Abstract
In this paper we show that many results on equilibria in stochastic games arising from economic theory can be deduced from the theorem on the existence of a correlated equilibrium due to Nowak and Raghavan. Some new classes of nonzero-sum Borel state space discounted stochastic games having stationary Nash equilibria are also presented. Three nontrivial examples of dynamic stochastic games arising from economic theory are given closed form solutions.
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Research partially supported by MNSW grant 1 P03A 01030.
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Nowak, A.S. On stochastic games in economics. Math Meth Oper Res 66, 513–530 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00186-007-0167-8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00186-007-0167-8