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Time consistent Markov policies in dynamic economies with quasi-hyperbolic consumers

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Abstract

We study the question of existence and computation of time-consistent Markov policies of quasi-hyperbolic consumers under a stochastic transition technology in a general class of economies with multidimensional action spaces and uncountable state spaces. Under standard complementarity assumptions on preferences, as well as a mild geometric condition on transition probabilities, we prove existence of time-consistent solutions in Markovian policies, and provide conditions for the existence of continuous and monotone equilibria. We present applications of our methods to habit formation models, environmental policies, and models of consumption under borrowing constraints, and hence show how our methods extend the results obtained by Harris and Laibson (Econometrica 69:935–957, 2001) to a broad class of dynamic economies. We also present a simple successive approximation scheme for computing extremal equilibrium, and provide some results on the existence of monotone equilibrium comparative statics in the model’s deep parameters.

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Notes

  1. For a small sampling of this work, see the papers of O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999a, b), Laibson (1997) and Angeletos et al. (2001), or Eisenhauer and Ventura (2006) for an empirical evidence supporting quasi-hyperbolic preferences hypothesis, among others.

  2. Recent approaches have appealed to related recursive optimization methods, but incorporating duality theory with policies defined on enlarged state spaces including dual variables that are associated with dynamic incentive constraints. Such contributions can be found in the work on recursive saddle-point theory that was first discussed implicitly in Kydland and Prescott (1977, 1980), and later developed in Marcet and Marimon (2011), and Messner et al. (2012a, b).

  3. For example, from a decision theoretic perspective, when a ”current” decision maker is indifferent between some alternatives in the future, that same decision maker can still strictly prefer such an alternative in advance and be willing to commit yet lacks access to a reasonable ”commitment device” that would impose discipline on the choices of her future ”selves” when tomorrow actually arrives.

  4. Also, in the case of recursive saddle-point methods, two critical problems exist. The first concerns conditions for the existence of saddle point stable solutions to dual programs which do not involve convexity conditions which typically are not present in quasi-hyperbolic discounting problems [e.g., see the papers of Messner et al. (2012a, b) for discussion of how these methods work when saddle points exist]. Second, often unique saddle points are needed to guarantee resulting dual solutions to Lagrangian formulations are primal feasible [e.g., to rule out the counterexample discussed in Messner and Pavoni (2004)].

  5. See also Fudenberg and Levine (2006) for a more recent discussion of related issues.

  6. The work of Maskin and Tirole (2001) provides an extensive set of motivations for why one might be interested in concentrating on SMNE (as opposed to SPNE).

  7. A countably chain complete poset is a partially ordered set that is closed under sup/inf of each monotone sequence.

  8. For example, in Sorger (2004), he proposes settings under which any twice continuously differentiable function can be supported as a policy of a time consistent hyperbolic consumer. This result can be subsequently linked to Gong and Smith (2007), where they show that a hyperbolic discounting is not observationally equivalent to exponential discounting. That is, it is always possible to calibrate an exponential model so that it predicts the same level of consumption as a hyperbolic model. However, the two models have radically different comparative statics. Hence, our approach allows us to sort out the exact nature of this question, and provide theoretical monotone comparative statics results based on the equilibrium set of the stochastic game itself. Such a result can clarify empirical questions that are asked by applied researchers.

  9. See Harris and Laibson (2001) for a discussion of their methods and stochastic games [e.g., Harris and Laibson (2001), footnote 13].

  10. In a GEE approach, the question of existence and characterization is closely related to solving systems of generalized Euler inequalities, and it appeals to the calculus of bounded variation for characterizing the structure of SMNE. Actually, when GEE methods have been used in the literature, they have been used in problems with a single control, and a single state. [e.g., the consumption-savings problem in Harris and Laibson (2001)]. For multidimensional problems with Euler inequalities, the calculus of bounded variation seem very difficult to implement and interpret. Our methods, in contrast, rely exclusively on value-policy iteration algorithm. This fact simplifies the problem of solving multidimensional dynamic consistency a great deal.

  11. Mathematical definitions and notations relating to partially ordered sets and lattices are found in the appendix.

  12. When the context is clear, in this paper, when we use the term “monotone”, we mean monotone increasing.

  13. The complication in this paper arises as our dynamically consistent plans need to be measurable, and under pointwise partial orders, spaces of measurable functions are only countably chain complete. That is, in spaces of measurable functions, for arbitrary subsets (resp., subchains), the \( \sup \) (resp, \(\inf )\) of the set need not be measurable unless the set is countable or compact in the uniform topology. So we need to prove a version of the Tarski/Markowsky theorem, but for “sigma” complete lattices (resp, countable chain complete partially ordered sets).

  14. Veinott’s fixed point comparative statics result is found in Veinott (1992) (Theorem 14, Chap. 4). See also Topkis (1998), Theorem 2.5.2.

  15. In this definition, recall for a poset \(A\subset X,\) \(\sup A\) (resp, \(\inf A) \) is denoted as \(\vee A\) (resp, \(\wedge A).\)

  16. These concepts are also directly related to the idea of an sequential order continuous operators developed by Vulikh (1967, p.27).

  17. Notice here the state space is not required to be bounded.

  18. For example, even in stochastic dynamic programming problems with unbounded state spaces and returns unbounded below, let alone a stochastic game, it is not clear how to identify useful conditions to guarantee the existence of upper (resp., lower) pointwise bounds for candidate value functions needed to pose the existence problem for a unique value function. For a discussion of the complications of finding these upper and lower bounds for stochastic dynamic programs, see Marinacci and Montrucchio (2010), Matkowski and Nowak (2011), and Vailakis and Le Van (2012). See also related discussion in Martins-da Rocha and Vailakis (2010). One resolution of this problem for very particular examples of our model (e.g., asset pricing and consumption-savings versions) if players have unbounded returns below is to introduce “cheap points” into endowment processes so that lower bounded for utility can be constructed without strong joint restrictions on the growth rate of utility and shocks as consumption goes to zero. This is approach taken in Duffie et al. (1994). In our stochastic game, these upper and lower bounds are needed to find a suitable countable chain complete set of values functions in which to pose our SMNE existence problem. In the end, this seems to be a purely technical problem for our stochastic game, and we abstract from this case, and just assume positive bounded returns.

  19. In an important recent paper by Chade et al. (2008), the authors study a repeated game using an APS type procedure. We remark that the presence of state variables in our model would greatly complicate the Footnote 19 continued

    problem of extending their APS procedures to our model (especially for the case of multidimensional state space as indicated by the discussion above per measurability and weak-star closure of the Nash equilibrium set). Therefore, it is not clear how to extend either their existence or equilibrium comparative statics results to the class of models in this paper.

  20. For each set \(A\), \(\mathbf {1}_A(\cdot )\) is said to be indicator of \(A\).

  21. The question of uniqueness of SMNE in this game is a critical one for numerical work, and is an important open question. We leave that problem for future work.

  22. We are indebted to one of the referees of this paper for bring this particular issue to our attention.

  23. MATLAB program implementing our numerical procedure is available from authors upon request.

  24. For simplicity, we have assumed a habit that depreciates after 1 period. We can easily incorporate more “durable” habits into our framework.

  25. \(X=^{d}Y=^{d}\tau \) means that random variable \(X\) has the same distribution as \(Y\), and it is \(\tau \).

  26. We should elaborate a bit on this point. In a generalized Euler equation method, on an open set of any point in the state space, we can always construct an local linearization (in a space of functions) that might be valid as a linear approximation to the function that satisfies the functional equation near that point; the problem is showing the Euler equation is necessary and sufficient on that open set. For the later claim to be true, you must know the value function in the equilibrium of the game is concave. In our method, such a local expansion will be valid; but then, we do not need the generalized Euler equation to compute the models equilibrium.

  27. See also Alj and Haurie (1983) or Nowak (2010) for related results.

  28. See also Gul and Pesendorfer (2004) for recursive temptation driven preferences in a dynamic setting. In their Sect. 6 they use such preferences to analyze a dynamic model of temptation driven preference in a stochastic economy.

  29. Dekel and Lipman (2012) also show that random Strotz preferences can represent GP preferences.

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Acknowledgments

We thank Robert Becker, Madhav Chandrasekher, Manjira Datta, Paweł Dziewulski, Amanda Friedenberg, Ed Green, Seppo Heikkilä, Len Mirman, Peter Streufert, and especially Ed Prescott, as well participants of our SAET 2011 session for helpful conversations on the topics of this paper. We especially thank two anonymous referees and the associate editor for their excellent comments on an earlier draft of this paper. Balbus and Woźny reserach has been supported by NCN Grant No. UMO-2012/07/D/HS4/01393. All the usual caveats apply.

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Appendix: Proof of technical result

Appendix: Proof of technical result

We begin with some useful definitions not provided earlier in the paper, but used in proofs of the proposition. An arbitrary set (\(X,\ge )\) is partially ordered set (or poset) if \(X\) is equipped with an order relation \(\ge :X\times X\rightarrow X\) that is reflexive, antisymmetric and transitive. If every element of a poset \(X\) is comparable, then \(X\) is chain. If \(X\) is a chain and countable, \(X\) is a countable chain. An upper (respectively, lower) bound for a set \( B\subset X\) is an element \(x^{u}(\)respectively, \(x^{l})\in X\) such that for any other element \(x\in B,\) \(x\le x^{u}\) (respectively, \(x^{l}\le x)\). If there is a point \(x^{u}\) (respectively, x\(^{l})\) such that \(x^{u}\) is the least element in the subset of upper bounds of \(B\subset X\) (respectively, the greatest element in the subset of lower bounds of \(B\subset X\)), we say \( x^{u}\) (respectively, \(x^{l})\) is the supremum (respectively, infimum) of \(B.\) Clearly if the supremum or infimum of a set \(X\) exists, it must be unique.

We say a set \(L\subset X\) is a lattice if for any two elements, say \(x\) and \(x^{\prime }\) in \(L, L\) is closed under the operation of infimum (denoted by \(x\wedge x^{\prime }),\) and supremum (denoted \(x\vee x^{\prime }).\) The former is referred to as “the meet” of the two points, while the latter is “the join” . A subset \(L_{1}\) of \(L\) is a sublattice of \(L\) if it contains the sup and the inf (with respect to \(L\)) of any pair of points in \(L_{1}.\) A lattice is complete if any \(L_{1}\subset L\), the least upper bound (denoted \(\vee L_{1})\) and the greatest lower bound (denoted \(\wedge L_{1})\) are both in \(L\) . If this completeness property only holds for countable subsets \(L_{c}\), the lattice is \(\sigma -\) complete. In a poset \(X\), if every subchain \(C\subset \) \(X\) is complete, then \(X\ \)is referred to as a chain complete poset (or equivalent, a complete partially ordered set or CPO). A set \(C\) is countable if it is either finite or there is a bijection from the natural numbers onto \(C.\) If every countable chain \(C\subset X\) is complete, then \(X\) is referred to as a countably chain complete poset.

Let \((X_{1},\ge _{X_{1}})\) and \((X_{2},\ge _{X_{2}})\) be posets. A function (or, equivalently, operator) \(f:X_{1}\rightarrow X_{2}\) is monotone (or order-preserving or isotone) if \(f(x^{\prime })\ge _{X_{2}}f(x),\) when \(x^{\prime }\ge _{X_{1}}x,\) for \(x,x^{\prime }\in X_{1}\). A sequence \(\{h_{n}\}\) in \(H\) is order convergent if there exists two monotonic sequences of elements from \(H\), one decreasing \( \{h_{\downarrow n}\},\) and one increasing \(\{h_{\uparrow n}\} \), such that \( h=\inf h_{\downarrow n}=\sup h_{\uparrow n}\) and \(h_{\uparrow n}\le h_{n}\le h_{\downarrow n}.\) A necessary and sufficient condition for an increasing sequence \(h_{n}\rightarrow h\) to be order convergent is \(h=\sup h_{n}.\)

Let \((X,\ge )\) be a countably chain complete poset, i.e. where each increasing sequence has supremum, and each decreasing sequence has infimum. Assume that \(X\) has the greatest element \(\overline{\theta }\) and the least element \(\underline{\theta }\). For a monotone sequence \(\{x_{n}\}_{n=0}^{ \infty }\), let

$$\begin{aligned} \bigvee x_{n}:=\sup \limits _{n\in \mathbf {N}}x_{n}, \end{aligned}$$

and

$$\begin{aligned} \bigwedge x_{n}:=\inf \limits _{n\in \mathbf {N}}x_{n}. \end{aligned}$$

Denote by \(F^{n}(x)\) the \(n\)-th orbit (or iteration) of \(x\) under the function \(F\), i.e. \(F^{n}(x)=F\circ F\circ \ldots \circ F(x)\). We have the following two theorems, with the first pertaining to fixed point existence, and the second pertaining to fixed point comparative statics. The auxiliary fixed point theorem found in Sect. 2 is a corollary of both theorems.

Theorem 7

Let \(X\) be a countably chain complete poset with the greatest element \(\overline{\theta }\) and the least element \(\underline{\theta }\), and \(F:X\rightarrow X\) an increasing function, that is monotonically sup-inf-preserving i.e.

  • if \(x_n\) is increasing, then \(F\left( \bigvee x_n\right) =\bigvee F(x_n)\) and

  • if \(x_n\) is decreasing, then \(F\left( \bigwedge x_n\right) =\bigwedge F(x_n)\).

Then:

  1. (i)

    \(\overline{\Phi }:=\bigwedge F^{n}(\overline{\theta })\) is the greatest fixed point and \(\underline{\Phi }:=\bigvee F^{n}(\underline{\theta } ) \) is the least fixed point.

  2. (ii)

    the set of fixed points is a nonempty countably chain complete poset with

    $$\begin{aligned} \overline{\Phi }=\bigvee \left\{ x:F(x)\ge x\right\} , \end{aligned}$$
    (10)

    and

    $$\begin{aligned} \underline{\Phi }=\bigwedge \left\{ x:F(x)\le x\right\} , \end{aligned}$$
    (11)

Proof

Proof of (i): Clearly \(F(\overline{\theta })\le \overline{\theta }\). If for some \(n,F^{n}(\overline{\theta })\ge F^{n+1}(\overline{\theta })\), then \(F^{n+1}(\overline{\theta })=F(F^{n}(\overline{\theta }))\ge F(F^{n+1}( \overline{\theta }))=F^{n+2}(\overline{\theta })\). Hence, \(F^{n}(\overline{ \theta })\) is decreasing, and \(\overline{\Phi }\) is well defined. Since \(F\) is monotonically inf-preserving, we have

$$\begin{aligned} F(\overline{\Phi })&= F\left( \bigwedge F^{n}(\theta )\right) , \\&= \bigwedge F^{n+1}(\theta ), \\&= \overline{\Phi }. \end{aligned}$$

Therefore, \(\overline{\Phi }\) is fixed point of \(F\). Let us take arbitrary fixed point \(e=F(e)\). Clearly, \(e\le \overline{\theta }\), and \(e=F(e)\le F( \overline{\theta })\). If \(e=\le F^{n}(\overline{\theta }),\) then \( e=F(e)=\le F^{n+1}(\overline{\theta })\). Therefore, \(e\le F^{n}(\overline{ \theta })\) for all \(n\), which implies \(e\le \overline{\Phi }\). Similarly, we prove that \(\underline{\Phi }\) is well defined and it is the least fixed point of \(F\).

Proof of (ii): Let \(e_{n}\) be an increasing set of fixed points. Let \(\bar{e} =\bigvee e_{n}\). Then,

$$\begin{aligned} F(\bar{e})&= F\left( \bigvee e_{n}\right) , \\&= \bigvee F(e_{n}), \\&= \bigvee e_{n}=\bar{e}. \end{aligned}$$

Similarly, we prove the thesis for decreasing sequences. Now, we finally prove equality (10). Let \(x\) be arbitrary point such that \( x\le F(x)\). Clearly \(x\le \overline{\theta }\). Assume \(x\le F^{n}( \overline{\theta })\). Then, \(x\le F(x)\le F(F^{n}(\overline{\theta } ))=F^{n+1}(\overline{\theta })\). Hence, \(x\le \overline{\Phi }\). Since \( \overline{\Phi }\in \{x:F(x)\ge x\},\) equality (10) is proven. We prove (11) analogously. \(\square \)

We finally prove a theorem (and a corollary) on increasing selections for parameterized problems that we use in the paper to obtain our results on equilibrium monotone comparatives.

Theorem 8

Let \(X\) be a countably chain complete poset with the greatest and least elements and \(T\) a poset. If \(F:X\times T\rightarrow X\) is increasing, and monotonically-sup-inf preserving on \(X\) then \( t\rightarrow \overline{\Phi }(t)\) and \(t\rightarrow \underline{\Phi }(t)\) are isotone.

Proof

Let \(t_{1}\le t_{2}\). From Theorem 7 we know that \(m_{i}:= \overline{\Phi }(t_{i})=\vee \Gamma _{i}:=\vee \{x:F(x,t_{i})\le x\}\). Note that by isotonicity of \(F(x,\cdot )\) we obtain \(m_{1}=F(m_{1},t_{1})\le F(m_{1},t_{2})\). Hence \(m_{1}\in \Gamma _{2}\). Since \(m_{2}\) is the greatest element of \(\Gamma _{2}\), hence \(m_{1}\le m_{2}\). \(\square \)

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Balbus, Ł., Reffett, K. & Woźny, Ł. Time consistent Markov policies in dynamic economies with quasi-hyperbolic consumers. Int J Game Theory 44, 83–112 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-014-0420-3

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