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Risky social choice with incomplete or noisy interpersonal comparisons of well-being

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Abstract

In this study, we develop a model of social choice over lotteries, where people’s psychological characteristics are mutable, their preferences may be incomplete, and incomplete or noisy interpersonal comparisons of well-being are possible. Formally, we suppose individual preferences are described by a von Neumann-Morgenstern (vNM) preference order on a space of lotteries over psychophysical states; the social planner must construct a vNM preference order on lotteries over social states. First, we consider a model where the individual vNM preference order is incomplete (so not all interpersonal comparisons are possible). Then, we consider a model where the individual vNM preference order is complete, but unknown to the planner, and thus modelled by a random variable. In both cases, we obtain characterizations of a utilitarian social welfare function.

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  1. Trent University, Peterborough, ON, Canada

    Marcus Pivato

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  1. Marcus Pivato
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Correspondence to Marcus Pivato.

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Pivato, M. Risky social choice with incomplete or noisy interpersonal comparisons of well-being. Soc Choice Welf 40, 123–139 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-011-0590-x

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