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Multi-valued strategy-proof social choice rules

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Abstract.

In this paper we introduce a new definition of strategy-proofness for multi-valued social choice correspondences. We prove two Gibbard-Satterthwaite type results for strategy-proof social choice correspondences. These results show that allowing multiple outcomes as social choices will not necessarily lead to an escape from the Gibbard-Satterthwaite impossibility theorem.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1.  Department of Economics and Finance, City University of Hong Kong, Kowloon Tong, HONG KONG (e-mail: steve.ching@cityu.edu.hk), , , , , , HK

    Stephen Ching & Lin Zhou

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  1. Stephen Ching
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  2. Lin Zhou
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Received: 24 January 2001/Accepted: 19 March 2001

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Ching, S., Zhou, L. Multi-valued strategy-proof social choice rules. Soc Choice Welfare 19, 569–580 (2002). https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550100134

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550100134

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