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Spanning network games

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Abstract.

We study fundamental properties of monotone network enterprises which contain public vertices and have positive and negative costs on edges and vertices. Among the properties studied are the nonemptiness of the core, characterization of nonredundant core constraints, ease of computation of the core and the nucleolus, and cases of decomposition of the core and the nucleolus.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Faculty of Commerce and Business Administration, The University of British Columbia, 2053 Main Mail, Vancouver, B.C., Canada V6T 1Z2 (e-mail: dgranot@gandolf.commerce.ubc.ca), , , , , , CA

    Daniel Granot

  2. Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 91904 Jerusalem, Israel (e-mail: maschler@vms.huji.ac.il), , , , , , IL

    Michael Maschler

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  1. Daniel Granot
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  2. Michael Maschler
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Received December 1994/Final version March 1998

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Granot, D., Maschler, M. Spanning network games. Game Theory 27, 467–500 (1998). https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820050085

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820050085

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