Abstract
When reelection is uncertain, the election mechanism may provide insufficient incentives for politicians to implement socially desirable policies. In this paper, we show that threshold contracts that the candidates themselves offer during the campaign can help to alleviate the problem, even if the preferences of the candidates are unknown to the public. A threshold contract stipulates a policy space in which the implemented policy must lie for an elected candidate to have the right to stand for reelection.
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Liessem, V. Electoral competition, incentive contracts for politicians and unknown preferences. Soc Choice Welfare 30, 13–41 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-007-0218-3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-007-0218-3