Abstract
We study cooperation structures with the following property: Given any two feasible coalitions with non-empty intersection, its union is a feasible coalition again. These combinatorial structures have a direct relationship with graph communication situations and conference structures à la Myerson. Characterizations of the Myerson value in this context are provided using the concept of basis for union stable systems. Moreover, TU-games restricted by union stable systems generalizes graph-restricted games and games with permission structures.
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Manuscript received: January 2001/Final version received: June 2001
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Algaba, E., Bilbao, J., Borm, P. et al. The Myerson value for union stable structures. Mathematical Methods of OR 54, 359–371 (2001). https://doi.org/10.1007/s001860100159
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s001860100159