Abstract.
The moral imperative requiring “equal treatment of equal claims,” or impartiality, is defined in the frameworks of Harsanyi's aggregation and impartial observer theorems as an axiomatic restriction of the underlying moral value judgments. The implications of impartiality for the functional form of the corresponding social welfare functions are derived and are shown to entail interpersonal comparison of variations in well-being. The argument is illustrated with examples.
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This paper was written while I visited CORE at the Universite Catholique de Louvain and Universite Sorbonne-Pantheon (Paris I). I am grateful to both institutions for their hospitality. I am also grateful to Omer Alper, Philippe Mongin, Zvi Safra, and Uzi Segal for their useful comments.
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Karni, E. Impartiality and interpersonal comparisons of variations in well-being. Soc Choice Welfare 21, 95–111 (2003). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-003-0203-4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-003-0203-4