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Axiomatizing core extensions

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Abstract

We give an axiomatization of the aspiration core on the domain of all TU-games using a relaxed feasibility condition, non-emptiness, individual rationality, and generalized versions of the reduced game property (consistency) and superadditivity. Our axioms also characterize the C-core (Guesnerie and Oddou, Econ Lett 3(4):301–306, 1979; Sun et al. J Math Econ 44(7–8):853–860, 2008) and the core on appropriate subdomains. The main result of the paper generalizes Peleg’s (J Math Econ 14(2):203–214, 1985) core axiomatization to the entire family of TU-games.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Economics, Rice University, 6100 Main Street, Houston, TX, 77005, USA

    Camelia Bejan

  2. Business Program, University of Washington, Bothell, 18115 Campus Way NE, Bothell, WA, 98011, USA

    Juan Camilo Gómez

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  1. Camelia Bejan
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  2. Juan Camilo Gómez
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Correspondence to Juan Camilo Gómez.

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Bejan, C., Gómez, J.C. Axiomatizing core extensions. Int J Game Theory 41, 885–898 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-011-0316-4

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-011-0316-4

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