Abstract.
In the first three sections of this paper we present a set of axioms which provide a characterization of an extension of the Banzhaf index to voting games with r alternatives, such as the United Nations Security Council where a nation can vote “yes”, “no”, or “abstain”. The fourth section presents a set of axioms which characterizes a power index based on winning sets instead of pivot sets.
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Received: 4 April 2000/Accepted: 30 April 2001
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Bolger, E. Characterizations of two power indices for voting games with r alternatives. Soc Choice Welfare 19, 709–721 (2002). https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550100145
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550100145