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A differential game related to terrorism: min-max zero-sum two persons differential game

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Abstract

In this work, we are going to study a differential game related to terrorism: min-max two persons differential game, the question and discuss the qualitative of how best to prosecute the “war on terror” leads to strategic interaction in an inter-temporal setting. We consider a min-max differential game between a governments and a terrorist organization. To obtain the optimal strategy of this problem, we study the analytic form of min-max two persons differential game and a necessary conditions of this problem. Furthermore, we study a saddle point of a min-max differential game. Finally, we make a comparison between the game of the government and the terrorist organization. In the final, I hope from among this study introduce the optimal control and state trajectory to the governments to counter-terrorist.

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Acknowledgements

My highly grateful and appreciation to the Basic Sciences Research Unit, Deanship of Scientific Research at Majmaah University for funding this study, Project No.23,1436 h-2015 ad.

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Correspondence to Abd El-Monem A. Megahed.

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Megahed, A.EM.A. A differential game related to terrorism: min-max zero-sum two persons differential game. Neural Comput & Applic 30, 865–870 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00521-016-2706-9

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00521-016-2706-9

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