Abstract
We provide a new axiomatization of the Kalai–Smorodinsky bargaining solution, which replaces the axiom of individual monotonicity by disagreement point monotonicity and a restricted version of Nash’s IIA.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Anbarci N, Bigelow JP (1994) The area monotonic solution to the cooperative bargaining problem. Math Soc Sci 28: 133–142
de Clippel G (2007) An axiomatization of the Nash bargaining solution. Soc Choice Welfare 29: 201–210
Kalai E, Smorodinsky M (1975) Other solutions to Nash’s bargaining problem. Econometrica 43: 513–518
Livne ZA (1989) Axiomatic characterizations of the Raiffa and the Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions to the bargaining problem. Oper Res 37: 972–980
Nash JF (1950) The bargaining problem. Econometrica 18: 155–162
Perles MA, Maschler M (1981) The super-additive solution for the Nash bargaining game. Int J Game Theory 10: 163–193
Peters H, Tijs S (1985) Characterization of all individually monotonic bargaining solutions. Int J Game Theory 14: 219–228
Roth AE (1977) Independence of irrelevant alternatives, and solutions to Nash’s bargaining problem. J Econ Theory 16: 247–251
Thomson W (1983) The fair division of a fixed supply among a growing population. Math Oper Res 8: 319–326
Thomson W (1987) Monotonicity of bargaining solutions with respect to the disagreement point. J Econ Theory 42: 50–58
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Rachmilevitch, S. A characterization of the Kalai–Smorodinsky bargaining solution by disagreement point monotonicity. Int J Game Theory 40, 691–696 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-010-0260-8
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-010-0260-8