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How majorities can lose the election Another voting paradox

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Abstract.

We show that due to free riding of potential voters facing positive voting costs, the proposal with the highest number of supporters can still be the most likely to lose a binary election.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. University of Groningen, Department of Economics, PO Box 800, 9700 AV Groningen, The Netherlands (e-mail: {m.a.haan; p.kooreman}@eco.rug.nl), , , , , , NL

    Marco A. Haan & Peter Kooreman

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  1. Marco A. Haan
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  2. Peter Kooreman
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Received: 17 January 2001/Accepted: 10 June 2002

Financial support was provided by The Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO). We thank an anonymous referee for useful comments.

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Haan, M., Kooreman, P. How majorities can lose the election Another voting paradox. Soc Choice Welfare 20, 509–522 (2003). https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550200196

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550200196

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