Abstract
This article evaluates the distribution of power within the Council of the European Union from the a priori perspective of constitutional design using two distinct approaches: (1) applying traditional voting power indices; (2) carrying out strategic equilibrium analysis of the EU’s consultation procedure. It clarifies why both approaches lead to different power indications, and investigates the determinants of the differences’ magnitudes. Depending on one’s assumptions about behavior of the consultation procedure’s agenda setter, the European Commission, traditional indices turn out to deliver a good approximation also of relative strategic power in the Council.
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Mika Widgrén contributed very actively to first drafts of this article; he unexpectedly passed away on 16.8.2009 at the age of 44.
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Napel, S., Widgrén, M. Strategic versus non-strategic voting power in the EU Council of Ministers: the consultation procedure. Soc Choice Welf 37, 511–541 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-010-0502-5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-010-0502-5