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A note on external angles of the core of convex TU games, marginal worth vectors and the Weber set

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Abstract

The paper studies the structure of external angles of the core of convex TU games. It is shown that the external angle at a vertex of the core is proportional to the number of marginal worth vectors defining the vertex. A notion of difference of two convex compact sets is used to define the Weber set of a TU game and to give another proof of the Weber theorem.

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Acknowledgments

I am very grateful to Elena Yanovskaya, Bernhard von Stengel (Co-Editor), an associate editor and two anonymous referees for their valuable comments and suggestions.

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Correspondence to Sergei Pechersky.

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Pechersky, S. A note on external angles of the core of convex TU games, marginal worth vectors and the Weber set. Int J Game Theory 44, 487–498 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-014-0441-y

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-014-0441-y

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