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On the security of the block cipher GOST suitable for the protection in U-business services

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Abstract

The paper revisits the security of the block cipher GOST, which is suitable for the protection in U-business services due to its simple design. Inspired from the reflection-meet-in-the-middle attack on GOST, we firstly find a large portion of weak keys on the full GOST: GOST has 2128 weak keys in which key recovery attack is mounted with a data complexity of 232 known plaintexts and a time complexity of 2125.5. Secondly, we present a differential fault attack on the full GOST, which required 64 fault injections to recover the entire key. This is the first known side-channel attack on GOST.

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Acknowledgments

This work was supported by Kyungnam University Foundation Grant, 2011.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of e-Business, Kyungnam University, 449 Wolyeong-dong, Masan, Changwon, Gyeongnam, Republic of Korea

    Jongsung Kim

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  1. Jongsung Kim
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Correspondence to Jongsung Kim.

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Kim, J. On the security of the block cipher GOST suitable for the protection in U-business services. Pers Ubiquit Comput 17, 1429–1435 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00779-012-0578-2

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00779-012-0578-2

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