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Borda winner in facility location problems on sphere

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Abstract

We characterize a Borda winner in facility location problems on a sphere. We show that in desirable (undesirable) facility location problems, the center of population (the antipode of the center of population) is the unique Borda winner if the voters’ average coordinate is not equal to the center of the sphere, and that any location is a Borda winner otherwise.

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Notes

  1. Aboufadel and Austin (2006) defined the center of population as a balancing location at which the total gravitational force on population is directed toward the center of the sphere and explicitly derived the unique center of population.

  2. See, for example, Wendell and Thorson (1974) and Hansen and Thisse (1981) for the optimal result from the Benthamite criterion, and Kawamori and Yamaguchi (2010) for the optimal result from the Rawlsian criterion.

  3. It is known that the explicit characterization of optimal locations is generally impossible. See Zhang (2003) for an algorithm for a minisum location and Das et al. (2001) for an algorithm for a minimax location.

  4. Note that since \(\rho ^i\left( x\right) =\pi -\rho ^i\left( -x\right) \), a location is a maxisum (maximin) location if and only if the antipode of the location is a minisum (minimax) location.

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Acknowledgments

The author is grateful to managing editor Clemens Puppe, an anonymous associate editor, and two anonymous referees for their useful comments.

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Correspondence to Kazuo Yamaguchi.

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Yamaguchi, K. Borda winner in facility location problems on sphere. Soc Choice Welf 46, 893–898 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-015-0940-1

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-015-0940-1

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