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On some properties of the ε-core of games with coalition structure

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Abstract:

Chang [1991] stated some inclusion relation about kernel, reasonable set, and ε-core of games with coalition structure. We give counterexamples and modify erroneous results.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Faculty of Administration and Social Sciences, Fukushima University, Matsukawa, Fukushima, 960-1296 Japan (e-mail: nakayama@g1.ads.fukushima-u.ac.jp), , , , , , JP

    Akira Nakayama

  2. Faculty of Economics, Shiga University, Hikone, Shiga, 522-8522 Japan (e-mail: naitoh@biwako.shiga-u.ac.jp), , , , , , JP

    Takeshi Naitoh

Authors
  1. Akira Nakayama
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  2. Takeshi Naitoh
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Received: May 1997/Revised version: January 1999

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Nakayama, A., Naitoh, T. On some properties of the ε-core of games with coalition structure. Game Theory 28, 253–255 (1999). https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820050017

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820050017

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