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Barefoot and footloose doctors: optimal resource allocation in developing countries with medical migration

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Abstract

In light of the shortage of healthcare professionals, many developing countries operate a de facto two-tiered system of healthcare provision, in which Community Health Workers (CHWs) supplement service provision by fully qualified physicians. CHWs are relatively inexpensive to train but can treat only a limited range of medical conditions. This paper explicitly models a two-tiered structure of healthcare provision and characterizes the optimal allocation of resources between training doctors and CHWs, and implications for population health outcomes. We analyze how medical migration alters resource allocation and population health outcomes, shifting resources towards training CHWs. In the model, migration stimulates health care provision at the lower end of the illness severity spectrum, improving health outcomes for those patients; sufferers of relatively severe medical conditions who can only be treated by doctors are made worse off. It is further shown that donor countries must be reimbursed by at least the training cost of emigrating physicians in order to restore aggregate population health to the pre-migration level.

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Notes

  1. According to Lehmann and Sanders (2007), the most widely accepted definition of CHW is the one proposed in WHO (1989): “Community health workers should be members of the community where they work, answerable to the communities for their activities, supported by the health system but not necessarily a part of its organization, and have shorter training than professional workers”.

  2. There is not an international market for CHWs since they are required to have profound knowledge of the local communities, including knowledge of language and culture.

  3. Bhagwati and Hamada (1974) show that, under certain conditions, the possibility of emigration lead the skilled workers of developing countries to bargain for higher wages, leading to an increase of unemployment.

  4. See, for example, McCulloch and Yellen (1975, 1977) and, more recently, McHale (2009).

  5. The main donor countries represented in the sample were India (around 42 %), Nigeria (8 %) and South Africa (roughly 7 %). Other Sub-Saharan Africa countries were also represented.

  6. Mountford (1997) shows that brain gain hinges on two crucial premises: that migration prospects determine decisions to enroll into medical school and that migrants are not strongly screened by the host country. Kangasniemi et al. (2007) find that, for medical migration towards the UK, the link between migration possibility and educational choices is likely to be weak and that host countries clearly cream-skim the best applicants; neither of the two crucial premises is thus likely to hold. Bhargava et al. (2011) find only a small positive effect of migration prospects on the decision to undertake medical training, clearly insufficient to generate a sizable effect on a county’s stock of doctors. As noted in Docquier and Rapoport (2012), curtailing medical brain drain would, overall, increase staffing levels in developing countries.

  7. At the moment, simple estimates of the number of CHWs and their patients vary widely according to the source of information. Important efforts are nonetheless being undertaken in order to compile such data (for, for example by the One Million CHWs campaign: http://1millionhealthworkers.org).

  8. Budgetary constraints are associated with endemic shortages within medical and health science school faculties, lack of equipment and essential infrastructure maintenance. This, in turn, limits the number of health professionals, such as doctors and CHWs, trained in Sub-Saharan African countries.

  9. More on the choice of the objective below.

  10. It is interesting that this result applies generally, for all budget levels and distributions of illness, hinging on the increasing marginal cost of quality of healthcare. This may explain why CHWs are trained and deployed also in rich countries, such as the USA.

  11. The objective function of program (7) can be written this way by Lemma 1.

  12. Several middle income countries achieved important increases in life expectancy through cost-effective primary care provision, relying heavily on CHWs. However, this cost-effective strategy is insufficient for tackling more severe non-communicable diseases that typically require treatment by fully qualified doctors, as made clear in a recent OECD policy report about China (OECD 2013).

  13. Policy reports (DFID 2010) claim that EDHR caused the number of medical doctors practicing in the country to increase noticeably; nonetheless, a causal impact evaluation of this program has not been undertaken.

  14. It could be argued that another form of compensation might consist of the host countries supplying doctors do developing countries. However, with some exceptions (such as the Cuban Medical Cops) the deployment of medics to developing countries is often transitory and associated with calamity relief and disease specific programs.

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Acknowledgments

The authors are grateful to Luigi Siciliani and Alan Winters for their comments and to participants at the OECD—Universities Joint Conference, 2013 and the conference held in Hermance, Switzerland, in June 2012, organized by the Harvard Program in Ethics and Health and the Brocher Foundation, where an earlier version of this paper was presented. We are grateful as well to two journal referees, who saved us from several errors. Any remaining errors are the authors’ responsibility.

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Correspondence to Pedro Rosa Dias.

Appendix

Appendix

Proofs of theorems are provided below.

Proof of Lemma 1

Suppose doctors spend time t(s) treating patients with illnesses in the interval \(s\in (s_1 ,s_1 +\updelta )\subset [1,\hat{{s}}]\). The outcome for this group of patients is

$$\begin{aligned} \int \limits _{s_1 }^{s_1 +\updelta } \hbox {log}{\left( {\frac{1+q_1 t(s)}{s}} \right) } dF(s). \end{aligned}$$
(24)

The cost of this treatment is \(c_1 \int \nolimits _{s_1 }^{s_1 +\updelta } {t(s)dF(s)=C_1 } \) . Now let \(\hat{{t}}(s)=\frac{q_1 t(s)}{q_2 }\), and let these patients be treated instead by CHWs with treatment times \(\hat{{t}}\left( s \right) \). The welfare outcome is identical but the cost of treatment is:

$$\begin{aligned} c_2 \int \limits _{s_1 }^{s_1 +\updelta } {\frac{q_1 t(s)}{q_2 }dF(s)=\frac{c_2 q_1 }{q_2 }\frac{C_1 }{c_1 }=\frac{r_2 }{r_1 }C_1 <C_{1} }, \end{aligned}$$
(25)

where the inequality follows from assumption (3). Hence it is not optimal to treat these patients using doctors. \(\square \)

Proof of Proposition 1

  1. 1.

    Observe first that \({Q}'(x)=1-F(x)>0\), so Q is increasing.

  2. 2.

    The proof is based on the fact that program (7) is a convex program. Define the Lagrangian function:

    $$\begin{aligned} L(\upvarepsilon )= & {} \int \limits _{1}^{\hat{s}}\hbox {log}\left( {\frac{1+q_2 (t_2 (s)+\upvarepsilon \Delta t_2 (s))}{s}}\right) dF(s)\\&+\,\int \limits _{\hat{{s}}}^\infty {\log } \left( {\frac{1+q_1 (t_1 (s)+\upvarepsilon \Delta t_1 (s))}{s}} \right) dF(s) \\&+\,{\upmu }_2 \left( {m_2 +\upvarepsilon \Delta m_2 -\int \limits _{1}^{\hat{s}} {(t_2 (s)+\upvarepsilon \Delta t_2 (s))dF(s)} } \right) \\&+\,\upmu _1 \left( {m_1 +\upvarepsilon \Delta m_1 -\int \limits _1^{\hat{{s}}} {(t_1 (s)+\upvarepsilon \Delta t_1 (s))dF(s)} } \right) \\&+\,\int \limits _1^{s^{*}} {\upalpha (\hbox {s})(s-(1+q_2 (t_2 (s)+\upvarepsilon \Delta t_2 (s))))} dF(s)\\&+\,\uplambda (\bar{{M}}-c_1 (m_1 +\upvarepsilon \Delta m_1 )-c_2 (m_2 +\upvarepsilon \Delta m_2 )) \end{aligned}$$

    where the functions \(t_1 (s),t_2 (s)\) and the numbers \(m_1 \hbox { and }m_2 \) comprise the candidate for the optimal solution of the program. If we can produce a non-negative function \(\upalpha (\cdot )\) on \([1,s^{*}]\) and non-negative constants \(({\upmu }_1 ,{\upmu }_2 ,\uplambda )\) such that \({L}'(0)=0\) at the values of these variables stated in the proposition, then the proposition is proved. For this will mean that the concave function L is maximized at \(\upvarepsilon =0\). In the Lagrangian function L the functions \(\Delta t_i (\cdot ),i=1,2\) are arbitrary feasible variations from the conjectured optimal solution, as are the numbers .\(\Delta m_i \).

  3. 2.

    Evaluating the derivative at zero:

    $$\begin{aligned} {L}'(0)= & {} \int \limits _1^{\hat{{s}}} \frac{q_2 \Delta t_2 (s)}{1+q_2 t_2 (s)}dF(s)+\int \limits _{\hat{{s}}}^\infty \frac{q_1 \Delta t_1 (s)}{1+q_1 t_1 (s)}dF(s) \nonumber \\&+\,\upmu _2 \left( {\Delta m_2 -\int \limits _1^{\hat{{s}}} {\Delta t_2 (s)} dF(s)} \right) \nonumber \\&+\,\upmu _1 \left( \Delta m_1 -\int \limits _{\hat{{s}}}^\infty {\Delta t_1 (s)} dF(s)\right) -\lambda (c_1 \Delta m_1 +c_2 \Delta m_2) \nonumber \\&-\int \limits _1^{s^{*}} {\upalpha (s)q_2 \Delta t_2 (s)dF(s)}. \end{aligned}$$
    (26)

    If we can choose non-negative Lagrangian multipliers \((\upmu _1 ,\upmu _2 ,\uplambda )\) and a non-negative function \(\upalpha (s)\) on \([1,s^{*}]\) so that the coefficients of \((\Delta t_1 (s),\Delta t_2 (s),\Delta m_1 ,\Delta m_2 )\) are all annihilated, then the result is proved.

  4. 3.

    The coefficients of these variations are:

    \(\Delta t_2 (s):\frac{q_2 }{1+q_2 t_2 (s)}-\upalpha (s)q_2 \updelta [1,s^{*}]-\upmu _2 =0, \hbox { for } s\in [1,\hat{{s}}]. \updelta [\hbox {a},\hbox {b}]\) is the function that is 1 on [a,b], and 0 elsewhere;

  5. 4.

    From the \(\Delta t_2 \) condition, we have \(\upalpha (s)=-\frac{\upmu _2 }{q_2 }+\frac{1}{s}\hbox { for }s\in [1,s^{*}]\). At \(s^{*}\), we choose \(\upalpha (s^{*})=0\), implying \(\upmu _2 =\frac{q_2 }{s^*}\). It follows that \(\upalpha (s)>0\hbox { for }s<s^{*}\). Therefore \(\uplambda =\frac{q_2 }{c_2 s^{*}}=\frac{1}{r_2 s^{*}}\) and so \(\upmu _1 =\frac{c_1 }{r_2 s^{*}}.\) Therefore \((1+q_1 t_1 )\frac{c_1 }{r_2 s^{*}}=q_1 \), giving \(t_1 =(\frac{r_2 s^{*}}{r_1 }-1)/q_1 \). For \(t_1 \) to be positive we require \(s^{*}>\frac{r_1 }{r_2 }\), which we will attend to below. We must also check that we are not treating patients with illness severity \(s>\hat{{s}}\) with more treatment than they require: that is, we want \(1+q_1 t_1 \le \hat{{s}}\). But this is true because \(s^{*}<\hat{{s}}<\frac{r_1 }{r_2 }\hat{{s}}\).

  6. 5.

    We now check the budget constraint for the proposed solution, which is:

    $$\begin{aligned} c_2 \int \limits _1^{s^{*}} {\frac{s-1}{q_2 }dF(s)+c_2 \int \limits _{s^{*}}^{\hat{{s}}} {\frac{s^{*}-1}{q_2 }} } dF(s)+c_1 \int \limits _{\hat{{s}}}^\infty {\left( {\left( \frac{r_2 s^{*}}{r_1 }-1\right) /q_1 } \right) } dF(s)=\bar{{M}}. \end{aligned}$$

    This can be written as:

    $$\begin{aligned} r_2 \int \limits _1^{s^{*}} {(s-1)dF(s)+r_2 (s^{*}-1)(F(\hat{{s}})-F(s^{*}))+(r_2 s^{*}-r_1 )(1-F(\hat{{s}}))=M} \end{aligned}$$

    which in turn is equivalent to condition (10) defining \(s^{*}\). Finally, our premise (ii) is exactly the condition that tells us a unique solution \(s^{*}\) exists to equation such that \(\frac{r_1 }{r_2 }<s^{*}<\hat{{s}}\). This is so because the function Q is monotone increasing, and the existence of \(s^{*}\) therefore follows from condition (ii) by the intermediate value theorem. \(\square \)

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Roemer, J.E., Rosa Dias, P. Barefoot and footloose doctors: optimal resource allocation in developing countries with medical migration. Soc Choice Welf 46, 335–358 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-015-0916-1

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