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Online Random Sampling for Budgeted Settings

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Abstract

We study online multi-unit auctions in which each agent’s private type consists of the agent’s arrival and departure times, valuation function and budget. Similarly to secretary settings, the different attributes of the agents’ types are determined by an adversary, but the arrival process is random. We establish a general framework for devising truthful random sampling mechanisms for online multi-unit settings with budgeted agents. We demonstrate the applicability of our framework by applying it to different objective functions (revenue and liquid welfare), and a range of assumptions about the agents’ valuations (additive or general) when selling identical divisible items. Our main result is the design of mechanisms for additive bidders with budget constraints that extract a constant fraction of the optimal revenue (under a standard large market assumption). We also show a mechanism that extracts a constant fraction of the optimal liquid welfare for general valuations.

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Notes

  1. This impossibility holds even if budgets are public.

  2. Based on personal communication with the authors, this is essentially what is assumed for the correctness of Mechanism RMk in Section 6 in [23].

  3. We refer to Appendix B for a description of the tie-breaking rule for this case.

  4. While VCG is defined and analyzed for offline settings, it is shown in [23] that it can also be applied in online settings by invoking it at the time where last agent arrives, serving only the agents that haven’t departed yet. While this method does not give any revenue guarantees, it is only used to extract truthful information from agents in the sampling set.

  5. A mechanism is IC if every agent’s expected utility is maximized when reporting her true valuation. A mechanism is IR if every agent’s expected utility is non-negative when reporting her true valuation.

  6. Lemmas 3 and 4 follow from the respective proofs of Lemma 5.2 and Theorem 5.1 in [8]. While these are stronger statements than the ones that appeared in [8], they are implied by the proofs in [8].

  7. Selling an entire item to each set is needed, since selling a fraction of item to a dominant agent does not give any guarantee on the liquid welfare.

  8. This lemma is stated quite differently in [8].

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Correspondence to Alon Eden.

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This article is part of the Topical Collection on Special Issue on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT 2017)

This work was partially supported by the European Research Council under the European Unions Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007-2013)/ERC grant agreement number 337122.

Appendices

Appendix A: Proofs of the Theorems from Borgs et al.

Recall that Pk(S) is the optimal price for selling k items to a set S of agents and that \(\overline {\epsilon } = \epsilon (S,k)\). Let \(r^{\infty }_{S}(p)\) denote the revenue achieved by selling an unlimited number of items (digital goods) to set S of agents at price per item p. In order to show the proofs of the lemmas in Section 3.3, we need the following lemma from [8]:

Lemma 20

[8] For anyδ > 0 andfor anypPk(S),the probability that\(\left |{r^{\infty }_{S_1}(p)-r^{\infty }_{S_2}(p)} \right | \leq \delta \cdot OPT(S,k)\)isat least\(1-2e^{-\delta ^2/4\overline {\epsilon }}\).

We now turn to prove the lemmas stated in Section 3.3.

Proof

of Lemma3 Since the revenue obtained from selling items at a given price per item is either bounded by the agents’ budgets or by the number of items for sale, we get that \(OPT(S,k)=\min \left \{P_k(S)\cdot k,r^{\infty }_{S}(P_k(S))\right \}\). Therefore, we get

$$ \begin{array}{@{}rcl@{}} OPT(S,k)\leq P_{k}(S)\cdot k, \end{array} $$
(7)

and

$$ \begin{array}{@{}rcl@{}} OPT(S,k)\leq r^{\infty}_{S}(P_{k}(S)). \end{array} $$
(8)

When unrestricted by the number of items, we have that

$$ \begin{array}{@{}rcl@{}} r^{\infty}_{S_{1}}(P_{k}(S))+r^{\infty}_{S_{2}}(P_{k}(S))=r^{\infty}_{S}(P_{k}(S))\geq OPT(S,k). \end{array} $$
(9)

Whenever \(\left |{r^{\infty }_{S_1}(P_k(S))-r^{\infty }_{S_2}(P_k(S))}\right |\leq \delta \cdot OPT(S,k)\), then

$$ \begin{array}{@{}rcl@{}} r^{\infty}_{S_{2}}(P_{k}(S)) \leq r^{\infty}_{S_{1}}(P_{k}(S))+\delta\cdot OPT(S,k), \end{array} $$
(10)

and

$$ r^{\infty}_{S_{1}}(P_{k}(S)) \leq r^{\infty}_{S_{2}}(P_{k}(S))+\delta\cdot OPT(S,k). $$
(11)

Combining (10) with (9) yields \(r^{\infty }_{S_1}(P_k(S))\geq \frac {1-\delta }{2}OPT(S,k)\). Similarly, combining (11) with (9) yields \(r^{\infty }_{S_2}(P_k(S))\geq \frac {1-\delta }{2}OPT(S,k)\). By (7) we clearly have \(P_k(S)\cdot \frac {k}{2}\geq OPT(S,k)/2\). Since both \(r_{S_1}=\min \left \{r^{\infty }_{S_1}(P_k(S)),P_k(S)\cdot \frac {k}{2}\right \}\) and \(r_{S_2}=\min \left \{r^{\infty }_{S_2}(P_k(S)),P_k(S)\cdot \frac {k}{2}\right \}\) we get that whenever \(\left |{r^{\infty }_{S_1}(P_k(S))-r^{\infty }_{S_2}(P_k(S))}\right |\leq \delta \cdot OPT(S,k)\) it holds that \(r_{S_1} \geq \frac {1-\delta }{2}OPT(S,k)\) and \(r_{S_2} \geq \frac {1-\delta }{2}OPT(S,k)\). The proof is now concluded by Lemma 20. □

In order to prove Lemma 4, we also need the following lemma from [8].Footnote 8

Lemma 21

[8] For allδ,p > 0 both\(r^{\infty }_{S_1}(p)\geq \min \left \{r^{\infty }_{S_2}(p)-\delta \cdot OPT(S,k),\frac {1-\delta }{2}\cdot OPT(S,k)\right \}\)and\(r^{\infty }_{S_2}(p)\geq \min \left \{r^{\infty }_{S_1}(p)-\delta \cdot OPT(S,k),\frac {1-\delta }{2}\cdot OPT(S,k)\right \}\)withprobability at least\(1-2e^{-\delta ^2/4\overline {\epsilon }}\).

Proof

Assuming \(\left |{r^{\infty }_{S_1}(P_k(S))-r^{\infty }_{S_2}(P_k(S))}\right |\leq \delta \cdot OPT(S,k)\) we get that both \(r^{\infty }_{S_2}(p)\geq r^{\infty }_{S_1}(p)-\delta \cdot OPT(S,k)\) and \(r^{\infty }_{S_1}(p)\geq r^{\infty }_{S_2}(p)-\delta \cdot OPT(S,k)\) with probability greater than \(1-2e^{-\delta ^2/4\overline {\epsilon }}\) for pPk(S).

Recall that in the proof of Lemma 3, we showed that both \(r^{\infty }_{S_1}(P_k(S))\geq \frac {1-\delta }{2}OPT(S,k)\) and \(r^{\infty }_{S_2}(P_k(S))\geq \frac {1-\delta }{2}OPT(S,k)\) whenever \(\left |{r^{\infty }_{S_1}(P_k(S))-r^{\infty }_{S_2}(P_k(S))}\right |\leq \delta \cdot OPT(S,k)\). Since with an unlimited supply of items, \(r^{\infty }_{S}(p_1)\geq r^{\infty }_{S}(p_2)\) whenever p1 < p2 (only more agents exhaust their budget), we get that for every pPk(S) both \(r^{\infty }_{S_1}(p)\geq \frac {1-\delta }{2}OPT(S,k)\) and \(r^{\infty }_{S_2}(p)\geq \frac {1-\delta }{2}OPT(S,k)\).

To conclude, we recall that according to Lemma 20, \(\left |{r^{\infty }_{S_1}(P_k(S))-r^{\infty }_{S_2}(P_k(S))}\right |\leq \delta \cdot OPT(S,k)\) occurs with probability at least \(1-2e^{-\delta ^2/4\overline {\epsilon }}\). □

We now proceed to show the proof of Lemma 4.

Proof

of Lemma4 We first assume that \(\left |{r^{\infty }_{S_1}(P_k(S))-r^{\infty }_{S_2}(P_k(S))}\right |\leq \delta \cdot OPT(S,k)\). By definition, \(OPT(S_1,k/2)\geq r_{S_1}\). In this case, as shown in the proof of Lemma 3, \(OPT(S_1,k/2)\geq \frac {1-\delta }{2}OPT(S,k)\). Therefore, it is clear that both

$$ \begin{array}{@{}rcl@{}} P_{k/2}(S_{1})\cdot\frac{k}{2}\geq \frac{1-\delta}{2}OPT(S,k), \end{array} $$
(12)

and

$$ \begin{array}{@{}rcl@{}} r^{\infty}_{S_{1}}(P_{k/2}(S_{1}))\geq \frac{1-\delta}{2}OPT(S,k). \end{array} $$
(13)

Combining the last inequality with Lemma 21, we get that

$$ \begin{array}{@{}rcl@{}} r^{\infty}_{S_{2}}(P_{k/2}(S_{1}))\geq \frac{1-3\delta}{2}OPT(S,k). \end{array} $$
(14)

Since in Offline-Rev-Maximization either the agents of S2 exhaust their budget, or k/2 items are sold, we get that the revenue of mechanism Offline-Rev-Maximization from agents in set S2 is not smaller than: \(\min \left \{r^{\infty }_{S_2}(P_{k/2}(S_1)),P_{k/2}(S_1)\cdot \frac {k}{2}\right \}\geq \frac {1-3\delta }{2}OPT(S,k)\). To conclude, we note that according to Lemma 20, \(\left |{r^{\infty }_{S_1}(P_k(S))-r^{\infty }_{S_2}(P_k(S))}\right |\leq \delta \cdot OPT(S,k)\) occurs with probability at least \(1-2e^{-\delta ^2/4\overline {\epsilon }}\). □

Appendix B: Tie Breaking

In this section, we show how to perform tie breaking when an agents is allowed to report the same arrival time as another agent, but cannot report an earlier arrival time than her real arrival time. The tie breaking rule we present is as follows. Whenever an agent i arrives at time ai, the mechanism chooses a uniformly at random value \(\tilde {a}_i\sim [0,1]\) and sets agent i’s arrival time to be \(\langle a_i,\tilde {a}_i\rangle \). The mechanism orders the agents according to the following rule: Agent i precedes agent j if ai < aj or if ai = aj and \(\tilde {a}_i< \tilde {a}_j\).

We change mechanisms Online-RS and SP-One-Dominant according to the above rule. We claim that these mechanisms are truthful. The only problematic case is when an agent reports an earlier arrival time such that she is placed in set A instead of being placed in set B (the proof of all the other cases is similar to the proof of Theorem 1). Since an agent cannot affect the random value assigned to her, and since we specifically prevent an agent from reporting an earlier arrival time, this is impossible.

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Eden, A., Feldman, M. & Vardi, A. Online Random Sampling for Budgeted Settings. Theory Comput Syst 63, 1470–1498 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00224-019-09918-y

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