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Equilibria in repeated games of incomplete information: The general symmetric case

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Abstract.

Every two person repeated game of symmetric incomplete information, in which the signals sent at each stage to both players are identical and generated by a state and moves dependent probability distribution on a given finite alphabet, has an equilibrium payoff.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Institute of Mathematics, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Givat Ram, Jerusalem 91904, Israel (e-mail: aneyman@math.huji.ac.il), , , , , , IL

    Abraham Neyman

  2. Laboratoire d'Econométrie, Ecole Polytechnique, 1 rue Descartes, 75005 Paris, France (e-mail: sorin@poly.polytechnique.fr), , , , , , FR

    Sylvain Sorin

Authors
  1. Abraham Neyman
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  2. Sylvain Sorin
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Received March 1996/Revised version January 1997/Final version May 1997

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Neyman, A., Sorin, S. Equilibria in repeated games of incomplete information: The general symmetric case. Game Theory 27, 201–210 (1998). https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820050066

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820050066

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