Abstract.
We introduce a new class of problems that contains two existing classes: allocation problems with single-peaked preferences and bankruptcy problems. On this class, we analyze the implications of well-known properties such as Pareto optimality, strategy-proofness, resource-monotonicity, no-envy, equal treatment of equals, and two new properties we introduce, hierarchical no-envy and independence of nonbinding constraints. Unlike earlier literature, we consider rules that allow free-disposability. We present characterizations of a rule we introduce on this domain. We relate this rule to well-known rules on the aforementioned subdomains. Based on this relation, we present a characterization of a well-known bankruptcy rule called the constrained equal awards rule.
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Received: 22 June 2000/Accepted: 21 March 2002
This paper is based on the first chapter of my Ph.D. thesis submitted to the University of Rochester. I wish to thank my advisor, William Thomson, for helpful comments and suggestions.
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Kıbrıs, Ö. Constrained allocation problems with single-peaked preferences: An axiomatic analysis. Soc Choice Welfare 20, 353–362 (2003). https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550200183
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550200183