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A preference change or a perception change? A comment on Dietrich and List

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Abstract

Dietrich and List (Int J Game Theory 1–25, 2012) enrich the standard model of choice by explicitly modeling a decision maker’s mental state. They assume that a change in mental state either induces a change in preferences, or alternatively, a change in the decision maker’s perception of the choice problem. This paper argues that the two interpretations are not always interchangeable. Presented are two examples which demonstrate that decision maker’s (“subjective”) perception may not be adequately modeled as embodied in his preferences over (“objective”) alternatives. It is also emphasized that in order to understand choice behavior, one has to take into the account decision maker’s perception of the choice problem rather than its “objective” description by an observer.

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Notes

  1. \(^{1}\) For further elaboration of their model, see Dietrich and List (2013a, b).

  2. See however Dietrich and List (2013b), where the difference between the two interpretations is more emphasized.

  3. Strictly speaking, “objective” description of alternatives is not feasible, hence the parentheses. The thesis, first emphasized by Popper (2002), that all perception is theory-laden seems now generally accepted (see especially recent literature on predictive coding, e.g. Mumford 1992; Rao and Ballard 1999; Friston 2005, 2012; Clark 2013), although there may be different senses in which theories affect perception (Khalil 2013). From this perspective “objective” description stands for “observer’s” description which may, but need not, correspond to decision maker’s perception.

  4. An example of such a dependence can be illustrated by the following observation by Katz (1937, 143) made with reference to animal perception: “A hungry animal divides the environment into edible and inedible things. An animal in flight sees roads to escape and hiding places [...] Generally speaking, objects change [...] according to the needs of the animal.” Similarly, Hardy and Heyes (1999, 24) claim that hungry people are more likely to notice food thus suggesting that mental states and perception are closely connected. Empirical evidence on the relationship between perception and motivation can be found in e.g. Balcetis and Dunning (2006) and Veltkamp et al. (2008).

  5. For further discussion on the issue of embodying asymmetric perception of players in their preferences, see Bacharach (2006), Bicchieri (2005) and Klein (2012).

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  1. Center for Theoretical Study, Charles University in Prague, Jilská st. 1, 110 00,  Prague 1, Czech Republic

    Marek Hudík

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Hudík, M. A preference change or a perception change? A comment on Dietrich and List. Int J Game Theory 44, 425–431 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-014-0436-8

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