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Proportional quota weighted voting system hierarchies

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Abstract

We investigate achievable and unachievable hierarchies in weighted voting systems where the quota is a proportion of the total weight. This extends work of Bean et al. (Theory Dec 65:285–302, 2007) where simple majority achievable hierarchies were characterized. In particular we resolve the question of which hierarchies are possible with common quota rules other than simple majority, such as 2/3-majority or 3/4-majority, and offer a conjecture about proportional quota achievable hierarchies in general.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Mathematics Department, University of San Diego, San Diego, CA, 92110, USA

    Dwight R. Bean, Jane Friedman & Cameron Parker

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  1. Dwight R. Bean
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  2. Jane Friedman
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  3. Cameron Parker
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Correspondence to Dwight R. Bean.

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Bean, D.R., Friedman, J. & Parker, C. Proportional quota weighted voting system hierarchies. Soc Choice Welf 34, 397–410 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-009-0404-6

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-009-0404-6

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