Abstract
There exist many uncertain factors in profits distribution between partner firms in competitive strategic alliances. On the basis of Rubinstein theorem, a method of Choquet integral is used to analyze the uncertain equilibrium of profits distribution between partner firms in competitive strategic alliances with the introduction of Choquet Expected Utility theory in uncertain analysis. It is found that the result of this method is much closer to reality. The conclusion also shows that partner firms will have weaker bargaining power if they have higher dependence to alliances. And, “first-mover advantage” in Rubinstein theorem does not always exist.
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Long, Y., Peng, J. & Iwamura, K. Uncertain equilibrium analysis on profits distribution between partner firms in competitive strategic alliances. Soft Comput 13, 203–208 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00500-008-0302-3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00500-008-0302-3