Abstract
We consider the problem of designing a mechanism to allocate objects to agents when each agent has a quota that must be filled exactly. Agents are assumed to have responsive preferences over items. We show that the only strategy-proof, Pareto optimal, and nonbossy mechanisms are sequential dictatorships. We also show that the only strategy-proof, Pareto optimal, nonbossy, and neutral mechanisms are serial dictatorships. Since these negative results hold for responsive preferences, they hold for more general preferences as well.
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We are grateful to Atila Abdulkadiroğlu, Syed Nageeb Mustafa Ali, Douglas Bernheim, Navin Kartik, Jon Levin, Paul Milgrom, and Azeem Shaikh and two anonymous referees and an editor for helpful discussions. This research has been supported by the Burt and Deedee McMurtry Stanford Graduate Fellowship.
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Hatfield, J.W. Strategy-proof, efficient, and nonbossy quota allocations. Soc Choice Welf 33, 505–515 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-009-0376-6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-009-0376-6