Abstract
The problem of selecting m best players out of n candidates, through pairwise comparisons, is considered. Deviating from the standard models, it is assumed in this article that the outcome of a pairwise comparison (e.g., a match between two candidates) may be manipulated by collaborating participants: The stronger party may intentionally lose to the weaker party in order to gain group benefit. We discuss protocol design issues for such scenarios, and develop both possibility and impossibility results.
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X. Chen supported by the Chinese National Key Foundation Plan (2003CB317807 and 2004CB318108), the National Natural Science Foundation of China grant 60553001 and the National Basic Research Program of China grant (2007CB807900 and 2007CB807901). Part of the work was done while visiting City University of Hong Kong.
X. Deng research results reported here were supported by a GRF grant of Hong Kong Research Grants Council (Proj. CityU 112909), a donation from Comet Electronics (HK) Ltd (Proj. No. 9220046), and an SRG grant of City University of Hong Kong (Proj. 7002308).
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Chen, X., Deng, X. & Liu, B.J. On Incentive Compatible Competitive Selection Protocols. Algorithmica 61, 447–462 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00453-010-9395-z
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00453-010-9395-z