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Simple Arrow-type propositions in the Edgeworth domain

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Abstract.

This paper presents an Arrow-type result which can be simply demonstrated to hold within the standard domain of welfare economics: in the m×n Edgeworth box, a best allocation must assign all goods to a single individual.

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Received: 4 July 2000/Accepted: 22 October 2001

For their encouragement and guidance, thanks are due to David Austen-Smith, Jill Barnard, Bob Sugden and (especially) John Weymark, and to participants at the March 2000 meeting of the Public Choice Society. The paper has also benefited from the considerate criticism of two anonymous referees.

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Bone, J. Simple Arrow-type propositions in the Edgeworth domain. Soc Choice Welfare 20, 41–48 (2003). https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550200165

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550200165

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