradient of cost function J with respect to its dependent variables W and b . The objective of this step is to update parameters W and b such that the loss function is minimised in each iteration. This is done by the help of gradient descent method that proceeds by calculating the partial derivative of the cost function with respect to the parameters W and b . By finding the partial derivative of Eq. 35 with respect to W we get the following result: -

$$dW^{[l]} = \frac{\partial J}{\partial W^{[l]}} = \frac{1}{t} * dz^{[l]} a^{[l-1]T} \quad 36$$

The partial derivative of Eq. 35 with respect to b is :-

$$db^{[l]} = \frac{\partial J}{\partial b^{[l]}} = \frac{1}{t} * \sum_{i=1}^t dz_i^{[l]} \quad 37$$

Using Eq. 36 and Eq. 37 we can update parameters W and b as follows: -

$$W^{[l]} = W^{[l]} - \alpha * dW^{[l]} \quad 38$$

$$b^{[l]} = b^{[l]} - \alpha * db^{[l]} \quad 39$$

α is just a scalar constant in these equations. Technically, it is termed as the learning rate whose value determines how fast the neural network learns and updates its parameters W and b . It is a hyperparameter and more optimized its value, faster will it hit the minimum. It shouldn't be either too high or too low.




Fig. 4 Deep neural network architecture

The DNN architecture is given in Fig. 4. In this architecture, the input layer consists of 115 neurons for each of the attributes. Then, the total number of hidden layers are selected as two. Both the hidden layer consists of 57 neurons (approximately half of the input neurons) of Relu activation units. Finally, the output neurons consist of the two classes, one for classifying attackers and the other for non-attacker.

3. Reputation based classifiers




Fig. 5 Classification including reputation

In our proposed approach, in addition to the existing fields of a node, we introduce two additional fields RP in Fig. 5. The figure represents the outline of the model formation when using a reputation scheme. The reputation strategies are maintained by Reputation Processing System (RPS), while the basic classification is done using the standard node metadata MD in Fig. 5. First field is the reputation threshold (T_m). The value of this field might be modified by the node itself as per its requirements. The value ranges from 0 to 1. In a place where we need more security, then reputation threshold may be enhanced. Vice versa in a place where we need less security, then reputation threshold may be diminished. Second field stores reputation score of the node. The value of this field might be modified by the behavior of the node in the networks not by node itself. Through simulation we try to find how this reputation score changes and that has been shown in the given three graphs with different 3 reputation threshold 0.25, 0.50 and 0.75.

In our proposed method when a node with lower reputation want to send a packet to a node with higher reputation would not be able to send packet and furthermore this attempt would lower the reputation of the sender node. In next case, when a node with higher reputation want to send a packet to a node with lower reputation would be able to send packet and by this process it would increase the reputation of itself.

This system has two-fold benefits. First benefit is to improve classification goodness. Second benefit is to improve the reputation of good nodes in the overall network and other hand lowering the reputation of bad nodes.

In the given three graphs we compare three cases with different node threshold value (T_m). These graphs show the dynamic nodes reputation assignment ' R_n^* ' based on current reputation assignment ' R_n '. These graphs are plotted with Example nodes with increasing reputation vs Reputation score (RP). In the graph (Fig. 6) we take the threshold value (T_m) 0.25 which shows node acceptance is highest with 'Green markers' than other two graphs. In the graph (Fig. 7) we take the threshold value (T_m) 0.50 which shows node acceptance is higher with 'Green markers' than last graph (Fig. 8) (where threshold value 0.75) but lower than the graph (Fig. 6) (where threshold value 0.25). In the graph (Fig. 8) we take the threshold value (T_m) 0.75 which shows node acceptance is lowest with 'Green markers' than other two graphs.

The reputation formula is given below in Eq. 40:

$$\begin{aligned}
 R_n^* &= 0 \text{ if } R_n + (R_n - T_m) * T_m \leq 0 \\
 &= 1 \text{ if } R_n + (R_n - T_m) * T_m \geq 1 \\
 &= R_n + (R_n - T_m) * T_m, \text{ otherwise}
 \end{aligned}
 \tag{40}$$

When the number of acceptances of a node are increased then reputation of that node will also increase and vice versa, which has been depicted in these given graphs. In first graph, we consider the threshold value is 0.25. This has been shown that the upper triangle of this point made by the lines R_n (Green line) and R_n^* (Blue lines) and shaded by green lines (which depicts reputation has been increased) is bigger in size than the triangle below of this point made by the same lines and shaded by red colour (which depicts reputation has been decreased). In 2nd graph, we consider the threshold value is 0.50. Here the number of acceptances of node are decreased than before. In this case upper triangle and lower triangle are same in size. In 3rd graph, we consider the threshold value is 0.75. Here the number of acceptances of node is lowest among these three cases. In this case upper triangle is smaller than lower triangle means that acceptance of a node lowest in this case among three cases we consider.




Fig. 6 Impact of node's behavior on its reputation for threshold:0.25




Fig. 7 Impact of node's behavior on its reputation for threshold:0.50




Fig. 8 Impact of node's behavior on its reputation for threshold:0.75

5 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

5.1 RESULT OBJECTIVES

Following are the objectives of the results section:

1. Identification of the evaluation metrics used for comparison of the algorithms.
2. To find variation in the model performances for general algorithms i.e., SVM and DNN versus the integration of reputation schemes with those algorithms i.e., RSVM and RDNN.
3. To compare the proposed models with the current state of the art techniques.

5.2 EVALUATION METRICS

Confusion Matrix: A classification issue prediction outcome summary is known as a confusion matrix. Confusion matrices are used to depict the counts of predicted and actual values. The Confusion Matrix serves as the foundation for all other measurements. True Negative (TN): This indicator displays the number of correctly identified negative cases.

True Positive (TP): This represents the number of correctly classified positive cases.

False Positive (FP): This metric displays the number of genuine negative examples that have been misclassified as positive.

False Negative (FN): It is the number of true positive examples categorized as negative

Precision: It's the number of correct positive outcomes divided by the classifier's anticipated positive results. The Eq. 41 is provided that is used to calculate Precision.

$$Precision (P) = \frac{TP}{TP + FP} \quad 41$$

In our proposed scheme no attacker is allowed to intrude in the system. So our objective is to reduce the false negative (FN), which is intended to increase false positive (FP). So precision should be decreased.

Recall: It is calculated by dividing the number of accurate positive findings by the total number of relevant samples (all samples that should have been identified as positive). The Eq. 42 is used to calculate Recall.

$$Recall (R) = \frac{TP}{TP + FN} \quad 42$$

In our proposed scheme we are trying to decrease the false negative (FN). So, we must increase the recall.

F1 Score: The Harmonic Mean of accuracy and recall is used to get the F1 Score. F1 Score is in the [0, 1] range. It indicates both the precision and the robustness of the classifier. F1 Score attempts to strike a compromise between recall and accuracy. The Eq. 43 is provided that is used to calculate F1 Score.

$$F1 = 2 \times \frac{Precision \times Recall}{Precision + Recall} \quad 43$$

Since in our proposed scheme precision should be lesser and recall should be higher and F1 score is the harmonic mean of both so this is an important metric to measure.

Accuracy: This metric measures the proportion of accurate predictions to all input samples. The Eq. 44 is provided that is used to calculate Accuracy.

$$Accuracy(A) = \frac{TN + TP}{TN + FP + FN + TP} \quad 44$$

5.3 MODEL VARIANCE EVALUATION

The Bar chart of Fig. 9 depicted that precision is higher than recall in SVM and DNN. But when we introduce the reputation of nodes in our system i.e., in RSVM and RDNN the value of recall has become higher than precision which is our objective.

The Line chart of Fig. 10 depicted that with the increment of threshold, precision also increased. The precision of RDNN is always higher than from RSVM by 1.5% on average.

The Line chart of Fig. 11 also depicted that with the increment of threshold, recall also increased. The recall of RDNN is always higher than from RSVM by 0.96% on average.

The Line chart of Fig. 12 depicted F1 score, which is the harmonic mean of precision and recall. The F1 score of RDNN is always higher than from RSVM by 1.26% on average.

The Line chart of Fig. 13 depicted Accuracy. Initially Accuracy of RSVM is higher than RDNN, but with the increment of threshold Accuracy of RDNN would become higher. We can conclude that accuracy is not so consistent.




Fig. 9 Different evaluation metrics comparison of four classifiers




Fig. 10 Line chart of Precision of RSVM and RDNN




Fig. 11 Line chart of Recall of RSVM and RDNN




Fig. 12 Line chart of F1 Score of RSVM and RDNN




Fig. 13 Line chart of Accuracy of RSVM and RDNN

5.4 COMPARISON WITH EXISTING APPROACHES

Table III Comparisons of accuracy

State of the Art Techniques	Used Dataset	Accuracy
RSVM	Kitsune Network Attack Dataset	97.51 %
RDNN	Kitsune Network Attack Dataset	98.91 %
Naïve Bayes [41]	CCIDS2017	75.31%
SVM [41]		99.68%
Random Tree [22]	ISCX-SlowDDos-2016	99.95%
k-NN [42]	UNSW-NB15	92%
	NSL-KDD	96%
Neural Network [23]	UNB-ISCX	98%
Deep learning neural network [24]	KDD Cup	97.10%
REPTree + SVM [25]	CTU-13	98.40%
RNN neural network [43]	CTU-13	98.39%
k-means clustering + Naïve Bayes [26]	UNB-ISCX	99%
Random Forest [27]	CIC DoS-2017	94.41%
SVM [27]		93.10%

We consider accuracy when evaluating a model, but we are more concerned with how resilient it is, how it will perform on diverse datasets, and how much flexibility it provides. Without a question, accuracy is a crucial statistic to evaluate, but it does not always provide a whole picture.

Accuracy is a useful metric for evaluating a model's performance in a problem setting. This can also be used to rank and compare different models. Some of the metrics are helpful in explaining how the model captures the problem and interprets the data.

The proportion of correct predictions to all input samples is known as accuracy. From here, we cannot deduct false positives or false negatives.

A false positive is an outcome when a model incorrectly predicts the positive class and a false negative is an outcome when the model incorrectly predicts the negative class. A false positive in a real life scenario can prove to be quite damaging.

In Intrusion Detection System, a false negative case happens when an action is classified as normal, even though it is malicious.

A confusion matrix is a specific table layout of dimensions 2×2 , that helps us visualize the performance of any Machine Learning algorithm. It helps us to calculate values like Precision, Recall, Specificity, F-1 score and ROC-AUC curve. These metrics, in addition to accuracy, let us understand a model's performance even better.

Dataset in machine learning doesn't matter when we train a model if the model is a generalized model or a good model. Because a generalized model works on unknown data. Then which dataset we would select for our experiment depends on our requirements. We selected the Kitsune Network Attack (KNA) dataset for our experiment since the number of instances of these datasets are 27170754 and the number of attributes is 115 and many attributes are required for MANET attacks in the network. We try to make the model generalized so that it not only works on KNA but works for any unknown dataset.

6 CONCLUSIONS

MANETs advantages like dynamic and decentralized nature also brings a lot of disadvantages when compared to any wired network technology. We identified the challenges that the state-of-the-art machine learning models faces when classifying a real DoS attack versus false classification due to a network error. A reputation-based approach is proposed assuming that nodes past history plays a very important role in determining whether the node is an attacker or not. This proposed approach in a lab environment simulation shows that it is able to improve the classification accuracy of existing machine learning models to a large extent. The reputation-based method is able to stop classifiers from discarding a node directly when a node has a good reputation and vice versa. The minimum increment in accuracy is 2.8%, which increases till 3.25% for other models. Further, the model recall is increased by a mean of 1% for all the tested models, which is a significant improvement considering the cost associated with the false classifications. The only limitation identified of the proposed approach is the cold start issue; as the dynamic nature of the MANETs does not allow a centralized system to handle the reputation system.

Declarations

Ethical Approval

Not applicable

Competing interests

As a part of research my domain of interests is Mobile Adhoc Network (MANET), Artificial Intelligence (AI) and this is my continuous learning process and there is no financial relationship with other people or organizations.

Authors' contributions

A.B. wrote the main manuscript text and C.D. prepared all figures. All authors reviewed the manuscript.

Funding

Not applicable

Availability of data and materials

We have used Kitsune Network Attack Dataset [33] for our experiment. Kitsune is an online, unsupervised, and efficient ANN-based network intrusion detection system (NIDS).

<https://archive.ics.uci.edu/ml/datasets/Kitsune+Network+Attack+Dataset>

- [1] S. Yi, P. Naldurg and R. Kravets, "Security-Aware Ad hoc Routing for Wireless Networks," in *The Second ACM Symposium on Mobile Ad Hoc Networking & Computing, MobiHoc, 2001*.
- [2] L. Yi, Y. Zhong and B. Bhargava, "Packet Loss in Mobile Ad Hoc Networks," Department of Computer Science Technical Reports. Paper 1558. , 2003.
- [3] B. Sun, Y. Guan, J. Chen and U. W. Pooch, "Detecting black-hole attack in mobile ad hoc networks," in *5th European Personal Mobile Communications Conference*, Glasgow, UK, 2003.
- [4] M. Al-Shurman, S. Yoo and S. Park, "Black hole attack in mobile ad hoc networks," in *ACM-SE 42: Proceedings of the 42nd annual Southeast regional conference*, 2004.
- [5] V. Gupta, S. Krishnamurthy and M. Faloutsos , "DENIAL OF SERVICE ATTACKS AT THE MAC LAYER IN WIRELESS AD HOC NETWORKS," in *MILCOM 2002. Proceedings*, Anaheim, CA, USA, 2002.
- [6] P. Xiao, W. Qu, H. Qi and Z. Li, "Detecting DDoS attacks against data center with correlation analysis," *Computer Communications*, vol. 67, no. 0140-3664, pp. 66-74, 2015.
- [7] P. K. Agrawal, B. B. Gupta and S. Jain, "SVM Based Scheme for Predicting Number of Zombies in a DDoS Attack," in *European Intelligence and Security Informatics Conference*, Athens, Greece, 2011.
- [8] S. Saad, I. Traore, A. Ghorbani, B. Sayed, D. Zhao, W. Lu, J. Felix and P. Hakimian, "Detecting P2P botnets through network behavior analysis and machine learning," in *Ninth Annual International Conference on Privacy, Security and Trust*, Montreal, QC, Canada, 2011.
- [9] S. Sambang and L. Gondi , "A Machine Learning Approach for DDoS (Distributed Denial of Service) Attack Detection Using Multiple Linear Regression," in *The 14th International Conference on Interdisciplinarity in Engineering—INTER-ENG 2020*, Târgu Mureș, Romania.
- [10] A. Fadil, I. Riadi and S. Aji, "Review of detection DDOS attack detection using naive bayes classifier for network forensics," *Bulletin of Electrical Engineering and Informatics*, vol. 6, no. 2, pp. 140-148, 2017.
- [11] Y.-C. Wu, H.-R. Tseng, W. Yang and R.-H. Jan, "DDoS detection and traceback with decision tree and grey relational analysis," *International Journal of Ad Hoc and Ubiquitous Computing*, vol. 7, no. 2, 2011.
- [12] M. Suresh and R. Anitha, "Evaluating machine learning algorithms for detecting DDoS attacks," in *Springer*, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2011.
- [13] S. Akram, I. Zubair and M. H. Islam, "Fully distributed dynamically configurable firewall to resist DOS attacks in MANET," in *First International Conference on Networked Digital Technologies*, Ostrava, Czech Republic, 2009.
- [14] L. Sahu and C. Sinha, "A Cooperative Approach for Understanding Behavior of Intrusion Detection System in Mobile Ad Hoc Networks," *INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF COMPUTER SCIENCE AND MOBILE APPLICATIONS - IJCSMA*, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 24-30, 2013.
- [15] H. X. Tan and W. Seah, "Framework for Statistical Filtering Against DDoS Attacks in MANETs," in *Second International Conference on Embedded Software and Systems (ICESS'05)*, Xi'an, China,, 2005.
- [16] S. Banerjee , R. Nandi, R. Dey and H. N. Saha, "A review on different Intrusion Detection Systems for MANET and its Vulnerabilities," in *International Conference and Workshop on Computing and Communication (IEMCON)*, Vancouver, BC, Canada, 2015.
- [17] Y. A. Huang and W. Lee, "Hotspot-based Traceback for Mobile Ad Hoc Networks," in *WiSe '05: Proceedings of the 4th ACM workshop on Wireless security*, Cologne, Germany, 2005.
- [18] J. Ioannidis, "DoS Pushback. Encyclopedia of Cryptography and Security," *Springer*, 2011.

- [19] M. K. Denko, "Detection and Prevention of Denial of Service (DoS) Attacks in Mobile Ad Hoc Networks Using Reputation-based Incentive Scheme," *Journal of Systemics, Cybernetics and Informatics*, vol. 3, no. 4, 2005.
- [20] L. Wenjia, J. Parker and A. Joshi, "Security through Collaboration and Trust in MANETS," *Mobile Networks and Applications, 2012 - Springer*, vol. 17, p. 342–352, 2012.
- [21] X. Wu and D. K. Y. Yau,, "Mitigating denial-of-service attacks in MANET by distributed packet filtering: A game-theoretic approach," in *ASIACCS '07: Proceedings of the 2nd ACM symposium on Information, computer and communications security.*, 2007.
- [22] A. B. Dehkordi and M. Soltanaghaei,, "The DDoS attacks detection through machine learning and statistical methods in SDN," *The Journal of Supercomputing © Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature*, 2020.
- [23] A. Saied, R. E. Overill and T. Radzik, "Detection of known and unknown DDoS attacks using artificial neural networks," *Neurocomputing © Elsevier B.V.*, vol. 172, pp. 385-393, 2015.
- [24] S. Sumathi and N. Karthikeyan, "Detection of distributed denial of service using deep learning neural networks," *Journal of Ambient Intelligence and Humanized Computing volume © 2021 Springer Nature Switzerland AG. Part of Springer Nature.*, 2020..
- [25] P. Kalaivani and M. Vijaya, "Mining based detection of botnet traffic in network flow," *International Journal of Computer Science Inf Technol Secur.*, pp. 535-540, 2016.
- [26] W. Yassin, N. I. Udzir, Z. Muda and M. N. Sulaiman, "Anomaly-based intrusion detection through k-means clustering and Naives Bayes classification," in *4th International Conference on Computing and Informatics, ICOCI, Sarawak, Malaysia*, 2013.
- [27] J. A. PÉREZ-D'AZ, I. A. VALDOVINOS, K. R. CHOO and D. ZHU, "A Flexible SDN-Based Architecture for Identifying and Mitigating Low-Rate DDoS Attacks Using Machine Learning,," *IEEE Access*, vol. 8, pp. 155859 - 155872, 2020.
- [28] F. PÉREZ and B. E. GRANGER, "IPython: A System for Interactive Scientific Computing," *Computing in Science and Engineering, publisher IEEE Computer Society*, vol. 9, pp. 21--29, 2007.
- [29] M. Abadi, A. Agarwal and P. Barham, "TensorFlow: Large-Scale Machine Learning on Heterogeneous Systems," 2015. [Online]. Available: <https://www.tensorflow.org/>.
- [30] C. R. Harris, K. J. Millman and S. J. van der Walt, "Array programming with NumPy," *Nature*, vol. 585, no. publisher Springer Science and Business Media {LLC}, pp. 357--362, 2020.
- [31] F. Pedregosa and others, "Scikit-learn: Machine learning in Python," *Journal of machine learning research*, vol. 12, pp. 2825-2830, 2011.
- [32] J. D. Hunter, "Matplotlib: A 2D graphics environment," *Computing in science & engineering*, vol. 9, pp. 90--95, 2007.
- [33] Y. Mirsky, T. Doitshman, Y. Elovici and A. Shabtai, "Kitsune: An Ensemble of Autoencoders for Online Network Intrusion Detection," in *Network and Distributed System Security Symposium 2018 (NDSS'18)*.
- [34] M. Patel and S. Sharma, "Detection of malicious attack in MANET a behavioral approach," in *IEEE International Advance Computing Conference, IACC, Ghaziabad, India*, 2013.
- [35] T. Poongothai and K. Duraiswamy, "Intrusion detection in mobile AdHoc networks using machine learning approach," in *International Conference on Information Communication and Embedded Systems (ICICES)*, Chennai, India, 2014.
- [36] S. Laqtib, K. E. Yassini and M. L. Hasnaoui, "A Deep Learning Methods for Intrusion Detection Systems based Machine Learning in MANET," in *SCA '19: Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on Smart City Applications, CASABLANCA, Morocco*, 2019.
- [37] F. O. Catak and A. F. Mustacoglu,, "Distributed denial of service attack detection using autoencoder and deep neural networks," *Journal of Intelligent & Fuzzy Systems*, pp. 1064-1246, 2019.
- [38] C. Xu, J. Shen and X. Du, "Low-rate DoS attack detection method based on hybrid deep neural networks," *Journal of Information Security and Applications, Elsevier*, pp. 2214-2126, 2021.

- [39] C. S. Shieh, W. W. Lin, T. T. Nguyen and C. H. Chen, "Detection of Unknown DDoS Attacks with Deep Learning and Gaussian Mixture Model," in *Applied Sciences*, 2021.
- [40] Y. Li and Y. Lu, "LSTM-BA: DDoS Detection Approach Combining LSTM and Bayes," in *Seventh International Conference on Advanced Cloud and Big Data (CBD), IEEE*, Suzhou, China, 2019.
- [41] A. N. Rimal and R. Praveen, "DDoS Attack Detection Using Machine Learning," *Journal of Emerging Technologies and Innovative Research*, vol. 7, no. 6, pp. 185-188, 2020.
- [42] A. Krivchenkov, B. Misnevs and A. Grakovski, , "Using Machine Learning for DoS Attacks Diagnostics," in *RelStat 2020: Reliability and Statistics in Transportation and Communication, Springer Nature Switzerland AG. Part of Springer Nature.*, 2020.
- [43] A. Bansal and S. Mahapatra, "A comparative analysis of machine learning techniques for botnet detection," in *SIN '17: Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Security of Information and Networks*, 2017.