Abstract
This article is devoted to the analysis of electoral systems involving two step procedures. It appears that designers are able to manipulate the result of these type of elections by gerrymandering, except in a very few cases. When imposing an unanimity condition on every jurisdiction’s voting rule, it is shown that, for any finite number of candidates, a two step voting rule that is gerrymander-proof necessarily gives every voter the power of overruling the unanimity. A characterization of the set of gerrymander proof rules is provided in the case of two candidates.
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Bervoets, S., Merlin, V. Gerrymander-proof representative democracies. Int J Game Theory 41, 473–488 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-011-0298-2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-011-0298-2