Abstract.
In this paper we discuss the issue of when oligopolization in collective rent-seeking occurs, that is, when some groups retire from rent-seeking. A complete characterization of the pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in a collective rent-seeking game among m (≥2) heterogeneous groups is derived. The conditions of oligopolization are derived by using this result and related to the works of Nitzan [9, 10] and Hillman and Riley [3]. Also, the subgame perfect equilibrium of a simple two-stage collective rent-seeking game (Lee [7]) is fully characterized. In this game, it is confirmed that no group retires from the contest in the second stage and oligopolization never occurs. An example of the two-stage collective rent-seeking game with monitoring costs is devised to show the possibilities of oligopolization.
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Received: 21 September 1999/Accepted: 27 March 2001
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Ueda, K. Oligopolization in collective rent-seeking. Soc Choice Welfare 19, 613–626 (2002). https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550100140
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550100140