Abstract
Kidney exchange programs (KEP) allow an incompatible patient–donor pair, whose donor cannot provide a kidney to the respective patient, to have a transplant exchange with another in a similar situation if there is compatibility. Exchanges can be performed via cycles or chains initiated by non-directed donors (NDD), i.e., donors that do not have an associated patient. The objective for optimization in KEP is generally to maximize the number of possible transplants. Following the course of recent approaches that consider a dynamic matching (exchanges are decided every time a pair or a NDD joins the pool), in this paper we explore two matching policies to find feasible exchanges: periodic, where the algorithm runs within some period (e.g each 3 month); and greedy, in which a matching run is done as soon as the pool is updated with a new pair or NDD. For each policy, we propose a matching algorithm that addresses the waiting times of pairs in a pool. We conduct computational experiments with the proposed algorithms and compare the results with those obtained when periodic and greedy matching aim at maximizing the number of transplants.
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Notes
Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network, CPRA Calculator: https://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/resources/allocation-calculators/cpra-calculator/ Access date: 2019-03-29.
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Acknowledgements
This work is financed by the ERDF European Regional Development Fund through the Operational Programme for Competitiveness and Internationalisation—COMPETE 2020 Programme, and by National Funds through the Portuguese funding agency, FCT—Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia, within project “mKEP—Models and optimisation algorithms for multicountry kidney exchange programs” (POCI-01-0145-FEDER-016677), by FCT project SFRH/BPD/101134/2014 and by COST Action CA15210, ENCKEP, supported by COST (European Cooperation in Science and Technology)—http://www.cost.eu/.
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Monteiro, T., Klimentova, X., Pedroso, J.P. et al. A comparison of matching algorithms for kidney exchange programs addressing waiting time. Cent Eur J Oper Res 29, 539–552 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10100-020-00680-y
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10100-020-00680-y