Abstract
Tight bounds for enforcement values (Ashlagi et al in J Art Intell 33:516–522, 2008) of soft correlated equilibrium (Forgó in Math Soc Sci 60:186–190, 2010) for generalized n-person chicken and prisoner’s dilemma games are determined. These games are special classes of mixed two-facility simple linear congestion games. It is proved that the exact value of the enforcement value is 2 for this class of congestion games. A better bound of \(\frac{3}{2}\) is obtained for 2- and 3-person chicken games.
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Special thanks are due to Kolos Ágoston for his help in editing the manuscript.
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The support of research Grant NKFI K-119930 is gratefully acknowledged.
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Forgó, F. Exact enforcement value of soft correlated equilibrium for generalized chicken and prisoner’s dilemma games. Cent Eur J Oper Res 28, 209–227 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10100-018-0575-2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10100-018-0575-2