Abstract
Condorcet’s Jury Theorem (CJT) provides a theoretical basis of public choice theory and political science. This paper provides an extension of CJT for random subcommittees consisting of dependent heterogeneous experts. Necessary and sufficient conditions for beneficial augmentation (reduction) of the size of a random subcommittee are provided. These results are applied in several dependency models.
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Berend, D., Sapir, L. Monotonicity in Condorcet’s Jury Theorem with dependent voters. Soc Choice Welfare 28, 507–528 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0179-y
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0179-y