Can naturalism explain consciousness? A critique

Abstract

The problem of consciousness is one of the most important problems both in cognitive science and in philosophy. There are different philosophers and different scientists who define consciousness and explain it differently. In philosophy, ‘consciousness’ does not have a definition in terms of genus and differentia or necessary and sufficient conditions. In this paper, I shall explore the very idea of machine consciousness. The machine consciousness has offered causal explanation to the ‘how’ and ‘what’ of consciousness, but they fail to explain the ‘why’ of consciousness. Their explanation is based on the ground that consciousness is causally dependent on the material universe and that of all conscious phenomena can be explained by mapping the physical universe. In this regard, consciousness is basically a physical phenomenon and can be mechanically explained following the naturalistic methods of science. In other words, the mechanistic assumption is that consciousness and mind have an artificial origin and therefore have to be understood only within a mechanistic framework available in the sciences. If this is so, then this epistemological theory of consciousness is essentially committed to scientific world view that cannot avoid metaphysical implication of consciousness. At the same time, neo-Advaitins have maintained that the evolution of nature leads to the manifestation of human consciousness only because consciousness is already implicit in the material nature. Thus, the existence of consciousness in this physical world far exceeds the methods of science and needs a non-mechanical metaphysical explanation.

Appendix

In this appendix, I would like to discuss briefly the Vedāntic perspectives of consciousness especially Advaita and Vishistadvaita. Advaita perspective counters the naturalistic model of consciousness. Advaita view about consciousness is explicitly borrowed from Māndukya Upanisad.²³ The Advaitins are proposing the concepts of Brahman and Ātman that are absolute and are the source of all form of consciousness and the world. There exists perfect identity between Brahman and Ātman. The pure consciousness, i.e., Ātman, cannot be ‘known as an object of mediate knowledge, yet it is known as involved in every act of knowing’. Therefore, the nature of consciousness is transcendental. The transcendental consciousness must be independent of worldly causality. That is to say that a transcendental account of consciousness regards consciousness without locus and without object and the condition of the possibility of manifestation of anything whatsoever. Moreover, this transcendental approach to consciousness does not treat consciousness as an object. Rather, it takes consciousness to be self-manifesting. If this is the fact, consciousness cannot be caused.²⁴ On the other hand, the Visistadvaitin’s claim that consciousness is a quality of the self, which is actively intentional and always changing. And further, to say that the self is eternal, and essentially conscious.²⁵ While Visistadvaitin’s theory of the relationship between consciousness and the self is dismissed from the Advaitic perspectives as contradictory because the Advaitin assumes that a substance must either be completely identical with, or different from, its attributes. Brahman cannot be both substance as well as attribute. Advaita tries to reconcile active, intentional consciousness with eternal and essential identity of consciousness and self by introducing a radical ontological distinction between two levels of consciousness.²⁶ At the first level, one talks of consciousness as the only reality, and at the second level, one talks about consciousness of the world. In Advaita, there is nothing called ‘consciousness of the world’ because the world is only illusory. In Vishistadvaita, the world is independent of consciousness.

Then, Advaita view of consciousness is neither a property nor an act of the self, but rather its constant ever-present essence. If by essence one means a set of properties without which it cannot be what it is, consciousness cannot be an essence of the self, for in that sense an essence must be a property or a group of properties. However, in saying ‘consciousness is the essence of the self’, one may mean that the self is consciousness, that the two are identical.²⁷ Therefore, the self-luminosity is the defining property of consciousness. The Advaitins hold that self-luminosity is the fitness of being immediately known without being an object of any cognition. This implies that consciousness is not intentional. That is to say that it is not ‘consciousness of’ or ‘consciousness for’ something. To be intentional means to have an object, but pure consciousness is that form which all content has been subtracted. Therefore, intentionality is extrinsic to the nature of consciousness.

On the other hand, the Advaitins argue that consciousness only appears to be intentional on account of the reflection of the sakāra vrtti. Therefore, Advaita theory of consciousness has been able to accommodate the two competing theories by assigning to them two different levels of consciousness. The first one is pure consciousness which is not intentional, and the second one is vrtti which is intentional. The second one owes to the causal influence of the object. The intentional structure and the causal story join together in the second level. As we know that for Advaita, aspects of consciousness and being are identical. This is because of the fact that consciousness itself is the source of being, that from which all entities derive their being. If one distinguishes between Being and beings, then for Advaita, Being is consciousness, while all objects are entities.²⁸

The Advaita theory of consciousness unconditionally rejects any kind of reduction in consciousness to material body. It also rejects any possible account of causal origin of consciousness. But it does not object to reducing mind to matter, though it keeps consciousness ontologically distinct from what remains outside the purview of such explanation of consciousness without which no brain states or machine states could be treated as knowing. In this respect, the Advaita thesis must be taken seriously. Many criticisms have been put forward by many physicists and scientists. The claim is that consciousness is an epiphenomenon or as something that has no ontological status. If we will see consciousness from Advaita perspective, it will give better picture than that of any scientific investigation. Many non-reductionists have speculated that if consciousness is to be explained by the brain sciences, ultimately manifestation of consciousness will have biological origin.

Moreover, the neo-Advaitins have maintained that the evolution of nature leads to the manifestation of human consciousness only because consciousness was already implicit in the material nature. This position would be compatible with Advaita view of things. The Advaitic perspective need not deny science. But it would not allow that materialism is the only promising interpretation of science. Therefore, the Advaitin would claim taking all the facts into account, that is, not only scientific facts but also the facts of the higher reaches of consciousness. This is because of the fact that the Advaitins accept the universal interpretation of consciousness. The Advaita Vedāntins theorized about consciousness which is under specific condition of human body becomes consciousness. They no doubt began with human consciousness but proceeded to find in it signs of its origin, source, true essence which is none other than the universal, all pervasive and consciousness.²⁹ Therefore, the ontology of consciousness plays a very vital role in order to explain the human nature, but this fact is completely missing in the naturalistic model of consciousness. An Advaitin may say that if there is no consciousness, there is nothing called nature, because nature is an appearance of consciousness.