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Welfare and stability in senior matching markets

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Abstract

We consider matching markets at a senior level, where workers are assigned to firms at an unstable matching—the status-quo—which might not be Pareto efficient. It might also be that none of the matchings Pareto superior to the status-quo are Core stable. We propose two weakenings of Core stability: status-quo stability and weakened stability, and the respective mechanisms which lead any status-quo to matchings meeting the stability requirements above mentioned. The first one is inspired by the Top trading cycle and Deferred Acceptance procedures, the other one belongs to the family of Branch and Bound algorithms. The last procedure finds a core stable matching in many-to-one markets whenever it exists, dispensing with the assumption of substitutability.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. El Colegio de México, C.E.E. Camino al Ajusco no. 20, Pedregal de Santa Teresa, 10740, México, DF, México

    David Cantala

  2. CIMAT, Apartado Postal 402, C.P. 36 000, Guanajuato Gto., México

    Francisco Sánchez Sánchez

Authors
  1. David Cantala
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  2. Francisco Sánchez Sánchez
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to David Cantala.

Additional information

The authors thank Salvador Barberà, Stephanie Dunbar, participants to seminars at Universidad de Vigo, El Banco de Mexico, Concordia University, participants to the Wallis Conference on Resource Allocation and Game Theory held at Rochester, the 8th International meeting of the Society for Social Choice and Welfare, the 17th International Conference on Game Theory at Stony Brook and SED 2006. Support from CONACYT is gratefully acknowledged.

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Cantala, D., Sánchez, F.S. Welfare and stability in senior matching markets. Int J Game Theory 36, 369–392 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-007-0079-0

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-007-0079-0

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