Abstract
This note extends the solution concept of the core for cooperative games to multi-choice games. We propose an extension of the theorem of Bondareva (Problemy Kybernetiki 10:119–139, 1963) and Shapley (Nav Res Logist Q 14:453–460, 1967) to multi-choice games. Also, we introduce a notion of reduced games for multi-choice games and provide an axiomatization of the core on multi-choice games by means of corresponding notion of consistency and its converse.
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Hwang, YA., Liao, YH. The multi-core, balancedness and axiomatizations for multi-choice games. Int J Game Theory 40, 677–689 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-011-0280-z
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-011-0280-z