Abstract
We study the optimal design of an organization in which a team of fallible individuals with heterogeneous abilities collectively decides whether to accept or reject projects. Conventional wisdom tells us that the opinion of those individuals with better decision-making abilities should be given a “larger” weight in the decision. We formalize this intuition in a sequential evaluation process and provide specific ways to characterize the optimal decision weights, as well as demonstrate that the magnitude of the weights depends on the relative abilities of the decision-makers, as well as where the decision-makers are placed in the project evaluation sequence.
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Koh, W.T.H. Heterogeneous expertise and collective decision-making. Soc Choice Welfare 30, 457–473 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-007-0242-3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-007-0242-3