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Characterizing best–worst voting systems in the scoring context

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Abstract

An increasing body of theoretical and empirical work on discrete choice considers a choice design in which a person is asked to select both the best and the worst alternative in an available set of alternatives, in contrast to more traditional tasks, such as where the person is asked to: select the best alternative; select the worst alternative; rank the alternatives. Here we consider voting systems motivated by such “best–worst” choice; characterize a class of “best–worst” voting systems in terms of a set of axioms in the context of scoring rules; and discuss briefly possible extensions to approval–disapproval systems.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. PRESAD Research Group, Department of Applied Economics, University of Valladolid, Avda. Valle de Esgueva 6, 47011, Valladolid, Spain

    José Luis García-Lapresta & Miguel Martínez-Panero

  2. Department of Psychology, University of Victoria, PO Box 3050, STN CSC, Victoria, BC, V8W 3P5, Canada

    A. A. J. Marley

  3. Centre for the Study of Choice, University of Technology, PO Box 123, Broadway, Sydney, NSW, 2007, Australia

    A. A. J. Marley

Authors
  1. José Luis García-Lapresta
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  2. A. A. J. Marley
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  3. Miguel Martínez-Panero
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Correspondence to José Luis García-Lapresta.

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García-Lapresta, J.L., Marley, A.A.J. & Martínez-Panero, M. Characterizing best–worst voting systems in the scoring context. Soc Choice Welf 34, 487–496 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-009-0417-1

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-009-0417-1

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