Abstract.
We axiomatize the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution (1975) in the Nash bargaining problems if the feasible sets can be finite. We show that the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution is the unique solution satisfying Continuity (in the Hausdorff topology endowed with payoffs space), Independence (which is weaker than Nash's one and essentially equivalent to Roth (1977)'s one), Symmetry, Invariance (both of which are the same as in Kalai and Smorodinsky), and Monotonicity (which reduces to a little bit weaker version of the original if the feasible sets are convex).
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Received: 4 November 1999/Accepted: 6 June 2001
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Nagahisa, Ri., Tanaka, M. An axiomatization of the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution when the feasible sets can be finite. Soc Choice Welfare 19, 751–761 (2002). https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550100150
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550100150