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(Article begins on next page)

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Abstract   In this paper, we address the problem of truth approximation through
theory change, asking whether revising our theories by newly acquired data leads us
closer to the truth about a given domain. More particularly, we focus on "nomic con-
junctive theories", i.e., theories expressed as conjunctions of logically independent
statements concerning the physical or, more generally, nomic possibilities and impos-
sibilities of the domain under inquiry. We define both a comparative and a quantitative
notion of the verisimilitude of such theories, and identify suitable conditions concern-
ing the (partial) correctness of acquired data, under which revising our theories by data
leads us closer to "the nomic truth", construed as the target of scientific inquiry. We
conclude by indicating some further developments, generalizations, and open issues
arising from our results.

Keywords   Nomic verisimilitude · Truthlikeness · Truth approximation ·
Belief change · Belief revision · AGM

The intuitive idea underlying the notion of verisimilitude can be expressed as follows:
a theory is highly verisimilar, or "close to the whole truth", if it says many things
about the domain under investigation and many of those things are (almost) exactly
true. The first formal definition of verisimilitude was proposed by Popper (1963).

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