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Axiomatizations of the Euclidean compromise solution

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Abstract

A multicriteria optimization problem is one of choosing an alternative that optimizes several—possibly conflicting—objective functions simultaneously. The utopia point of a multicriteria optimization problem is the vector that specifies for each objective function the most favorable feasible value. The Euclidean compromise solution in multicriteria optimization is a solution that selects from a feasible set the alternative such that its vector of criteria values has minimal Euclidean distance to the utopia point. This paper provides several axiomatic characterizations of the Euclidean compromise solution that are based on consistency properties.

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Correspondence to M. Voorneveld.

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Voorneveld, M., van den Nouweland, A. & McLean, R. Axiomatizations of the Euclidean compromise solution. Int J Game Theory 40, 427–448 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-010-0240-z

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