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Formal analysis of human operator behavioural patterns in interactive surveillance systems

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Abstract

An important area of Human Reliability Assessment in interactive systems is the ability to understand the causes of human error and to model their occurrence. This paper investigates a new approach to analysis of task failures based on patterns of operator behaviour, in contrast with more traditional event-based approaches. It considers, as a case study, a formal model of an Air Traffic Control system operator’s task which incorporates a simple model of the high-level cognitive processes involved. The cognitive model is formalised in the CSP process algebra. Various patterns of behaviour that could lead to task failure are described using temporal logic. Then a model-checking technique is used to verify whether the set of selected behavioural patterns is sound and complete with respect to the definition of task failure. The decomposition is shown to be incomplete and a new behavioural pattern is identified, which appears to have been overlooked in the informal analysis of the problem. This illustrates how formal analysis of operator models can yield fresh insights into how failures may arise in interactive systems.

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Correspondence to Antonio Cerone.

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Communicated by Dr. Bernhard Beckert.

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Cerone, A., Connelly, S. & Lindsay, P. Formal analysis of human operator behavioural patterns in interactive surveillance systems. Softw Syst Model 7, 273–286 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10270-007-0072-x

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10270-007-0072-x

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