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Comparing influence theories in voting games under locally generated measures of dissatisfaction

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Abstract

The Isbell desirability relation (I), the Shapley–Shubik index (SS) and the Banzhaf–Coleman index (BC) are power theories that grasp the notion of individual influence in a yes–no voting rule. Also, a yes–no voting rule is often used as a tool for aggregating individual preferences over any given finite set of alternatives into a collective preference. In this second context, Diffo Lambo and Moulen (DM) have introduced a power relation which ranks the voters with respect to how ably they influence the collective preference. However, DM relies on the metric d that measures closeness between preference relations. Our concern in this work is: do I, SS, BC and DM agree when the same yes–no voting rule is the basis for collective decision making? We provide a concrete and intuitive class of metrics called locally generated (LG). We give a characterization of the LG metrics d for which I, SS, BC and DM agree on ranking the voters.

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Correspondence to B. Tchantcho.

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Diffo Lambo, L., Tchantcho, B. & Moulen, J. Comparing influence theories in voting games under locally generated measures of dissatisfaction. Int J Game Theory 41, 719–731 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-012-0342-x

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-012-0342-x

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