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Farsighted Stability in an n-Person Prisoner’s Dilemma

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Abstract

Farsighted stability is examined in an n-person prisoner’s dilemma. It is shown that any individually rational and Pareto efficient outcome is a farsighted stable set and no other farsighted stable set exists; it is further shown that the largest consistent set consists of all individually rational outcomes.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Policy and Social Studies, Faculty of Literature and Social Sciences, Yamagata University, 1-4-12 Kojirakawa-machi, Yamagata-shi, 990-0021, Japan

    Akihiro Suzuki

  2. Department of Social Engineering, Graduate School of Decision Science and Technology, Tokyo Institute of Technology, 2-12-1 Oh-okayama, Meguro-ku, Tokyo, 152-8552, Japan

    Shigeo Muto

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  1. Akihiro Suzuki
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  2. Shigeo Muto
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Correspondence to Akihiro Suzuki.

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Suzuki, A., Muto, S. Farsighted Stability in an n-Person Prisoner’s Dilemma. Int J Game Theory 33, 431–445 (2005). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-005-0209-5

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-005-0209-5

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