Abstract.
In this paper we introduce and study the w-Coalitional Lorenz Solutions to identify the similarities and differences between the prenucleolus and the Shapley value. The similarity is that they both use egalitarian criteria over coalitions. The two main differences are: the prenucleolus and the Shapley value use different egalitarian criteria, and they weight the coalitions differently when applying the criteria.
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Received: 27 October 2000/Accepted: 2 October 2001
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Arin, J., Feltkamp, V. Lorenz undominated allocations for TU-games: The weighted Coalitional Lorenz Solutions. Soc Choice Welfare 19, 869–884 (2002). https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550200163
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550200163